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Abstract
Mark C. Taylor’s “deconstmctive a/theology,” unveiled in 1984 with the 
publication of Erring: A Postmodern A/theology, represents a significant contribution to 
the task of theological thinking in a postmodern age. An imaginative synthesis of 
Hegelian dialectics, Nietzschean negation, Derridean deconstruction and Altizerian 
radical theology, Taylor’s a/theology seeks to be thoroughly post-'. foundational, 
/705^-ecclesial, and even perhaps/?o5^-theological. However, Taylor’s work has been 
neglected and even in some cases discounted by many within academic theology and has 
thus far found no sustained discourse with ecclesially accountable Christian theology. I 
find this to be a startling oversight. While Taylor’s a/theology is difficult, and no doubt 
troubling to traditional doctrinal theology, 1 assert that it is a potentially viable and even 
vital path for the future of theological thinking.
In this dissertation, I undertake the task of outlining the basic premises of 
a/theology as demonstrated and developed in the corpus of Taylor’s writings. I seek to 
contextualise Taylor’s a/theology within a particular and particularly Christian textual 
tradition that goes back to the gospels (best exemplified by St. Mark) and also includes 
the negative tradition of early and medieval Christian mystics such as Meister Eckhart 
and Pseudo -Dionysius. I argue that the embodiment of a/theology is the practice or 
performance of erring, Taylor’s literal and literary metaphor for the contemporary 
human condition, and bring his a/theological work into mutually-enlightening dialogue 
with other writers and texts selected for their resonance with Taylor’s particular 
textuality. Furthermore, I suggest that a/theology, as a parasitic and deconstmctive 
force, necessarily deconstmcts itself in the process of deconstructing its host (theology), 
which results in the eventual abandonment o f both theology and a/theology, a forsaking 
that never reaches a final end.
List of Abbreviations
E  Mark C. Taylor. Erring: A Postmodern A/theology. Chicago and London:
Chicago UP, 1984.
DC  Mark C. Taylor, ed. Deconstruction in Context: Literature and Philosophy.
Chicago and London: Chicago UP, 1986.
A Mark C. Taylor. Altarity. Chicago and London; Chicago UP, 1987.
T  Mark C. Taylor. Tears. New York: State University of New York Press, 1990.
TC Robert P. Scharlemann, ed. Theology at the End o f the Century: A Dialogue on
the Postmodern with Thomas J  J. Altizer, Mark C. Taylor, Charles E. Winquist 
and Robert P. Scharlemann. Charlottesville, VA: Virginia UP, 1990.
D  Mark C. Taylor. Disfiguring: Art, Architecture, Religion. Chicago and London:
Chicago UP, 1992.
N  Mark C. Taylor. Nots. Chicago and London: Chicago UP, 1993.
H  Mark C. Taylor. Hiding. Chicago and London: Chicago UP, 1997.
AR Mark C. Taylor. About Religion: Economies o f Faith in Virtual Culture. Chicago
and London: Chicago UP, 1998.
RT  Mark C. Taylor. “Retracings.” In J. R. Stone, ed.. The Craft o f Religious Studies. 
Hampshire and London: Macmillan, 1998. pp. 258-76.
Overture
The advent in the 1980s of Mark C. Taylor’s deconstmctive a/theology 
represents a noteworthy contribution and challenge to the traditional theological 
enterprise. If, as it has been suggested, the abandonment of theology gives way to ‘the 
more energetic mode of theological thinking,’* Taylor’s work is a key example of a non- 
foundational or non-ecclesial approach. Published in 1984, Erring: A Postmodern 
A/theology emerged as the first comprehensive effort to introduce the theological task to 
the claims of deconstruction, the French post-stmcturalist philosophical movement of the 
mid-1960s, which in the meantime had become the object of great interest in other 
disciplines such as literary criticism, philosophy and anthropology. The primary touch- 
point Taylor found by which to carry out his synthesis of deconstmction and theology 
was the “death of God” theology of radical American theologian Thomas J. J. Altizer^ 
which, an ocean away from France, also saw its advent in the mid-1960s. With 
remarkable candour and stylistic flair, Erring set its “author” apart as a bold young 
thinker carving out his niche and attempting to (re)invent himself (and the paradigm 
itself) as the a/theologian.
Although a/theology attempts to describe the situation of theological discourse in 
the face of postmodemity, still many questions remain: What is theological discourse 
about after the “death o f God”? Who is engaged in thinldng theologically in a 
postmodern condition^ characterised by the disappearance o f the autonomous Subject?
* David Jasper. “From Theology to Theological Thinking: The Development of Critical Thought 
and its Consequences for Theology.” pp. 295-96. See also Carl Rasclike, Theological Thinking: 
An Inquiry.
 ^As a definitive volume, see Thomas J. J. Altizer and William Hamilton, Radical Theology and the 
Death o f  God. While other names are connected with death of God theology, Taylor is primarily 
indebted to Altizer, and it might be said that Taylor is a sort of “spiritual son” to Altizer.
 ^ In light of the many divergent attempts to define the postmodern, I have, for reasons that should 
become obvious, elected to adhere to Taylor’s characterisation o f postmodemity as having
To what historical tradition(s) is theology accountable after our legitimizing meta- 
narrative(sf crumble? Is it possible to speak o f theological Truth without God, the Self 
the Church, and the Bible? What is the logia o f theology in the absence o f the Theos? 
And still our contemporary situation continues to change, to be constantly redefined by 
cultural, political and economic factors. It seems enough time has passed to find an 
appropriate vantage point with sufficient critical distance to offer an analysis of Taylor’s 
a/theology. At this time of writing. Erring is two decades old, and yet, after thwarting 
abortive efforts in its infancy, a/theology still failed to grow to maturity and has been set 
aside, if  not forgotten altogether -  largely written-off, like its radical forebear, as a timely 
trend, a flash-in-the-pan. In many ways, even the word a/theology itself, much less the 
vision it describes, has failed to take root in the lexicon of theology -  if it has left any 
sort of mark, it has been on (primarily American) “secular” academic theology^ as 
opposed to theology which maintains accountability to the Chiistian Church.*  ^ Why is
experienced the death o f God, the disappearance of the Self, the end of History and the closure of 
the Book. These four traits are not, of course, absolute or all-inclusive. As the roots of these traits 
lie not in postmodemity but tliroughout modernity itself, some would opt for the designation late- 
modern (Fredric Jameson’s characterisation late capitalist is also useful). However, I wish to 
remain consistent with Taylor in my treatment of his “postmodern a/theology.” See fn. 4 below.
 ^Cf. Jean-François Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition. Lyotard connects postmodemism to 
narrative, describing how postmodemity ushers in the retum of nanative (as opposed to 
scientific) knowledge, which is repressed by modernity, while also rendering impossible any 
appeal to the credibility o f a grand narrative, or metananative. The grand narrative, as the source 
of legitimation for all other “little” narratives {petit récits), is the product of a modem era 
determined to organise and master reality according to pure rationality -  a trend which nins 
through the work of Descartes, Kant and Hegel, amongst others. Postmodemity, as a reaction to 
and an attempt to move beyond modemity, renders metanairatives untenable and is for this reason 
necessarily non-foundational. O f course, as the geist of modernity still lingers, foundations are 
still grasped after, as evidenced by everything from the growing evangelical fervour of American 
Protestantism to the rise of the “postmodem” theological movement known as Radical 
Orthodoxy. See Gavin Hyman’s The Predicament o f  Postmodern Theology for a detailed account 
of the history (if one is possible) of (post)modemism and the contemporary situation of 
postmodem theology, especially pp. 9-52.
 ^ See Clayton Crockett, ed. Secular Theology. The essays in this volume well represent trends and 
explorations in the loosely-defined area of “secular” theology. See especially Crockett’s 
Introduction (pp. 1-9) and Charles Winquist’s essay “Postmodern Secular Theology” (pp. 26-36).
 ^As my perspective and concern in this thesis is with a/theology’s relationship to Christian 
theology, I will use Church tluoughout to refer to the catholic or universal body of Cluist known 
as the Christian Church. I realise, of course, that Taylor’s a/theology is influenced by and
7this? Why was a/theology destined to be nothing more than the plaything of academics, 
and even a relatively small number of those? Why has it made no noticeable impact on 
the belief and practice of the Church? The obvious answer to this question -  because 
a/theology is rooted in the assumption that God does not exist, an assumption which the 
Church rejects -  seems unconvincing, and fails to address the significant and potentially 
constructive, if overlooked, “openings” Taylor’s work contributes to both academic and 
ecclesial theology. So does a/theology have anything to offer? Is it a viable path for 
theology? Might it be that in an era characterised by post-'s (postmodern, post- 
Christian, perhaps even post-theological) the only way to thinlc theologically is now to 
look beyond theology toward something like an a/theology? Does Taylor’s explicitly 
deconstmctive a/theological (which is not to say atheistic^) endeavour have any 
constructive, even redemptive, theological value?
In this thesis, I will pursue responses to some of these questions and issues. 
Where answers cannot be found, this study seeks, despite the deconstmction of narrative, 
to tell a story in which the function of a/theology might be understood as having 
something to do with the enduring task of theology, and even perhaps wherein 
a/theology might have something to say about and to the beliefs and practices of the 
Christian Church. Of course dialogue cannot, or at least should not be a one-way 
endeavour, and so it follows that the Church might also have something to say in 
response to the challenges of a/theology. It might be suggested that theology and 
a/theology have no choice but to agree to disagree and go their separate ways. But this
contains implications relevant to religions other than Christianity, not the least of which is 
Buddhism. However, I am unequipped to attend to such issues in the scope of this study. It 
should also be noted that my capitalisation of Church, used throughout, is in no way intended to 
place Christianity in a masterly relationship to other religions, but rather to distinguish the 
universal Christian Church, in all of its diversity and plurality, from instances of particular, local 
churches.
 ^ ‘A/theology is not the opposite of theology and must not be identified with atheism’ (AR, 40).
cannot be true if a/theology proves to be that which it claims to be -  always already 
existing within theological discourse as something “other,” a perpetually critical 
parasite.^ It could be said, then, that a/theology cannot be properly understood as an 
entity, an -ology unto itself, as it relies and thrives on the pre-existence and presence of 
theology to function. But if  this is the case and a/theology has no merit of its own 
because it exists as theology’s other, then neither can theology stand alone -  it too relies 
on a/theology as its other. As shall be demonstrated, the relationship between theology 
and a/theology is complicated, even co-dependent. It is a mistake for positivist theology 
to ignore or repress the negative challenge that a/theology elicits, for in doing so, 
theology risks self-negation. The positive needs a negative, just as the negative requires 
a positive. Kevin Hart writes, Tt is a pennanent task of religious thought to keep the 
negative and the positive in play, to demonstrate that the impossible is not in 
contradiction with the possible.’^  Indeed, on the surface Taylor’s a/theology appears to 
contradict theology, but their relationship is not blocked, or at least not fully. Even if  its 
deconstructionist nature does partially block a/theology’s relationship to theology, the 
very presence of this obstacle, this boundary, reinforces the reality and the radicality of 
the relationship between the two -  a relationship which is difficult, problematic, even 
precarious, but nonetheless necessary and possibly even life-sustaining.
While it is difficult to begin a work examining a/theology, which inevitably 
problematises “proper” beginnings and endings, every begimiing should contain a clear 
statement of the aims of the work at hand. This thesis aims broadly to evaluate the 
contributions and challenges a/theology offers to Christian theology and practice. The 
first task of this project must be to seek, as much as possible, a clear understanding of
See Mark C. Taylor. “Text as Victim.” In Altizer, et al.. Deconstruction and Theology, pp. 65-68. 
Here Taylor discusses more generally the parasitic nature of interpretation upon writing. 
Elsewhere, Taylor has written: ‘Like any parasite. Deconstruction attacks from within’ {E, 10).
 ^Kevin Hart. “Jacques Deirida: The God Effect.” In Post-Secular Philosophy, P. Blond, ed. p. 278.
Taylor’s deconstmctive a/theology -  to this end, I will carry out a close reading and 
analysis of Erring as Taylor’s seminal work and primary description of his a/theological 
vision. Achieving some grasp of what an a/theological approach loo1<s like -  its basic 
characteristics and functions - 1 will be equipped to address this project’s first aim, 
which is to locate Taylor’s deconstmctive a/theology within a particular, and particularly 
Christian, theological context that extends from the Gospel(s) through to the present day. 
A/theology did not spring forth fully-fonned and wholly original from the pen of Mark 
Taylor. In fact, for all its cumency and controversy, I will argue that a/theology falls 
within a tradition even more ancient than the systematic and doctrinal forms of theology 
which a/theology attempts, but finally fails, to subvert.
As the language of the previous sentence suggests, a/theology is necessarily 
active or performative; hence, the second aim of this project is to explore the possible 
outcome(s) of the performance of a/theology. Put othei*wise, I will seek to follow the 
movement of a/theology as its work is earned out and performed in a variety of ways. I 
will explore how, in Taylor’s own writings, a/theology performs itself Working from 
the inside-out, a/theological writing embodies (perhaps by <iA-embodying) the very 
discussion it undertakes, and in this way, what a/theology is about is the perfonnative 
moment or deconstmctive event of a/theology -  it is a play, in both the theatrical and 
recreational sense. Additionally, I will explore the performance of a/theology 
intertextually with reference to other literature, ancient and contemporary. An additional 
aim of this thesis concerns the current situation and direction of the theological thought: I 
will attempt to evaluate the relative success of deconstmctive a/theology, not simply by 
the criteria provided by theology but also by the criteria provided by a/theology itself; I 
will offer an assessment of the relationship between theology and a/theology in the 
current context; and I will make suggestions for the furtherance of conversation between
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theology and a/theology in hopes that the deconstmctive shape of their relationship is 
only the necessary prelude to (re)constmctive interaction. Conclusions, if  any anive, 
will likely be various and less clearly identifiable.
The end of theology is, in a sense, impossible — an ever-deferred event. It is not 
an “end” to be accomplished as much as it is a “beyond” to be thought. The end of 
theology, which is to be thought and thought beyond, is occasioned by the deconstmction 
from within of theological foundations, which does not so much unravel the fabric of 
theology as it works to expose its holes and flaws and its inevitable breakdowns. When 
theology’s reliance on certain indubitable truth claims prevents the enteiprise from 
maintaining its intellectual integrity, what emerges, then, is something other than 
theology which yet resides within theology -  theology’s other which is at the same time 
also the same. Whereas theology is modem, defined according to systems and reason, 
this emergent other is, therefore, po^hnodem. While theology relies on foundations, this 
other is non-foundational. Whereas theology is necessarily conservative, this other 
appears gratuitously liberal. While theology celebrates orthodoxy, this other is expressly 
heterodox. The end of theology, which is a plurality of ends, turns out to be a beginning, 
a multiplicity of beginnings -  the possibility of the emergence of something other than 
theology which yet always already exists within theology. To think the end of theology 
is, then, to think the beginning of something other than theology which yet owes its 
genesis to theology. It is this thinking beyond which concerns the work of chasing after 
tmth when all such work is revealed as an endless maze -  work which is, in Taylorian 
terms, endlessly mazing. When certain significance dissipates into the eternal freeplay of 
signification, play is the work at hand, and all work/play is recreational, generative, 
constmctive — in a word, poetic.
11
I. Prelude: On the progression (digression?) of Mark Taylor’s work
The moments unfurled one after the other, and at each 
moment the future stood before me as a blank, a white page 
o f uncertainty. I f  life was a story and each man was the 
author o f  his own story, then I  was making it up as I  went 
along. I  was working without a plot, writing each sentence 
as it came to me and refusing to think about the next... 
The question was what I  was supposed to do when the pen 
ran out o f  ink.'^^
Prelude: Kierkegaard and Hegel
It is important to be aware of the overall shape that Mark Taylor’s work has 
taken throughout the course of a career that, at this time of writing, spans four decades. 
After earning doctoral degrees from Harvard (1973) and the University of Copenhagen 
(1981), Taylor’s earliest work is primarily concerned with the writing of Soren 
Kierkegaard and the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel,** and these two thinkers emerge as 
key figures in nearly all of Taylor’s work to follow. While Hegel, whose dialectical 
philosophy is integral to deconstructionist thought (and against whose work much of 
postmodern criticism is a reaction),*^ functions as Taylor’s daunting and haunting 
philosophical interlocutor, Kierkegaard provides the embodied textual and theological 
model from which Taylor seems to draw his inspiration. It is the anonymity, or perhaps 
more accurately the pseudonymity of Kierkegaard’s writing that Taylor attempts to 
emulate in Erring in his denial of authorial responsibility.*^ It is between Kierkegaard’s
*** Paul Auster. Moon Palace, pp. 41-42.
See Mark C. Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study o f  Time and the Self 
(1975) and Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard (1980).
*^  See Jacques Derrida, Positions: ‘We will never be finished with the reading or rereading of 
Hegel, and, in a certain way, I do nothing other than attempt to explain myself on this point’ (p. 
77).
 ^Taylor writes: ‘If authorship is never original but always a play that is an inteiplay, clearly “I” 
did not write this text. Or at least “I” alone did not write it’ {E, xi).
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either/or and Hegel’s botlVand that Taylor attempts to navigate by applying Derrida’s 
neither/nor in ‘an un-negation that affinns rather than negates negation’ {AR, 32).
Outlining: A/theology (un)veiled
The first important shift in Taylor’s work occurs in the early 1980s, when 
deconstructionist criticism, which had already become incorporated into other academic 
disciplines, first began to infiltrate theology departments throughout North America. 
Deconstruction is primarily attributed to the critical and philosophical work of Jacques 
Deirida, whose reading of the linguistic work of Ferdinand de Saussure*"* led him to 
identify logocentrism, or the deference to and reliance upon the intrinsic truth of 
words/language that characterises Western thought. The result of the delusion that words 
and language contain some sort of definitive meaning is a binary, oppositional system of 
hierarchies in which one term is always privileged over another, such as light to 
darkness, transcendence to immanence, or as in the preference of the immediacy of 
speech to the errancy of writing, which is cut off from its author. Derrida traces the 
primacy of speech back to Plato’s Phaedrus to demonstrate how speech and writing are.
*"* In his Course in General Linguistics, Saussure distinguishes between fundamental elements of 
the system of signification, determining that words essentially have an arbitrary relationship to 
their objects. In Saussurean semiotics, the temi signifier describes the sign’s material component, 
or how the word sounds when verbally articulated and processed aurally or appears when printed 
on the page and processed visually. The temi signified, then, refers to the conceptual component 
of the sign, or the mental concept of the thing to which the sign refers. These two components, 
the signifier and the signified, together make up the linguistic sign. Saussure identifies that it is 
not the thing to which the sign refers that gives it its meaning, but rather all of the things which it 
is not. In a language system that relies purely on differences -  definition by negation -  only 
negative, and no positive, terms exist. This breakdown of the linguistic system may be 
considered the starting point of what is to be a complete and thorough unravelling o f all structures 
of signification and hence meaning, which is exposed as arbitrary, fluid, duplicitous, pluralistic. 
For Saussure, thought and language are coextensive; therefore there can be no pre-linguistic 
thought. Therefore, since language contains within itself its own negation, all thought, spoken or 
written, is fundamentally fiawed. In addition to the common, adjectival sense meaning 
“imperfect” or “defective,” also note the more obsolete noun form offlaw, meaning “a fragment” 
or “splinter,” which is indeed a characteristic of language post-Saussure. For a concise 
description of Derrida’s application of Saussure, see Stephen D. Moore’s Post-structuralism and 
the New Testament, 14-16.
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in the end, equally flawed. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, Derrida 
suggests that this problematic nature applies to all structures of language and, by 
extension, all structures of thought.
Of course, it would require a voluminous study to outline the development and
implications of post-stmcturalism and deconstruction .S till, as regards Taylor’s
a/theology, a working knowledge of deconstruction is crucial. With Derrida’s work,
absolute truth begins to give way to duplicity and a plurality of meaning, and the innate
power stmctures and hierarchies within Western thought are exposed as ultimately
biased and oppressive. The epistemological yardstick is turned on its head. The
philosophical contribution of deconstmction is often thought of as the overturning of
logocentrism, but this description is overly simplistic. Rather than a simple reversal or
inversion, deconstmction produces the rupture of meaning. In the absence of the
transcendental signified -  that is, some originary essence or source of meaning -  all
meaning is understood in temis of difference. Derrida coins the tenn différance (derived
from French terms for “to differ” and “to defer”) which is actually no-thing in and of
itself but always already exists within the matrix of signification, a description of the
absence of an origin or an originary presence. While Demda attempts to maintain that
his project is non-theological, not the same as negative theology, and even famously
claiming that différance ‘blocks every relationship to theology,’*^  the implication and the
application of his work nonetheless has a profound impact on theological thinking.
Derridean thought, ‘which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms freeplay.’
Turned toward the lost or impossible presence of the absent origin, this 
stmcturalist thematic of broken immediacy is therefore the saddened, 
negative. .. side of the thinking of play whose other side would be the 
Nietzschean affirmation, that is the joyous affirmation of the play of the
For a thorough analysis, see Jonathan Culler’s monumental On Deconstruction: Theory and 
Criticism after Structuralism.
*** Jacques Derrida. Positions, p. 40.
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world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is 
offered to an active interpretation. This affirmation then determines the 
non-center otherwise than as loss o f the center}^
Following this, Taylor writes in Erring that, in the absence of originary tmth, the
a/theological task is ‘how to count all of this not only as loss but as gain’ {E, 17).
Despite it continental roots, deconstmction first took hold in North American 
scholarship, becoming the plaything of philosophers and literary scholars. While 
Demda’s three early works {Of Grammatology, Writing and Difference, and Speech and 
Phenomena) were all published in the late-1960s, their influence did not penetrate the 
realm of academic theology until the early 1980s -  interestingly around the same time 
that narrative theology*^ had begun to stake its claim as a much-needed connective to 
traditional doctrinal or systematic theology. While narrative theology has perhaps 
maintained more lasting and farther-reaching impact within the field of theology, 
deconstructionist theology remained, and remains, almost exclusively a North American 
phenomenon, its viability and value being largely overlooked and even discredited in 
Europe.*^ With the release of Deconstruction and Theology (1982), a collection of 
essays by Taylor, Thomas Altizer, Robert Scharlemann, Carl Raschke, Charles Winquist 
and Max Myers, the connections between these two enterprises began to be further 
explored. Taylor’s inclusion in this volume identified him early as one of the chief 
proponents of deconstmctionist theology. His essay “Text as Victim” employs 
Kierkegaard to explore the intrinsic problem of authorship and writing and, as Carl 
Raschke summarises in his Preface, ‘shows how textuality is the final meaning of the
Jacques Demda. Writing and Difference, pp. 369-70.
See George W. Stroup, The Promise o f Narrative Theology. Also Stanley Hauerwas and L. 
Gregory Jones, eds. Why Narrative? Readings in Narrative Theology.
See, for example, Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text? The Bible, the reader 
and the morality o f literary knowledge. Wliile not focused on Taylor’s work, Vanlioozer’s study 
implicitly and occasionally explicitly criticises Taylor’s conception of textuality. O f course, 
Taylor is not without his American critics; for one example, see Peter Hodgson’s review of 
Erring m Religious Studies Review 12/3 (1986), 256-259.
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incarnate Word, where logos is no longer transcendent but “sacrificed” and totally 
“disseminated.” ’^ ** Also published that year was Taylor’s Deconstructing Theology, a 
short collection of essays wherein Taylor begins to move from theory to application. 
Deconstructing Theology is hardly more than a prelude to Erring, basic sketches of the 
work to come, but it is interesting as one of the first and few attempts at writing (a) 
deconstmctive theology -  that is, writing deconstruction theologically and/or writing 
theology deconstructively. In his “Pretext” to this work, Taylor asserts that ‘Derrideans 
who disregard such theological issues risk superficiality, just as theologians who ignore 
Deconstruction risk irrelevance....Despite its overt atheism, postmodernism remains 
profoundly religious, and this atheistic religiosity offers a promising point of departure 
for a truly postmodern theology.’ *^ It is exactly this sort of postmodern theology which 
becomes £i/theology in Erring.
Taylor’s next major work, certainly his most significant, begins the a/theological 
project sketched out by his earlier work. 1984’s Erring: A Postmodern A/theology is 
arguably Taylor’s most original and lucid work,^^ although, as Peter Hodgson points out 
in his review, it ‘is not as original a work as it first appears...[but] rather a clever, 
exhaustive work of assimilation.’^  ^ However, I assert that this is precisely Erring" s 
originality, the weaving together of texts and ideas from diverse and disparate writers. In 
Erring, Taylor stakes out his territory, unveiling his postmodern a/theology with such 
flourish that every attempt to umnask proves impossible; in the end ‘revelation is 
reveilation.’ "^* hi this way, Taylor gi*atuitously becomes the ‘tailor’ who ‘stitches 
together textiles that have been woven by others’ {E, 180), whose task is not to unclothe
Carl A. Raschke. “Preface.” In Altizer, et al., Deconstruction and Theology, p. ix. 
Mark C. Taylor. Deconstructing Theology, p. xx.
Susan E. Wennemyr. “Dancing in the Dark.” p. 573.
Peter Hodgson. “Review o î Erring: A Postmodern A/theology.” p. 256.
Mark C. Taylor. “Masking: Domino Effect.” p. 549.
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but to clothe the meaning or truth of his text. Like Derrida, Taylor draws near by 
withdrawing, and manages to slip every grip. Though concise, it is a monumental work, 
and as this thesis elsewhere spends a great deal of time analysing and explicating Erring,
I will forego further elaboration at this point.
Contextualising: A/theology (dis)located
With Deconstruction in Context, Taylor makes both an interesting move in the 
development of his own work and a significant contribution to the larger enterprise of 
deconstructionist criticism. While Erring, as an assimilation of the words of others, 
implicitly reveals the sources of his deconstructive a/theology, in Deconstruction in 
Context Taylor explicitly traces the genealogy of deconstmction and by extension his 
own thought. Paradoxically, the work seems like both an ancestor to and the offspring of 
Erring. Ordered almost chronologically (a strange manoeuvre for one who two years 
prior declared the end of History), the work is a collection of significant primary texts 
from the philosophical predecessors of deconstruction: Kant, Hegel, Kojève, Husserl, 
Saussure, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, 
Levinas, Bataille, Blanchot, and (naturally) Deirida. Whereas Taylor served as the 
dispossessed author of Erring, here he is the editor who, like every writer, is also a 
reader. Taylor’s introductory essay, “System...Structure...Difference...Other” {DC, 1- 
34), is a crucial point in the development of his deconstmctive a/theology, for in it, he 
carefully crafts a narrative which essentially tells the story of deconstmction and sets the 
stage for the debut of his own work. Deconstruction in Context is an invaluable 
collection for literary critics and theologians with interests in deconstmctive criticism, hi 
Erring we are confronted with the death of the A/author, the end of History and the 
impossibility of the Book, and yet on its heels Taylor publishes a very traditional book,
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even a somewhat encyclopaedic book -  a Book in the proper sense. Deconstruction in 
Context pays homage to those thinkers whose work has led to and shaped Taylor’s own, 
and by coUeeting their texts into this very bookish Book, Taylor canonizes these thinlcers 
as “authors” in their own right, authors of these timeless texts which are yet situated in a 
very temporal narrative which delineates the development -  the History -  of 
deconstructive criticism. Furthermore, as Taylor is a scholar of religion and self- 
proclaimed a/theologian, and as his field had so lagged behind other fields (philosophy, 
literary studies) in attending to the implications of deconstmction. Deconstruction in 
Context becomes a sort of tool for proselytisation, a primer by one of the leading 
proponents of deconstmctionist theology for those not yet indoctrinated -  an 
a/theological catechism. And yet, like any good deconstmctive writing, the Book 
unmakes itself, a perfect and particularly formal example of how deconstmction 
deconstmcts itself, renders its own task impossible. By exposing logocentrism, by 
pulling back the curtain on the totalising structures of History’s coherent narratives and 
Books as receptacles of meaning, and by revealing the nothingness that lies beneath, 
Taylor, knowingly I suspeet, must resort to narrative, to (a particular) History, to the 
Book. To understand deconstmction, Taylor writes the (hi)story of deconstmction, and 
the collected texts that follow are, in one sense, elaborations on his introductory essay.
Taylor’s next two works, Altarity and Tears, also both collections of essays, are 
more “original” in the sense that the collected essays are Taylor’s own. In Altarity, 
Taylor further pays tribute to the thinkers most influential to his work by writing essays 
about a particular thinlcer centred around a certain theme, i.e. Hegel (Conception), 
Blanchot (Nots), Denida (Rewriting) and Kierkegaard (Transgression). With this work, 
Taylor fashions his own version of Derrida’s différance with the neologism altarity, 
which he claims ‘ evokes dimensions of difference and aspect of otherness overlooked.
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excluded, or repressed by the notion of differance" (A, xxix). Taylor suggest that ‘While 
the question of the religious, which might be neither theological nor ontotheological, is 
silent in the a of différance, it toils endlessly in the a of altarity’ (A, xxxiii). Continuing 
this linguistic playfulness, Taylor titles his next published work Tears, punning on the 
word’s duplicitous meaning. In contrast to the a of altarity (or, for that matter, the “/” of 
a/theology), which is silent and cannot be spoken but only written, the distinction 
between tears and tears cannot be written but only spoken (as I have just demonstrated). 
Taylor divulges his intentional duplicity in the last and most significant essay in the 
collection, “How to do Nothing with Words,” where he writes, ‘The wound of words is a 
tear that can never be mended—a tear that can never be wiped away’ {T, 22>3)}  ^ While 
Taylor’s work beginning with Erring is decidedly interdisciplinary, attending to 
literature, painting and sculpture in addition to philosophy and theology, in Tears, Taylor 
begins to expand his project further into the domain of art and architecture, areas he will 
continue to develop. As half of the twelve essays included in the volume were 
previously published in other forms between 1988 and 1990,^^ Tears, for the most part, 
seems more like an afterthought than a “proper” work like Erring, Deconstruction in 
Context and Altarity, and does more to hint at things to come than necessarily to further 
develop his deconstmctive a/theology.
Performing: A/theology (dis)embodied
Turning the comer into the 1990s, the apocalyptic tone of the previous decade 
must have dwindled, for at this point, Taylor’s work takes a turn away from the 
theoretical and toward the practical. If in Erring, Deconstruction in Context and Altarity,
Compare with Taylor’s epigraph to Tears, borrowed from Samuel Beckett, which minors this 
play-on-words: ‘...my words are my tears’ {T, xv).
Refer to the copyright page in Tears for the details of prior publication.
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Taylor respectively introduces, supports and expounds upon his a/theology, his next 
three works are, in a sense, the critical application of that project. 1992’s Disfiguring: 
Art, Architecture, Religion proposes a shift from a modernist notion of theoesthetics, ‘in 
which art and religion join to lead individuals and society from fragmentation and 
opposition to integration and unification’ (Z), 46), to a postmodern a/theoesthetics which, 
forsaking the utopian dream of unification and the hope for salvation, recognises and 
celebrates altarity by confessing that ‘the impossibility of reconciliation means there is 
no resurrexit here or elsewhere, now or in the future’ {D, 317). Taylor’s eiTant journey 
through the desert of postmodernist art and arehitecture leads him to conclude that ‘there 
is only exile -  clironie exile -  without begiiming and without ending’ (£>, 319). The 
discussion of art and architecture is extended to the human body and advertising as a 
postmodern art form in Nots, a collection of essays subdivided into sections on religion, 
art and the body. As Taylor spells out in his introduction “Why Not?,” the overarching 
concern of the volume is the question of how to think not, which ‘falls between being 
and nonbeing’ and hence remains unthinlcable {N, 1). The gem of Nots is its final essay, 
“The Betrayal of the Body: Live Not,” in which Taylor describes autoimmune 
dysfunction as ‘a breakdown in the communications systems that govern the body.’ As 
the failure that leads to dis-ease is always already present within the body, ‘The body 
betrays -  always inevitably betrays’ {N, 215). This extremely technical exposition is in 
the end, however, a prelude to a brief autobiographical reflection on Taylor’s personal 
struggle with diabetes. These concluding paragraphs about Taylor’s own body mark an 
interesting first in Taylor’s body of work: that of the author -  who, recall, Erring 
deconstructs -  turning his critical gaze back upon himself, a self-reflexive move which 
leads not to deepened se lf  understanding but to the further deeonstmction of the self.
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It becomes apparent that in each instance, as Taylor’s a/theology is applied to 
each new area of critique, the theological nature of his work becomes less and less 
apparent. This is nowhere more obvious than in Imagologies: Media Philosophy, which 
Colin McGinn describes as ‘an anti-book for the image age.’^^  This experimental work, 
eo-“authored” (if such a term applies) with Finnish philosopher Esa Saarinen, explores 
the emerging global network of telecommunications at a time when “internet” had yet to 
become a household word. While touching on education, politics, economics, religion 
and teclmology, Imagologies can hardly be considered a critical work on any of those 
subjects but rather more of an experiment in praxis, utilizing the very networks it seeks 
to critique. Taylor continues his experimentation with text and image in 1997 with 
Hiding, which extends Taylor’s discussion of bodies to tattooing, neo-tribal body 
modification and suspension rituals, performance art, and fashion. Reminiscent of 
Denida’s shattered and shattering Glas, Hiding superimposes word(s) and image(s) in 
unconventional ways, producing a text that is impossible to read as a Book -  at least to 
read in the same manner as any other book. In the first chapter, “Skinsc(r)apes,” Taylor 
simultaneously unfolds two separate lines of text, one in the traditional, horizontal 
formatting and the other mmiing vertically in inserted blocks along each page. The 
chapter concludes with another autobiographical excursus on the simultaneity of life and 
death through a description of Taylor’s chance introduction to novelist Paul Auster and 
the deaths of Taylor’s mother and father and his friends Edmond and Arlette Jabès. 
Hiding digresses into discussions of Las Ve g a s , p y i  amids and computer networks, at
Mark C. Taylor and Esa Saarinen. Imagologies. See front flap ‘blurbs.’
Collaborating with José Marquez, Taylor also produced an interactive CD-ROM project called 
The Réal, Las Vegas, N V  which acts as a sort of companion piece to Hiding. The digital work, 
which is part art project and part computer game (but not exactly either), is described in the back 
flap of Hiding as a ‘virtual scrapbook...a postmodern mystery set in Las Vegas in the year 2033 
within the rooms of the Motel Real.’ It is a bizarre piece of cultural criticism, nearly impossible 
to make sense of, and yet another example of Taylor’s attempt to write without B/books or
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once looking back to Imagologies and hinting at coming works. It is difficult to read and 
impossible to analyze -  and this is its triumph: Taylor has finally written his “impossible 
Book,” which, like Erring, embodies and becomes the very object of its own discussion. 
Hiding is about appearances and surfaces. It seeks a movement not further in-depth but 
increasingly outward, exterior, toward boundaries by demonstrating that every surface 
merely conceals/reveals another surface and masks mask masks. Deconstruction 
becomes a reconstruction as the layers of the onion are not peeled away but restored, un­
peeled. The gaze at the body, so deeply penetrating in Nots, moves outward toward the 
surface, the skin, to texts marked on the skin, to textiles which clothe the skin -  surfaces 
which simultaneously conceal and reveal.
In a strange way, these four texts perform or embody Taylor’s a/theology by 
(dis)embodying it. In the application of a/theology, a/theology becomes lost along the 
way, hidden deep beneath the surface as that which always already resides within the 
critical work. As Taylor applies his project to specific objects of scrutiny -  moving from 
God to art and architecture to advertising, from the inside of bodies to the outside of 
bodies to fashion -  his work probes deeper by becoming increasingly shallow. As such, 
it becomes decreasingly theological or a/theological; increasingly trivial; profoundly 
superficial although not superficially profound. And yet this is what Taylor, seemingly, 
seeks to accomplish -  to expose the nothing which lies beneath everything, death which 
accompanies and is contained within life, the absence masked by every pursuit of 
presence, the “not” that we cannot thinlc, and yet which we have already thought in the 
first instance of (not-)thinking.
A/authors. A fine example of collaboration, the project is published jointly by Williams College 
Museum of Art and the Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art.
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Abandoning: A/theology (un)forsaken
Taylor’s most recent work continues the course he has set in previous work -  the 
occasional autobiographical forays, the outward-moving expansive and expanding gaze, 
the devolution of his a/theological project, which becomes not so much about theology 
as religion, attending to “the sacred” rather than “God,” and eventually deconstructing to  
the point that his work seems hardly concerned with theological or religious matters at 
all. Yet this seems, for all its illogic, a logical progression within the particular, peculiar 
trajectory of Taylor’s work. As he plays out his project, it becomes evident that the end 
he seeks (of theology, philosophy, criticism) is impossible and ever deferred. A/theology 
is ultimately embodied in the forsaking and forsakenness of a/theology. 1999’s About 
Religion: Economies o f Faith in Virtual Culture is ironically about religion precisely by 
being not about religion, or at least not overtly. The essays collected in this volume, like 
much of Taylor’s work, are a sort of unsaying, wherein he attempts to discuss religion by 
not discussing religion, instead discussing films, literature, art, sculpture, politics, 
capitalism, cyberspace, architecture and, again, Las Vegas. In his introduction, “About 
About,” Taylor writes: ‘Always a matter of surprise, religion is, I believe, most 
interesting where it is least obvious. Thus, I deliberately avoid the space of church, 
synagogue, and mosque in order to have time for art, literature, economics, science, and 
teclmology’ {AR, 1). About Religion also includes two significant autobiographical 
essays which add to Taylor’s emerging body of such self-reflexive writing. Chapter 2, 
“Denegating God,” is a treatise on negation as well as a reflection on Erring and 
a/theology 15 years on, and chapter 10, “Indifference,” is a series of entries as if from a 
diary that blur the line between fact and fiction, academic writing and autobiogiaphy. 
Fascinatingly, Taylor succeeds in writing much about the sacred, even about faith, and
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by extension, about religion, without writing much about religion at all -  it is a writing 
that is a not writing, a writing (of) not.
Taylor’s most recent works, like About Religion (and even less so) seem to be 
hardly about religion at all/^ In 1999, Taylor also published The Picture in Question: 
Mark Tansey and the Ends o f Representation^ a short analysis of artist Tansey’s 
paradoxical recovery and deconstruction of representative painting. The Moment o f  
Complexity: Emerging Network Culture (2001) continues discussions that Taylor began 
in Imagologies and Hiding about communications, networks and media, happily trotting 
even farther away from his a/theological roots into the realm of complexity theory.
Grave Matters (2002) is a collection of photographs of the gravesites of many modern 
artists and thinkers as diverse as Ralph Waldo Emerson and Vincent van Gogh. Taylor’s 
text serves as a commentary on the significance of graves and memorial sites, on the 
simultaneity of presence and absence, and on the tenuous boundary between life and 
death. And most recently Taylor has published Confidence Games: Money and Markets 
in a World without Religion (2004).^^ Judging from the title alone, Taylor appears to 
continue along his decidedly eirant path -  having already examined the 
telecommunications networks that create such possibilities, he now takes as his subjeet 
economics, the global marketplaee and “virtual money.” With the slight exception of 
About Religion, it seems that every text that Taylor has published since Nots is, on the
Admittedly, I am not as intimately familiar with Taylor’s four most recent works as I am with his 
earlier, more explicitly a/theological work, but, as we learn from Taylor himself, surfaces reveal 
at least as much as they conceal. Ergo, these works deserve mention as their titles alone describe 
the progression-digression of Taylor’s work that I wish to clnonicle here.
Due to the recency of its publication, I have not taken Confidence Games into consideration for 
the purposes of this thesis. However, a description is available on the University of Chicago 
Press website: Tn Confidence Games, Mark C. Taylor considers the implications of [various] 
developments for our digital and increasingly virtual economy. According to Taylor, money and 
markets do not exist in a vacuum but grow in a profoundly cultural medium, reflecting and in turn 
shaping their world. To understand the recent changes in our economy, it is not enough to analyze 
the impact of politics and teclmology -  one must consider the influence of art, philosophy, and 
religion as well.’ See http://www.nress.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/hfs.cui/00/16411.ctl.
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surface, hardly theological, hardly even a/theological -  perhaps fitting more comfortably 
under the description of cultural analysis than theology, religious studies or even 
philosophy. As will be further explored, it is evident by tracing the arc of Taylor’s work 
over the course of his career that his (un)veiling, (dis)locating, (dis)embodying and 
(un)forsaking of his a/theological project -  a journey which is simultaneously a 
progression and a digression -  is, in fact, the intellectual and textual embodiment of his 
a/theological vision of erring.
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II, (Un)Veiling: A/theology in Outline
Overview
[The] writer can be compared to a tailor. With pens and 
needles, the writer stitches and cross-stitches.... The tailor, 
after all, is profoundly interested in surfaces and completely 
preoccupied with appearances. His task is to cover rather 
than to strip, to veil instead o f unveil...surf aces are not 
superficial. {E, 180)
If deconstmction is an expressly po^sr-stmcturalist critical event/ ^  it is perhaps 
objectionable to describe Mark Taylor’s deconstructive a/theology as or according to a 
structure. Still, for the sake of metaphor, it could be said that the “stmcture” of Taylor’s 
a/theology is supported by four pillars: the death of God, the disappearance of the Self, 
the end of History, and the closure of the Book. Perhaps the metaphor would be better 
rendered thus: Taylor’s a/theology arises phoenix-like from the rubble and ruin of the 
four pillars which were once thought to support the entire Western theological and 
philosophical tradition -  God, Self, History and Book. The site where the old stmcture 
once stood becomes the “(de)constmction site” for the para-silQ that is a/theology. Of 
course, this is no proper building site, as the interest is not so much in building as tearing 
down. In Erring: A Postmodern A/theology, Taylor begins by setting out the terms of his 
project under the section heading “Deconstmcting Theology,” describing these four 
events (or conditions) -  the death of God, the disappearance of the Self, the end of 
History, and the closure of the Book -  which also seiwe as the first four chapter titles.
He responds in the latter half of the text by unfolding his “Deconstmctive A/theology.”
If deconstmction, as claimed, exists always already within discourse, it should not be considered 
a particular critical strategy or a sort of system or entity. For this reason, I will refer to 
deconstmction, and by extension to Taylor’s deconstmctive a/theology, as a critical event, 
moment or movement so as to maintain awareness that deconstmctive a/theology is a critical 
performance which is, in fact, the performance of criticism. I tmst that this rationale will become 
increasingly apparent as this thesis develops.
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The death of God in chapter 1, then, corresponds to the “Writing of God” (ch. 5) in 
which the divine milieu is construed as the freeplay of writing. The disappearance of the 
Self results in “Markings,” which inscribe the presence of the trace that is the absence of 
the Self. The end of History makes room for “Mazing Grace” in chapter 7, wherein the 
beginning and end of historical narrative(s) collapse into the middle, the wilderness of 
the now. Finally, the closure of the Book described in chapter 4 con esponds to “Eiring 
Scripture” in the text’s final chapter, wherein this closure marks the simultaneous 
opening of the text and of textuality. Book-ended by a “...Prelude” and an “Interlude...” 
with intentional ellipses denoting the endlessness of all writing, Erring proves, 
paradoxically, despite its own denial o f its status as a Book, to be a fairly systematic text: 
divided in half, four chapters per half, each chapter sub-divided into three sections -  an 
introduction and conclusion (if not very introductory or conclusive, respectively), a 
section of endnotes and a “Biblio Graphy.”^^
It seems, despite the death of God, Taylor cannot help but write about (the 
impossibility of) God throughout his work. Despite the disappearance of the Self, which, 
as Taylor describes, renders the A/author, authority and authorship impossible, Erring 
still bears the name of Mark C. Taylor on its cover and copyright pages. Despite the end 
of History, Erring, in its deconstruction of theology, sculpts its own narrative signposted 
by these four pillars -  that is, to deconstruct History, Taylor must tell the story the 
climax of which is the end of History. And despite the closure of the Book described in 
these pages. Erring cannot fully extricate itself from its given generic forms and 
conventions. I do not point out these paradoxes to discredit Taylor’s work by exposing
I concur with David Jasper, who has commented to me that Erring is oddly ‘a rather bookish 
book.’ Walter Lowe, in his review article “A Deconstmctionist Manifesto: Mark C. Taylor’s 
ErringE  also notes the text’s systematic nature, writing: ‘The reader may be relieved to discover 
that this celebration of eiTancy exhibits, in its broad outline, a remarkable clarity of structure’ (p. 
324). Still, out of respect to Taylor’s insistence that Erring is not properly a Book, nor a proper 
Book (which I agree is tme), I will refer to Erring as a text or work rather than as a B/book.
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some inconsistency (in fact, it is unfair to think of these features as inconsistent) but 
rather to indicate the delicate boundary that Taylor’s writing “errs” along, this tenuous 
line between theology and a/theology -  a boundary represented by the “/” that both 
separates and joins a- and theology. Taylor clearly asserts that ‘A/theology represents 
the liminal thinking of marginal thinkers. The of a/theology (which, it is important to 
note, can be written but not spoken) marks the limen that signifies both proximity and 
distance, similarity and difference, interiority and exteriority’ {E, \2)?^ Carl Rasclike, in 
his review of Erring, sheds additional light on a/theology’s “/” when he writes ‘The slash 
separating the prefix from the stem of Taylor's neologism suggests that his “a/theology” 
is a cancelling out of what we ordinarily mean by the “theological” venture.... An 
a/theology is the “end” of theology i t s e l f . I t  could be said that the larger task of 
Taylor’s a/theological work, most succinctly captured in the pages o f Erring, is an 
attempt to thinlc and to write (beyond) this “end” of theology, an end which the Western 
theo-philosophical tradition has left unthought -  an end which is always drawing near(er) 
but is ever defen ed and never finally arrives.^^ It is exactly this sense of inconclusion, 
this lack of closure, that produces the condition of erring, Taylor’s titular metaphor, 
which is rich with layers of meaning. After a comprehensive analysis of the word’s 
etymological potential, Taylor suggests that erring ‘is “wandering, roaming; deviating 
from the right or intended course; missing the mark.’” However, Taylor warns against 
associating a/theology with traditional atheism, pointing out that ‘erring thought is
Taylor also writes that ‘deconstmctive criticism constantly en s along the / of neither/nor’ {E, 11).
Carl A. Raschke. “Review of Erring: A Postmodern A/theology."'' p. 153.
See Taylor’s essay “The End(s) of Theology,” in which he suggests that ‘modem theology 
reaches a certain end in the death-of God theology’ (p. 239). Ergo, ‘The infinite defenal of the 
end harbors an end that is not the end of theology. An end that is not the end of theology would 
be an end that is never present -  an end that does not, indeed, cannot arrive’ (p. 242). 
Significantly, Taylor borrows from Freud the term “parapraxis,” stating ‘To write parapraxically 
is to write the limit rather than to write about the limit’ (p. 245). See also Taylor’s essays “How 
to do Nothing with Words” {T, 203-31) and “Nothing Ending Nothing” {TC, 41-75).
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neither properly theological nor nontheological, theistic nor atheistic, religious nor 
secular, believing nor nonbelieving’ (E, 12).
After the four pillars have crumbled, we are destined to err, and that endlessly. 
Taylor’s vision of e r r i n g , i n  its lack of direction and “unavoidable...rar/ma/ 
purposelessness” {E, 157), is an affront to the conventions of theology. Erring is, in one 
sense, the condition that theology traditionally seeks to suppress and overcome, and 
therefore a/theology goes against the grain. The condition of erring implicates all who 
attempt to write and think theologically in the wake of the death of God. After the 
erasure of God (Father, Creator, guarantor of meaning), Self (autonomous, rational 
Subject), History (tradition, ecclesial or otherwise), and Book (Bible, any absolute truth), 
the Subject finds himself in the role of Jesus’ parabolic prodigal son. Taylor writes: 
‘Convinced that the father is dead, the prodigal is unable to believe in any prospect of 
return. He is, it seems, destined to err endlessly’ {E, 143). In this sense, the only way 
that theological writing remains possible is through kenosis, self-emptying. By emptying 
itself of final or certain meaning, theological writing becomes a/theological. It reve(a)ls 
(in) the “play”^^  -  that is, in the dramatic interacfion of players and fools, and also in the 
duplicity of linguistic meaning and the plurality of the postmodern condition. But this is 
not simply a project or experiment of thinking. With Altizerian overtones, Taylor makes 
the case that ‘the death of God is realized in a radical christology in which the incarnate 
word is read as writing’ (E, 158). Ening is praxis, and therefore, to write emngly is by 
nature perfoimative -  it is the unending perfonnance of (a) play.
To distinguish Taylor’s text {Erring: A Postmodern A/theology) from the a/theological vision 
described therein, note that Erring' (capitalized and in italics) refers to the text itself, while 
“Ening” or “en’ing” will be used when discussing the condition, event, paradigm, phenomenon, 
etc. described in Taylor’s a/theological writing(s).
See Jacques Demda, Writing and Difference. ‘Play is the disruption of presence.. .Play is always 
play of absence and presence.. .Being must be conceived as presence or absence on the basis of 
the possibility of play and not the other way around’ (p. 369).
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This section will examine Taylor’s a/theology according to the vision of erring set 
forth in Erring. As will become evident, a deconstmctive a/theology can only issue forth 
from the deconstruction of the four foundational pillars. Interestingly, despite its 
professed non-foundationalism, Taylor’s work is utterly dependent upon this 
deconstmctive “event” for its foundation. Since, as Taylor has famously stated, 
''deconstruction is the “hermeneutic” o f the death o f God' {E, 6 — italics in original), the 
“death of God” is the lynch-pin of a/theology. Whether an event in the life of God, an 
attempt to free the Divine from the word/symbol “God,” or simply a description of the 
condition of a godless universe,w ithout the presupposition of the death or absence of 
God, Taylor’s (post-)stmcture topples. In fact, as Susan Wennemyr points out in her 
insightful essay, Taylor’s work makes several assumptions akin to the ‘leaps of faith’ 
upon which ecclesial theology relies.^^ In the same way that Taylor cannot manage to 
fully escape the conventions of language, form or genre, neither, it seems, can he rid 
himself of the necessity of faith. As writing emerges as the divine milieu, faith in God is 
exchanged for faith in writing -  and indeed, to have faith in writing, after the crisis of 
language ushered in by Saussure via the post-stmcturalists, is just as unreasonable as a 
faith in the Divine. But of course, Taylor never claims that Erring!on:mg or a/theology is 
the least bit rational or reasonable. Rather, it is more akin to what John Schad calls 
‘Christian Unreason.
See Altizer and Hamilton, pp. 14-15 for a list of the possible meanings of the “death of God.” 
See Susan E. Wennemyi*, “Dancing in the Dark: Deconstructive A/theology Leaps with Faith.’ 
See Jolm Schad, Queer Fish: Christian Unreason from Darwin to Derrida.
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Death o f God —  God as Writing
Erring begins where it already finds itself to be -  at an e n d /’ This end, which is 
the “end” of God, is the beginning and ending, the Alpha and Omega, that becomes the 
means (middle, centre) of a deconstructive a/theology. While its genesis is often thought 
to be with the declaration of Nietzsche’s madman, the roots of the death of God begin * 
even earlier. As Taylor writes. T he eclipse of belief in God did not suddenly appear on 
the horizon’ {E, 3), and indeed the 200 years beginning with Descartes and leading up to 
Nietzsche do not spring from nowhere but do reach a certain prophetic fulfilment in the 
proclamation of the death of God. The 1?”^ and 18”’ centuries were characterised by a 
profound confidence in freedom and human reason. Since tlu'oughout modernity, 
freedom is associated with autonomy, T he  explicit goal of the fight for mastery and 
against domination was independent selfhood’ {E, 22). Of course, the quest for the Self 
begins much earlier than Descartes’ indubitable, doubting cogito. Taylor sets about 
revealing the self as a relatively recent invention, the history of which begins with St. 
Augustine’s Confessions and ends with Hegel’s Phenomenology o f  Spirit, writing ‘If 
portraiture and self-portraiture were impossible before Augustine, they are no longer 
possible after Hegel’ {E, 35).'’^  He rightly points to the autobiographical Confessions of 
St. Augustine as the beginning of the self-reflexive quest for the Self. Nowhere is there 
found a better example of the Self seeking to identify itself according to its relationship 
to the Divine. St. Augustine, “knowing” the God who is Trinity, seeks (but never fully 
succeeds) to understand his own Self according to some triune figuration. Augustine’s 
example sets the tone, in a sense, for all of Western philosophy and theology,
See E, p. 3. From Jacques Derrida, O f Grammatology, p. 162; ‘We must begin wherever we 
are..An a text where we already believe ourselves to be.’
In Thomas Altizer’s contrasting view, the Self finds it beginning on the cross -  in the negation of 
God’s Self, in which God becomes fully incarnate, even unto death. See Altizer’s The Gospel o f  
Christian Atheism.
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culminating, according to Taylor, in the Protestant Reformation, captured in Martin 
Luther’s doctrine of pro nobis -  that Christ exists fo r  us. This focus on the individual 
human subject is carried to its logical extreme in and throughout the project of 
modernity.
Taylor asserts that the relationship between God and humankind. Creator and 
creature, is figured according to the hierarchical economy of master and slave -  that is, 
as with Augustine, humankind historically seeks to define the Self in subservient relation 
to a Creator-God. Therefore, the quest for the Self necessarily results in the slave’s quest 
to overcome the master. This oppositional logic requires that the master be expunged for 
the Self to become free and autonomous. Descartes’ pursuit of truth leads him to doubt 
everything he knows or perceives until he is left with the only indubitable thing -  his 
own doubting self. Taylor writes that ‘Descartes radicalized doubt’ and, ‘in a move 
destined to change the face of the earth,’ he then ‘identified truth with certainty’ (E, 22). 
In this way, while never stating it as such, Descartes foretells the death of God in the 
cogito ergo sum. I f  I  think, therefore I  am, it follows that i f  I  think God (not), therefore 
God is (not).
Nietzsche seemingly understood the consequences of modernity’s emphasis on 
the individual, rational ego. hi the literary creation of his madman, Nietzsche himself 
becomes the madman, the idiot, the absurd court jester who in the face of such (social, 
intellectual) fonnality is the only one who gets away with speaking tmth.”  ^ The 
madman, seeking God amongst the people but finding Him nowhere, responds to his 
detractors with the now-famous statement: ‘God is dead. God remains dead. And we 
have killed him.’ Of course, this word has ‘come too early.’ The madman realises, ‘my
Compare with Carl Rasclike's comment in his review o ïErring: ‘Perhaps Taylor has deliberately 
set about to play the part of the voluble jester tinkling his bells before the drunlcen monarch and 
his cynical retainer’ (p. 156).
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time has not come yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering -  it has 
not yet reached the ears of man.’ Nietzsche, via his madman, offers no cure but only 
exposes the wound for what it is -  a universe without its Creator, ‘plunging 
continually... Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions’ -  a universe wandering, 
erring, ‘straying as through an infinite n o t h i n g . S t i l l ,  humankind is not prepared to 
receive this prophecy, and remains so until it is prepared to face the failure of modernity 
that is, in one sense, marked by the horrors of the Holocaust and the bombastic end of 
World War Within 20 years of this “end” of modernity (which is also a “beginning” 
o f postmodemity), a handful of eirant theologians begin the task of setting out their 
“death of God” theology.
Thomas J. J. Altizer and William Hamilton’s publication of Radical Theology and 
the Death o f  God in 1966 marks the first expressly theological attempt to account for the 
“death of God.” Like Hegel and others before them, Altizer and Hamilton attempt to 
make sense of a world without God -  a world that had endured the trauma of two world 
wars and, with America’s involvement in Vietnam, found itself potentially on the cusp of 
another. In their introduction, the co-authors lay out ten possible interpretations of what 
is meant by the “event” of the “death of God.” Among those most significant to Taylor’s 
work are: ‘ 1. That there is no God and that there never has been... 3. That the idea of 
God and the word God itself are in need of radical refonnation. Perhaps totally new 
words are needed; perhaps a decent silence about God should be observed... 10. .. .that 
our language about God is always inadequate and imperfect.’"’” For Altizer, specifically, 
the death of God is inextricably bound to Christ’s death on the cross, and for this reason
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, § 125. In Kaufmann, ed. The Portable Nietzsche, pp. 95-96.
See Mark C. Taylor and Esa Saarinen, Imagologies. ‘Modernity ended on August 6, 1945. The 
postmodern condition we are living is not simply the result of having been raised on television. 
As the children of Hiroshima, we have always known that modernity is a nightmare from which 
we must awake.’ § “Telepolitics.” p. 2.
Altizer and Hamilton, pp. 14-15. See also Altizer, Christian Atheism.
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his remains a gospel of profoundly Christian, or at least christological, atheism. Taylor
follows Altizer when he writes,
The main contours of deconstmctive a/theology begin to emerge with the 
realization of the necessary interrelation between the death of God and 
radical christology. Radical christology is thoroughly incamational -  the 
divine “is ” the incarnate word. Furthermore, this embodiment of the 
divine is the death of God. With the appearance of the divine that is not 
only itself but is at the same time other, the God who alone is God 
disappears. The death of God is the sacrifice of the transcendent 
Author/Creator/Master who governs from afar. Incarnation irrevocably 
erases the disembodied logos and inscribes a word that becomes the script 
enacted in the infinite play of interpretation. To understand incarnation as 
inscription is to discover the word. Embodied word is script(ure), the 
writing in which we are inscribed and which we inscribe. Like all writing, 
the carnal word is transgi'essive. Inscription inverts the traditional 
understanding of the God-world relationship and subverts all fonns of 
transcendence. A/theology is, in large measure, a critique of the notion of 
the transcendent God... {E, 103-04)
As the transcendent becomes immanent with the incarnation of the Word {Logos) made
flesh, God relinquishes God’s divinity -  God becomes man to be with us. Therefore the
incarnate Christ, known as a then historical and now ecclesial presence, marks the
absence of the transcendent God. I will give more attention later how Taylor
distinguishes himself from Altizer in subtle but significant ways. Still, it is apparent that
Altizer’s work is extremely influential and significant to Taylor’s deconstructive
a/theology.
In a similar way that Augustine’s inward quest might involve looking away from 
God so as to see his own reflexive Self,"’^  for Taylor turning away from God is the 
necessary by-product of modernity’s turn toward the Self. In attempting to free the 
created son from the Creative Sun, humankind is forced to “kill o ff’ the Father/Creator 
God -  in this way, it is the En/zg/z/enment that ironically plunges the universe into the 
darkness and shadows of the death of God. While Taylor claims that his a/theology in no
Augustine, Confessions. § 8.7. ‘O Lord, you were turning me around to look at myself. For 1 
had placed myself behind my own back, refusing to see myself. You were setting me before my 
own eyes’ (p. 169).
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way seeks to recover lost presence, I wonder if his constmal of writing as the divine 
milieu is not, in some way, a sort of recovery. The deconstmction of the old notions of 
God makes way for writing to emerge, a reconstmction of sorts. And yet this is a writing 
-  like Derrida’s écriture, both “writing” and “scripture” -  which has lost every vestige of 
certainty, a writing that issues from and in fact is the freeplay of language. In the same 
way that the old notions of an absolute God unravel with the death of God, so also do the 
old notions of certainty in language fall apart into semantic play after Demda’s O f 
Grammatology. Glimpsing now the “end” of the Book and the “beginning” of writing 
(wherein “writing” implies a shiftiness of meaning), Taylor suggests that ‘[w]riting 
presupposes, on the one hand, that origin is inaccessible and originality illusory and, on 
the other hand, that ends are elusive and definitive conclusions impossible’ {E, 98). It 
may be that Taylor’s connection between the Divine and writing is another “leap of 
faith,” and yet this understanding of the Divine and/as wxiXingJécriture becomes the 
paradigm for a radically relational conception of textuality. Like the radically 
interrelated Trinity, writing can now only be understood as radical intertextuality, for as 
Taylor writes, ‘Since each text becomes itself in relation to other texts, every text implies 
a difference that dislocates its proper identity...This irreducible relativity constitutes 
every text an intertext’ {E, 178). In this view, writing becomes slippery, impossible to 
hold on to, for ‘Words are incurable, scripture holey’ {E, 110). It is always scattering, 
disseminating, and running away -  it is a freeplay that is also a playing freely ‘ along this 
boundless boundary [where] the word appears divine’ {E, 116). Writing, and all 
language, now emptied of meaning, becomes a kenotic event, and this is central to 
understanding Taylor when he writes that ‘Scripture is the divine milieu, and the divine 
milieu is writing’ {E, llb)."’^  As we shall discover in following sections, this
The kenotic nature of language/writing will be discussed further in section IV. See E, p. 118.
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understanding of writing, of words, relates to the Story of the God-man, the Logos made 
flesh, in the Gospel narrative, for it is only by the death of the Word that humanity might 
be saved — saved from the need and desire to overcome some primal lack with saving 
presence.
Disappearance o f the S e lf-  Self as Trace
If the quest for the Self ushers in the death of God, the death of God reciprocally 
instigates the disappearance of the Self. This unqualified corollary might be legitimated 
with a further explication of the relationship between the Self and God, understood as 
creature and Creature, son and Father, the Hegelian notion of slave and master. The 
desire of the slave to overthrow and become the master, ultimately resulting in the death 
of the master -  a sort of patricide — can be understood as the slave’s desire for mastery or 
dominance. But as such, the oppositional hierarchies remain in place. This overthrow is 
not a shattering of the broader problem, which is the system of domination, but simply an 
inversion of the relationship between the two. As has been stated, the Self, then, moves 
from an identity once defined according to an “other” -  the Creator-God -  to one which 
is self-authenticating, as expressed by Descartes’ cogito. However, this inversion 
maintains the stmggle for mastery and eventually leads to the unavoidable disappearance 
of the Self. That is, without an “other” against which to define itself, the Self vanishes 
along with the “other” of the Creator-God. No longer can the Self be thought of as 
created in imago dei.
Taylor employs naming/nomination as his trope for understanding the 
disappearance of the Self. In modernity, ‘To be a self is to possess and to be possessed 
by a name’ {E, 34). But this unravels with the death of God which solicits the 
disappearance of the Self. Names are erased, and all that remains are traces, present only
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in profound absence. The Garden of Eden is mythologically the ‘the primal scene...of 
nomination -  a scene of naming and being named’ {E, 34). Just as man receives his 
name from God, man receives the power of nomination from God, and along with it, 
mastery over the rest of creation. This is an example of the creature doing the work of 
the Creator, and by a sort of reverse logic, the only way to disperse the hierarchical 
economy of domination, between God and man, and man and nature, is to “un-do” the 
nomination of and nominatory capacity of humankind. This points to what Taylor calls 
the ‘thoroughly specular’ relationship between God and man wherein ‘each minors the 
other’ {E, 35). In a thorough discussion of the subjectivity and “Being-ness” of God, 
who identifies Godself in voicing the “I AM,””^  Taylor concludes that human 
subjectivity is conceived according to divine subjectivity, which is fully self- 
authenticating and self-reflexive.
Therefore, to be a Self, which is to possess and be possessed by a name, is also to 
be one who possesses -  to possess property, to be a proprietor -  and to be “proper.” To 
be a Self is also to be present, to be present in the present. Furthennore, just like the 
God who is One but also Tliree, the Self begins to reveal the identity of its own interior 
difference. Taylor reminds us that ‘From a monotheistic perspective, to be is to be one,’ 
and thus the Self seeks to gain ‘its most precious possession -  itself....The property of 
personality suggests that owning is oneing and oneing is owning’ {E, 41-42). Here again 
Augustine provides an understanding which proves to be a pharmakon, both poison and 
cure, problem and solution.”” Augustine, in his attempt to understand the Self according 
to some God-mirroring triune figuration, eventually settles on the fact that he may only 
laiow himself through a process of remembering himself. Therefore, the identity of the
For more on the “I AM,” see Thomas Altizer’s The Self-Embodiment o f  God, especially Ch. IV, 
“Incarnation” (pp. 63-80).
Jacques Deirida. Dissemination. See “Plato’s Phannacy,” pp. 61-171, especially pp. 95-117 on 
the pharmakon.
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self is located not in the present but in the past, and is therefore, in a sense, dis-located.
Expounding on this, Taylor writes:
Nomination, therefore, is not a simple act of presentation, it is, instead, 
the complex activity of representation...representation can only re-present 
a presence/present that never is and never can be fully realized... 
presentation invariably opens the gap it seeks to close....Inasmuch as all 
presentation is representation, the subject’s struggle to secure identity and 
establish a proper name inevitably fails....Like Alice gazing into the 
looking glass, the reflective/reflexive subject discovers an uncanny hole, 
tlnough which it disappears. {E, 48)
In this dis-possession of the Self, ‘Apparent “selving” is actual “unselving” {E, 51). 
Therefore, it becomes necessary for the Self to understand itself and seek coherence by 
crafting and possessing narratives which allow the Self to constmct a symbolic 
“narrative self’ which it may (re)present to itself. The Self seeks a coherent narrative 
with a beginning, middle and end by which, to adapt Nietzsche,”’ to ‘tell the Self to 
itself -  or more appropriately for Taylor, to "write the Self to itse lf’ As difference in 
identity and identity in difference emerge as the essential nature of the Self, Taylor 
suggests that, ‘In the effort to secure its identity and establish its presence, the self 
discovers its unavoidable difference and irrepressible absence....The search for self­
presence in self-consciousness leads to the discovery of the absence of the self {E, 50). 
Just as in Cliristian theology the presence of God is mediated in the incarnation of Jesus 
Clrrist, the Word of God made flesh, and it is the dis-possession and loss -  the 
irreducible absence -  of this particular Self (Cln ist) that leads to grace, so also the 
constructed human Subject is, now, always the object of its own se lf scrutiny and subject 
to mediation, hr this way, ‘The journey to selflrood turns out to be a dangerous voyage -  
nothing less than the way of the cross..,. Within the space of the trace is inscribed a cross 
that marks the site of the disappearance of the self {E, 51). If this appears similar to a
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche writes, T tell my life to myself.’ See Walter Kaufman’s translation in 
The Basic Writings o f  Nietzsche, p. 677.
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Buddhist understanding of the “no-self,” it is perhaps no accident.”^  Several have 
identified in Taylor’s work hints of such Eastern influence which on the surface appears 
antithetical to the Western binary oppositions he is so intent to deconstruct/” In Taylor’s 
vision, the dispossessed and ultimately disappear-ed/ing Self becomes merely the trace 
of the Self -  identity is sacrificed and proper names are erased. Wandering errantly with 
no God and no Self, the Self becomes an “err-er,” an error, the unvanquishable mark left 
by the erasure of the Self,
Taylor carries out the abnegation of the Self in Chapter 6 o f Erring, discussing the 
way that the name and the signature are evidence that the Self is under erasure, 
attempting to mark the presence of what is truly an absence, and placing the Self, now 
the trace, within a network of radical inteiTelation. The ‘“trace” retains a radical 
ambiguity. A trace is neither properly present nor absent -  it is, in some sense, at the 
same time present and absent....[The] trace can be represented by the cross that marks the 
place where identity and difference, as well as presence and absence, repeatedly 
intersect. Always in transition and constantly in the “middest,” the trace is iiTcpressibly 
liminal and ever erring’ {E, 138). Naturally, the absence of the Self is also the absence of 
the author, just as the impossibility of possession, property and propriety renders 
authority and authorship equally impossible. Recall the specular relationship between 
Creator and creature; hence, the death of the Author-God is simultaneous with the death 
of the human author. Whereas the self-possessed Self seeks to be whole and centred, the 
trace is without a centre, is ex-centric and appears eccentric {E, 139). Derrida claims that
See Thomas J. J. Altizer. The Contemporary Jesus, especially Ch. 9, “The Buddhist Jesus” (pp. 
161-83).
See, for example, Wyschogrod, et al., “On Deconstructing Theology: A Symposium on Erring: A 
Postmodern A/theology," especially pp. 526, 537, and 553. See also Carl Raschke’s review of 
Erring in Journal o f  the American Academy o f  Religion 54/1 (1986), 153-56.
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‘The absence of a center is here the absence of a subject and the absence of an author,’”"’ 
which serves to illuminate Erring's first sentences: ‘If authorship is never original but is 
always a play that is an interplay, then clearly “I” did not write this text. Or at least “I” 
alone did not write it’ {E, xi).”” This absence of an A/author presents a dilemma to the 
conventions of theology. As Taylor points out, ‘When man is represented as the image 
of God, the self also appears to be self-identical, self-present, and self-conscious. The 
proper theological subject is the solitary self, whose self-consciousness assumes the 
fonn of an individual “I” that defines itself by opposition to and transcendence of other 
isolated subjects. Such a self is primarily and essentially a unique individual' {E, 130). 
Ergo, the disappearance of the Self problematises the theological enteiprise by 
extinguishing its subject, the “I,” and its object, God.
End o f History  -  Mazing the Middest
Taylor identifies that ‘History...grows out of the ceaseless struggle for 
transcendence’ and ‘amounts to an unending seareh for a presence that saves’ {E, 151). 
But as shall become apparent, for Taylor this originary saving presence for which 
humanity unendingly searches is irrecoverable because it is a characteristic of a 
beginning that never was. Taylor points out that ‘History, as well as self, is a theological 
notion’ and ‘a relatively recent invention. Indeed, there can be no individual self apart 
from history and no history without the individual subject’ {E, 53-54). Here the 
interconnection between God, Self, History and Book comes more clearly into focus. If 
the death of God and the disappearance of the Self are inextricably bound, it is certain 
that the failure of these two pillars will quickly lead to the failure o f the remaining two.
Jacques Demda. Writing and Difference, p. 363.
”” From here, Taylor goes on to recognise those ‘who are always already “within” the tangled lines 
o f Erring,' including, naturally, the names of Thomas Altizer and Jacques Denida.
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finally toppling the structure of Western thought. Taylor marks the “age” of History in a 
similar mamier that he bookends the era of the Self: with Augustine and Hegel. Just as 
the Phenomenology o f Spirit brings to a close what began with Augustine’s Confessions, 
so also Hegel’s Philosophy o f History ‘completes and subverts [Augustine’s] City o f  
God' {E, 54).
Taylor’s understanding of History in Erring is heavily dependent on the myth of 
Ariadne’s thread. In this story, whieh Taylor recounts in chapter 3, Theseus undertakes 
the slaying of a troublesome Minotaur imprisoned in a labyrinth. Ariadne, having been 
given the secret to the labyrinth by its creator, imparts this wisdom to Theseus so as to 
secure the success of his endeavour. She gives Theseus a tln ead which enables him to 
locate the Minotaur in the labyrinth and then re-trace his way back out of the maze. 
Taylor employs Ariadne’s thread as a metaphor for the line of History’s narrative, which 
‘presents events as interrelated episodes within a coherent pattern, which emerges 
progressively. A narrative constmes scattered events as meaningful by inscribing them 
in an intelligible story’ {E, 63). History presents -  makes present in the present -  its 
story in the fonn of narrative. ‘Narrativization ties together the separate threads of 
ehronicle by foiming a centred stmcture with a definite beginning, middle, and end. This 
reading of naiTative helps to explain the structure of history as a whole' {E, 64). 
Narratives shape worlds, and naiTatives thought to explain ultimate reality tend to 
become “sacred” nainative, which by necessity have easily identifiable beginnings, 
middles and ends -  such as creation, fa ll and redemption -  and leave no loose ends.
Yet, like Ariadne’s thread, narrative coherence only exists inasmuch as it is 
constmcted, re-traced by going back over ground that has already been traversed. 
Accordingly, it could be said that the events of History have no interconnection except in 
hindsight. As the fabrication of the Self (now deconstructed) looking back, narrative
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centeredness or coherence is proved to be impossible, and this suggests the end of
history. The contemporary, postmodern context is one in which ‘the centre cannot
hold.’”” Narratives have lost their centre as, following Lyotard, legitimating narratives in
the end deconstruct themselves. As History, and the nan*atives of History, are revealed
as the attempt of the Self to deny death by asserting authority, the unity or autonomy of
narratives proves to be as elusive and illusory as the unified or autonomous Self creating
the narrative. Taylor elucidates this, writing;
It is possible that there is more “imagination” and “fairy tale” in history 
than most people are willing to acknowledge....To say that history is an 
“imaginative construction” is not to imply that it is “unreal.” The fanciful 
dimension of history does, however, suggest that “reality” is, in some 
sense, imaginative. The careful examination of history subverts the sharp 
distinction between historical fact and fiction. To the extent that history 
involves narrative it is, like the eentered self, ineluctably literary rather 
than literal....Beginning, middle, and end, as well as the connective 
narrative thread, are “summational fictions.””^  {E, 66-67)
Just as for Nietzsche ‘tmth is a fiction whose fictive status has been forgotten’ (DC, 15-
16),”® so History, it seems, though it may be forgotten to be so, never escapes its
imaginative core. Like the Self, History is a literary construction, and without a Self
serving as its subject, the narratives of History fragment and scatter.
History, then, can be understood as the Selfs attempt to deny death by presenting 
Itself with a coherent plot. ‘Just as the self-reflexion of the autobiographer interiorizes 
experienees that otherwise seem only externally related, so the plot of history assembles 
apparently discrete episodes into a coherent whole’ {E, 70). Humankind finds itself 
‘Suspended between a past that has been lost and a future not yet possessed,’ and stuck 
in ‘the domain of discontent and restlessness, or striving and strife. Within the bounds of
”” William Butler Yeats. “The Second Coming.” Quoted in Taylor {E, 3).
According to his endnotes, Taylor is here bonowing from Vaihinger’s The Philosophy o f “As if"
® See Nietzsche’s “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense” {DC, 216-19), exceipted from 
Kaufman’s The Portable Nietzsche, pp. 42-47. Kaufman’s translation reads ‘truths are illusions 
about which one has forgotten that this is what they are.’
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history, dissatisfied and unhappy subjects stmggle to save presence by seeking saving 
presence’ {E, 68). Since History is, in one sense, the (hi)story of the relationship 
between God and humankind -  that is, of the interaction between God(s) and Selves -  
and since God is looked to as the guarantor of Tmth, Ariadne’s tln ead unravels with the 
death of God and the disappearance of the Self. Without the tlnead, Theseus is 
abandoned, lost within the maze.
It is the subject’s stmggle for mastery in the pursuit of presence that exposes a 
profound lack which is original and iiTcducible. ‘For the guilty subject, lack is an 
acquired deficiency rather than an “original” incompletion’ {E, 152). This ‘guilty 
subject’ is enslaved to the ‘law’ of History by his need to say ‘N o’ to death. Here 
Taylor’s vision of erring comes more clearly into focus, for if  historical narratives are 
only the creative literary devices of Selves attempting to navigate what is, in reality, an 
endless, meaningless maze, the only viable option is to accept, even celebrate, this 
condition as grace. The enant outlaw breaks the law of History because, ‘In the 
gmtuitous play of the wor(l)d, and the gracious wor(l)d of play, the errant trace is a 
graceful out-law’ {E, 160). The only way to avoid the guilt which ‘eventually leads to a 
revolt against oneself {E, 152) is to be content in the wilderness -  to be a happy 
wanderer, an erring outlaw. Taylor writes: ‘Insofar as the outlaw is not only a heretic 
who transgresses but also a subversive who breaks the (power of the) law, erring points 
to the ways of grace. Ening is serpentine wandering that comes, if at all, by grace -  
grace that is mazing’ {E, 150). Therefore, since the beginning (creation) and end 
(redemption) of History can no longer be guaranteed by a transcendent God, all that 
remains is the wilderness of the middle.
Taylor equates the middle with the desert, which is not our destination -  as erring 
is aimless, it has no telos, no end goal -  but which must be passed through endlessly, for
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there is no past to be recovered nor future to be hoped for. The labyrinth of the desert 
becomes, for Taylor, the carnival, wherein errors reveal and revel in the carnality of their 
incarnation-ality. The eiTor embodies his errancy in the grotesqueness of his mortal 
body. In a phenomenon not unlike Nietzschean eternal recurrence, the endless play of 
language which results in the endless erring through the mazing desert becomes a sort of 
hall of mirrors, where every presentation is a representation, and reality is 
indistinguishable from illusion. Margins, limen, boundary, desert, wilderness, labyiinth, 
maze, hall of miiTors, fun house, carnival -  all become for Taylor tropes for his vision of 
erring, the traversal or transgi'ession of the limits by the trace of the Self.
As History endures the same erasure as God and the Self, the structure becomes 
that much more unstable. Taylor’s dissolution of these pillars -  God, Self, History, and 
Book -  is, in one sense, not their deconstmction, but their reduction to the ‘middest,’ the 
middle, the milieu. ‘Within the divine milieu, creation and destruction, life and death, 
are forever joined’ {E, 168). Altizer coneludes his work Total Presence by writing, ‘Not 
only is the only true paradise the paradise that we have lost, but the only regained 
paradise is the final loss of paradise itself.’”” Taylor reminds us that ‘This loss is grace’ 
{E, 168). Therefore, as all is reduced to the middle, the mean(s) of gi'ace, God becomes 
the incarnate Clrrist, who suffers death on the cross; Self becomes non-self in radical 
inten elationality neither affinned nor negated by altarity, the difference of identity and 
the identity of difference; History becomes the Fall, eternal fallenness, the endless desert 
of the middle; and the Book becomes “unbound,” boundless stories of only middles with 
no beginnings or endings, which err endlessly as the bindings come unglued and the 
pages scatter in the wind. Our exile to the margins of the wilderness is eternal, and not
”” Thomas J. J. Altizer. Total Presence, p. 108.
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to be mourned but celebrated -  impossible selves joined in impossible, invisible 
communities that ‘re-Joy ce’”” in their ening.
Closure o f the Book  -  Opening o f Text(uality)
The Western tradition, which grants truth purchase to the narratives of History, 
regards the Book as the receptacle of historical truth. Similar to the specular relationship 
between the Self and God, the structure of the Book mirrors the (hi)stories inscribed on 
its pages. Just as History is considered a coherent narrative with a clearly defined 
begimiing, middle and end -  and therefore deemed “true” -  so also is the Book a 
coherent, clearly defined entity, a container o f truth. And yet, this understanding of the 
Book cannot be maintained after the deconstmction of History ushered in by the death of 
God and the dispossession or erasure of the Self.”’ Since ‘Every “proper” book bears a 
signature -  a signature that is a sign or mark,’ the Book cannot survive without an 
Author. ‘The distinguishing mark of the sign is its tendency to point beyond itself to 
something it signifies. In the case of a book, the sign points to the one who signs. 
Signature, in other words, refers to author’ {E, 80). Ergo, after the four pillars have
”” E, 163. As Finnegans Wake is amongst the finest literary examples of what could be described 
as a boundless text, Taylor often turns to James Joyce (and Joyce’s protégé Samuel Beckett) in 
the latter chapters of Erring to embody -  flesh out -  his notion of ‘ening scripture.’
”’ It is important to note that while these four events -  the “ends” of God, Self, History and Book -  
may at first appear to occur in this particular succession, a chain reaction or ‘domino effect’ 
(Taylor employs this phrase in the title of his response essay in Wyschogrod, et al., op. cit.), the 
crumbling of these four pillars actually occurs simultaneously. These four foundations are so 
radically interdependent that to compromise the integrity of any one necessarily destroys the 
others, toppling the entire structure of Western thought. I am reminded of the broadway musical 
Fiddler on the R oof (1964, by Stein and Hamick, based on the stories of Sholom Aleichem), in 
which the central character, Tevye, struggling with looming cultural changes, sings a song 
entitled “Tradition.” The song, which is reprised several times and provides a vital motif 
throughout the show, contains two lines that are particularly relevant to this discussion; ‘One little 
time, you pull out a prop, and where does it stop?...Pull out a tluead, and where has it led?’
Indeed, without these four foundations, the traditions o f the West are as shaky and unstable as a 
fiddler on the roof. And yet some (Peter Hodgson, for example) have questioned whether 
engaging in such errant semantic play as Taylor celebrates is the ethical equivalent of fiddling 
while Rome burns. While I am convinced that it is not, my defence of this conviction will 
emerge as this thesis develops (see fn. 135 for more).
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crumbled, it is as ludicrous to suggest that an A/author is the proprietor of his or her 
writing as it is to say that a book is the property or possession of its Ayauthor(s). 
Accordingly, the Book has theological co(i)mplications because ‘Cliristianity is a 
religion of the book, and the West is a book culture’ {E, 76), and naturally ‘God is not 
just any author, nor is His book just any book. God is the Author of authors who dictates 
the Book of books. For this reason, God is the Author to whom all authors finally defer, 
and His Book is the Book to which all books ultimately refer’ {E, 81). Taylor points out 
that ‘when the book is normative, theology tends to be systematic....If, however, we now 
stand “beyond” the closure of the book, then it seems likely that systematic theology is at 
an end’ {E, 79). If writing is the divine milieu, and if, as Taylor suggests, theology has 
reached a certain end (if an end which never finally arrives), it follows that ‘the 
theologian who realizes the implications of the closure of the book must become a 
“writer”’ {E, 79). The a/theologian, then, must be(come) a writer, and the writer, 
consciously or not, is the a/theologian par excellence.
To write (at) the end of theology means writing without end -  and in this sense, 
"E/erring is endless' {E, 184).”^  Taylor’s notion of the Book is coterminous with his 
understanding of History and, therefore, time. He conjures up the image of the Book as a 
Scroll, the closure of which involves the act of rolling up the scroll. In this form, the 
beginning and end are brought together in closest proximity to one another, fonning a 
circular boundary around the text. While the covers of the Book denote a certain 
linearity, the circuity of the Scroll lends itself to a circular construction of narrative and 
time. But Taylor reminds us that ‘Both circle and line are forms o f closure and figures o f
See also Taylor’s essay “How to do Nothing with Words” (T, 203-31), in which he writes: ‘To 
write beyond the end of theology is to write the lack of language that is (a) nothing other than the 
nothing of silence. ...To write the “beyond” that is not the end of theology, it is necessary to write 
in a way that is nonreferential without being self-reflexive’ {T, 223). Elsewhere Taylor notes that 
‘Literature writes the end of philosophy by writing without end’ {DC, 34). The same could be 
said for the relationship of writing to this end (of theology).
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plenitude that serve as totalizing metaphors' {E, 70) which prove inadequate once the 
pursuit of presenee is forsaken, and which expose the Book as fundamentally 
logocentric. The only presence (authorial, narrative, etc.) in the Book is, in this 
(dis)figuration, the presence of (an) absence. Taylor asserts that ‘The circularity of the 
volume reflects the closure of the book’ {E, 77) and the absent presence/present absence 
contained therein. After being wrapped around and around itself, coiled up like a 
serpent, the middle of the scroll -  the “body” of this would-be narrative -  is only empty 
space, a void, an absence.
To explore the idea of the Book, Taylor employs the concepts of Hegel’s 
encyclopedia and the labyrinthine “Library of Babel” in the short story of that title by 
Jorge Luis Borges.”” The encyclopedia, literally meaning ‘the circle of learning,’ ‘must 
assume the shape of a circle’ and is therefore thoroughly systematic: utterly complete, 
internally organised, self-referential and self-sufficient {E, 78-79). Contrast this with 
Borges’ Library of Babel which, although on first glance appearing to be so, proves to be 
anything but systematic, histead of encyclopedic -  circuitous and insular -  in structure, 
the library is an endless labyrinth which in(de)fmitely repeats itself and extends 
in(de) finitely in every direction. The universe of Borges’ library consists of hexagonal 
galleries -  all identical, all interconnected via portals in ceilings, floors and walls. Each 
gallery contains precisely the same number of shelves, which hold the same quantity of 
books, each made up of the same number of pages and lines of text. However upon 
examination, the characters of these “books” appear completely random, devoid of 
meaning, bearing no correspondence to one another or (with rare exception) to anything 
resembling decipherable inscription. Borges writes: ‘For every rational line or forthright
”” Taylor here refers to Hegel’s Encyclopedia o f  the Philosophical Sciences and Borges “Library of 
Babel,” which was first published in a collection appropriately entitled Labyrinths. See Taylor’s 
discussion of Borges’ Library {E, 75-76) and his discussion of Hegel’s encyclopedia {E, 78-79).
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statement there are leagues of senseless cacophony, verbal nonsense, and incoherency.’”"’ 
This textual cacography results in the spoken linguistic cacophony of the library, for ‘it is 
true that a few miles to the right...language devolves into dialect and that ninety floors 
above, it becomes incomprehensible’ {LB, 114). As the library contains no two identical 
books, it is believed to contain all possible books: ‘all that is able to be expressed, in 
every language. All -  the detailed history of the future, the autobiographies of the 
archangels, the faithful catalog of the Library, thousands and thousands of false 
catalogs...’ and on and on {LB, 115). While this understanding of the library leads some 
to fabricate systems of religious belief, ‘Infidels claim that the rule in the Library is not 
“sense,” but “non-sense”’ {LB, 117). Borges’ writing, in the end, reveals itself as a 
mirror of that which it discusses, and in this way Borges does not write about the 
cacography of the Library of Babel so much as he actually attempts to write this very 
cacography.
To speak is to commit tautologies. This pointless, verbose epistle exists 
in one of the thirty volumes of the five bookshelves in one of the 
countless hexagons -  as does its refutation. (A number n of the possible 
languages employ the same vocabulary; in some of them, the symbol 
“library” possesses the conect definition “everlasting ubiquitous system 
of hexagonal galleries,” while a library -  the thing -  is a loaf of bread or a 
pyramid or something else, and the six words that define it themselves 
have other definitions. You who read me -  are you certain you 
understand my language?) {LB, 118)
As such, the story is a non-story, without a plot, with no proper begimiing, middle or
end. In fact, the story “ends” with a footnote which further (un)veils the concept of the
library/Book:
...the vast Library is pointless; strictly speaking, all that is required is a 
single volume, of the common size, printed in nine- or ten-point type, that 
would consist of an infinite number of infinitely thin pages....each 
apparent page would open into other similar pages; the inconceivable 
middle page would have no “back.” {LB, 118)
”"’ Jorge Luis Borges. Collected Fictions, pp. 114. Further references to “The Library of Babel” will 
be abbreviated LB and cited in-text.
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When the dispossessed “narrator” of this “story” writes ‘The certainty that everything
has already been written annuls us, or renders us phantasmal’ {LB  ^ 118), he expresses
that which Taylor would have us believe about writing after the “end” of God (Author)
and the Self (author): that
the text is radically open. It is neither self-contained nor definitively • 
bound in a single volume. A text is more like a fabric with loose ends 
than a hemmed cloth... Since each text becomes itself in relation to other 
texts, every text implies a difference that dislocates its proper 
identity...every text [is] an intertext. {E, 178)
The fabric(ation) of intertextuality not only lacks beginning and middle; it 
has no end. Texts forever cross and crisscross in a perpetual process of 
interweaving... The meaning of a text, therefore, is never fully present. 
Meaning is always in the process of forming, defoiming, and refonaiing. 
{E, 179)
We therefore discover in the mazing grace of the wilderness Taylor’s nomadic 
‘ening scripture,’ which ‘renders meaning both transitional and transitory. Floating 
signifiers yield only migratory meaning’ (A, 175). ‘Having realized that the text is never 
his own, the author acknowledges his lack of authority. In staging what he had believed 
to be his wordplay, the writer eventually learns that scripture is the endless play of the 
word that dispossesses every subject....[The] author discovers that “his” proper name is 
an empty trace -  an erased mark’ (A, 181). The error, whom Taylor elsewhere calls an 
‘outlaw,’ is then related to Borges’ ‘infidel,’ who realises that the rule is not “sense” but 
“non-sense” -  for whom every saying is an unsaying and writing the end that is not the 
end means (not) writing (not) without end. In Am«g/erring, ‘The meaning of shifty 
mark(s) and shifting signs can never be fixed securely’ (A, 174), and the ‘truth can never 
be pinned/penned down’ (A, 176). Embodying this, Taylor has produced a work that 
elides definitive inteipretation -  an “impossible” B/book written by a ‘shifty M/mark’ 
who acknowledges that '‘there can be no such thing as proper or literal meaning. 
Meaning is always improper -  it is more literary than literal’ (A, 174). Like Borges,
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Taylor’s text enacts his own discussion -  namely, the labyrinthine structure of texts, of 
meaning, and by in(de)finite extension, of everything. Taylor’s use of repetition -  like 
his use of words purloined from others; like the (post-)structure of his text; like his 
implementation of metaphor and ambiguity -  is an enactment or embodiment of his very 
argument. The/“his” text is the impossible possibility of all textuality. In the fiayed 
lines of the/his text, we find ourselves entangled in Ariadne’s thread; lost with no hope, 
but no desire, to be found, as we know that ‘This loss is gi'ace’ (A, 168). In the 
wilderness, ‘truth is unbecoming’ (A, 176), a progression that is a digression -  a trespass. 
It is the endless transgi'ession which has always already been committed, and as such 
alleviates the need for forgiveness.
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III. (Dis)Locatiiig: A/theology in (Christian) Context
The meaning o f shifty mark(s)...can never be fixed securely.
(A, 174)
Overview
Having outlined the primary characteristics of Taylor’s a/theology, the task now 
is to situate a/theology within a particular, and a particularly Cliristian, theological 
tradition. Just as the death of God suggested by Hegel, prophesied by Nietzsche and 
described by Altizer did not simply appear unannounced on the horizon, neither does 
deconstructive a/theology spring forth fully-formed from the autonomous mind of the 
Author. Indeed, as a/theology itself renders autonomy and authorship impossible, and as 
Taylor’s a/theological writings are admittedly intertexts leading merely to other texts, it 
is both feasible and constructive to situate a/theology within a textual tradition horn 
whence it draws its inspiration. In Erring and elsewhere, Taylor traces his own thought 
back to Hegel, occasionally glancing further back to Descartes and Kant, and when 
appropriate, to St. Augustine. But I suggest that Taylor’s a/theology, and the tradition he 
identifies as his own, may also be understood as consistent with that of an even more 
ancient textual and performative tradition, a tradition often forgotten or repressed, but no 
less present for its absence. This tradition is afforded a certain return by the opening 
made by a/theology’s effort to think beyond the totalising structures of Western 
oppositional binaries, to think in the space between and discover that which is radically 
other and consistently left unthought.
This section will undertake a similar sort of (re)tracing or back-tracking as is 
often characteristic of Taylor’s own work. I will attend to the particular ways in which 
Taylor’s a/theology emanates fiom (intentionally or not) or extends themes and trends
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that are intrinsic to the Chiistian tradition. While I make no apologies for the seeming 
exclusivity of this focus, I would also assert that I am in no way attempting to totalise 
Taylor’s a/theology by contriving for it a location within the “metanarrative” of 
Christianity -  a currently fashionable theological vision that I do not wholly accept^^ -  
nor am I attempting to “Christianise” Taylor’s a/theology by forcing it into consistency 
with the tenets of orthodox Christianity. I acknowledge that Taylor’s work resists such 
totalisation, and that to understand his work in the first instance is to accept the 
impossibility of any such “metanairativisation.” What I shall attempt to do, in a mode 
that is more literary than anything else, is locate Taylor’s work within a textual and 
performative tradition that also includes traces of the Christian tradition; to locate within 
the Christian tradition the repressed, unthought “other” to which Taylor’s a/theology 
attempts to give voice; and to locate within Taylor’s work a repressed, unthought 
glimmer of Christianity not as realised in ‘the precincts once declared holy’ (RT, 259)^^ 
but as realised in that disastrous moment of utter abandonment of the Cross -  the silence 
that follows Jesus’ despairing death-cry.
This section will unfold in two parts. In the first, I will bring Mark Taylor’s 
deconstructive a/theology into what I hope will be a constructive dialogue with the 
gospel according to St. Mark.^^ It should be noted that I make no claim to be a biblical
I here wish to distinguish myself from the recent theological movement known as “radical 
orthodoxy.” While their programme is one with which I share many affinities and similarities, I 
do not wish to appropriate or be appropriated by their (over-)reliance on legitimating 
metanarratives. Those associated with radical orthodoxy are perhaps a less loosely-defined group 
than they might appear on first glance. For example, the centrality of the Cliristian metanarrative 
in the work of John Milbank (e.g. Theology and Social Theoty: Beyond Secular Reason) is much 
less a characteristic of the work of Graham Ward (e.g. Cities o f God). For the definitive collection 
of essays and an excellent introduction to this school of thought, see Jolin Milbank, Catherine 
Pickstock and Graham Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology.
Taylor’s full statement here is: ‘Worlds beyond the church -  every church -  have always seemed 
more fraught with religion than the world within the precincts once declared holy’ (RT, 259).
In an a/theology in which proper names are erased, it would appear ill-advised, if not simply 
asinine, to create such a dialogue solely on the basis of this nominatory coincidence. However, as
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scholar, but rather I approach the text of St. Mark’s gospel primarily as I would a literary 
text. When critical analysis of the gospel text should prove necessaiy, I will turn to two 
“authorities” that I have found most helpful, structuralist literary critic Frank Kennode 
and post-structuralist New Testament scholar Stephen D. Moore.^^ Not content to set up 
a one-way interpretive channel, I will endeavour to allow the “gospels” of St. Mark and 
Mark C. Taylor to read each other and when appropriate to read each other through 
other texts as well. Following this exercise, I will move forward several hundred years 
to examine the correspondences between Taylor’s a/theology and the Christian mystical 
tradition, focusing on “The Mystical Theology” of Pseudo-Dionysius^^ and the sermons 
of Meister Eckhart (1260-1327?). While I do not claim that a/theology is synonymous 
with the via negativa, I would suggest that a textual similarity seems to emerge when 
their respective writings are read alongside one a n o th e r .T h e  connections I wish to 
draw will further illustrate the textual and performative tradition shared by these various 
texts -  a tradition that does not find its place in the centre of established religious or 
philosophical discourse but in the margins, in the desert(ed) wilderness where those 
considered outsiders by those inside find space to err endlessly.
shall become obvious, St. Mark’s gospel, for all of its aporias and (arguable) incompletion, is the 
most conducive to the conespondences I wish to draw.
However, I would distinguish my own reading of St. Mark’s gospel from those of Kennode and 
Moore in this way: while I do read Mark (both Marks, actually -  Taylor and the gospel) in a 
primarily literary mode for the purpose of exploring certain tropes and traces, I hesitate to identify 
my reading as “secular.” In saying that I approach the biblical text as I would any other literary 
text is not to suggest the secularity of Scripture but to suggest the sacrality of writing -  ‘true 
fiction’ or (in Taylorian terms) ‘true scription.’ See Douglas Templeton, The New Testament as 
True Fiction.
The actual identity of the author of the texts attributed to Pseudo-Dionysius is highly debated 
amongst scholars. The texts, written in Greek, date from the fifth or sixth century.
Neither do I wish to paint Taylor himself as a sort o f contemporary mystic, but as should become 
increasingly apparent, “Mark Taylor,” as well as being a scholar, professor, writer (husband, 
father...), for our purposes should also be understood as a collection of texts, just as in her 
translator’s preface to Derrida’s O f Grammatology, G. C. Spivak writes that ‘Jacques Deirida is 
maître-assistant in philosophy at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris. He was born forty-five 
years ago of Sephardic Jewish parents in Algiers...(etc.)’ and then, having listed Derrida’s coipus 
of publications to date, asserts that 'Jacques Derrida is also this collection o f  texts' (emphasis 
mine). See Jacques Derrida, O f Grammatology. p. ix.
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This exercise of locating Taylor’s a/theology within a particularly Cliristian 
tradition is undeniably problematic. It is, perhaps, more accurate to describe my effort as 
attempting to locate a particular tradition, or a particular shared space, in which 
Christianity (and the Jewish tradition from which it springs), the gospels, mysticism, 
a/theology, philosophy, literature -  theory and practice -  might commune together. In 
the end, this location reveals itself as a ti/5'location, for it requires certain sacrifices be 
made on all accounts and inevitably results in irreconcilable (which is not to say 
irredeemable) tensions. In one particularly confessional essay, Taylor notes that ‘our 
differences increasingly are tearing us apart. Faced with this situation, 1 asked: Are the 
only alternatives a unity that excludes differences or differences that exclude unity?’ {RT, 
274). If the genesis of Christianity is located in the ultimate kenosis of God and Self on 
the Cross, then Christianity -  what it means to “be Christian” -  and the redemption to 
which Christianity bears witness must be figured (or ri/j-figured, as the case may be) 
differently than tradition commonly dictates. While on one level this “opening” created 
by the dissemination of the Word (made flesh) is, for established orthodoxy, a moment 
of disaster^ ^ -  of impossibility, seeming to create the very heterodoxy that orthodoxy 
fears and seeks to repress -  this opening, this utter loss which is grace, is a sort of 
through-road, ‘a third alternative that neither mediates nor synthesizes unity and 
difference and yet opens the space and provides the time for connections and 
associations that create and sustain differences’ {RT, 274).
See Maurice Blanchot, The Writing o f  the Disaster. While it would be futile to attempt to 
summarise the nuances of Blanchot’s aphorisms in full, this passage captures his notion of the 
disaster particularly well: T will not say that the disaster is absolute; on the contrary, it disorients 
the absolute. It comes and goes, errant disarray, and yet with the imperceptible but intense 
suddenness of the outside, as an irresistible or unforeseen resolve which would come to us from 
beyond the confines of decision’ (p. 4). Blanchot’s work appears to increasingly influence Taylor 
as his a/theology develops. See especially Taylor’s essay on Blanchot, “Nots” {A, 219-53) and 
“Nothing Ending Nothing” {TC, 41-75).
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Shifty Marks, Part I  -  Mark's Gospel and Mark Taylor
Recalling the four simultaneous “events” from which deconstructive a/theology 
emerges -  the end(s) of God, Self, History and Book - 1 suggest that the gospel 
according to St. Mark’s represents a textual example of the a/theological vision described 
in Mark Taylor’s writing. The “story” that St. Mark tells -  or, more appropriately, writes 
— like the “story” that Mark Taylor tells/writes, is not a proper story. It cannot be 
described as proper for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the absence of the 
A/author. In fact, the gospel text is perhaps a better example of this than any work in 
Mark Taylor’s corpus, for while the gospel we attribute to St. Mark was originally 
circulated anonymously and only later attributed to “Mark,”^^  all of Mark Taylor’s 
writings indubitably bear his name, the signatory stamp of the author. The 
questionability of the gospel’s author(ship) makes us question his (?) authority -  should 
we believe the words he inscribes in these pages? Is the story told therein truel Can he 
or it be trusted? It could be that the evangelist in question is sowing salacious seed, 
disseminating a dubious, perhaps devious, word. But, following Taylor, is this not a 
condition of our entrance into any piece of writing? It could be said that St. Mark’s text, 
which is not properly his property, as well as Mark’s excentric/eccentric central character 
(Jesus), is ‘always paradoxical, double, duplicitous, excentric, improper ... en*ant’ (A,
10).
Janice C. Anderson and Stephen D. Moore, eds. M ark and Method, p. 97. Moore further points 
out that ‘This name appears to have been stolen from certain neighbouring texts.. .that feature a 
(Jolin) Mark who was a companion of Peter and Paul.’ That the name associated with this gospel 
text is potentially purloined renders the identity and authority of the author all the more uncertain 
-  like Taylor, his signature is a ‘shifty M/mark’ (A, 174).
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Furthermore, the nan*ative of St. Mark’s gospel is improper in that it functions, on 
one level, as a narrative about the obscurity of namatives,^^ a writing about the problem 
or impossibility of writing, even hinting at something like Taylor’s notion of the closure 
of the Book. By any naiTative standards, the beginning and ending of Mark’s story are 
both a disaster. Whereas the other synoptic gospels begin with an explanation of Jesus’ 
origins -  Matthew providing a detailed genealogy, and both Matthew and Luke including 
accounts of the virgin birth -  Mark’s gospel provides no such account, and thereby ‘rips 
up its own birth record’ and 'ends with a virginal conception -  its own. Its tomb 
becomes a miraculous womb,’^ '^  from whence the Church is bom. Beginning with the 
proclamation of the good news of Jesus, Mark’s narrative (if it can may be described as 
such) actually begins not with Jesus but a pre-text about his pre-cursor; John, the 
messenger, a for(tun)e-teller of sorts. In fact, in telling of this teller, the writer 
unavoidably begins intertextually, refemng back to Malachi and Isaiah. It is as if the 
gospel writer, by pointing beyond the gospel to other texts, is preparing the reader for the 
excentric text to come. It seems that St. Mark could well have, like Taylor, begun by 
writing, ‘Clearly “I” did not write this text. Or at least “I” alone did not write it’ (A, xi).
Isaiah’s words in John’s mouth claim to make straight the Lord’s paths (Mk. 1:3), 
but paradoxically these paths are not made straight. Rather, the paths which prepare the 
way for the Lord are errant and lead in and out o f the wilderness -  these (a)mazing paths, 
leading eventually to the Cross, do not even end there but in fact journey on endlessly. 
The wilderness, a place not to be inhabited so much as passed through, is not unfamiliar 
to Jesus and his followers -  nor, as it turns out, to his precursors. John the baptizer, 
whose appearance marks the already uncertain beginning of Mark, ‘appeared in the
Frank Kermode. The Genesis o f  Secrecy. See especially Ch. 2, “Why Are Narratives Obscure?’
Anderson and Moore, Mark and Method, p. 86. See also Stephen D. Moore, Mark and Luke in 
Poststructuralist Perspectives, p. 7.
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wilderness, proclaiming’ (1:4)7^ This proclamation is John’s vocation -  his calling is 
simply to call, a vocation which is a vocalisation. This voice, crying out in the 
wilderness, has as its audience only fellow wilderness wanderers, those eccentrics 
content to dwell in the margins. These are John’s people, for John, ever the outsider in 
dress and manner, certainly does not fit well within “proper” society (1 ;6). He foretells 
Jesus’ coming, and the good fortune he tells indeed comes to pass. Jesus’ own baptism 
by John is itself an unusual event, with another vocalisation (not John’s) emanating from 
the heavens, identifying Jesus as the Beloved Son of this disembodied voice. The writer 
of Mark’s gospel is often preoccupied with voice, perhaps falling prey to the Platonic 
hierarchy that prefers speech to writing, for indeed the text that he writes is riddled with 
the spoken word -  with the riddles (called parables)^^ spoken by the Word.
‘Immediately,’^^  the text tells us, following his baptism by John, Jesus is driven 
by the Spirit out into the wildemess wherein he is ‘tempted by Satan; and he was with 
the wild beasts; and the angels waited on him’ (1:12-13). Jesus remains in the 
wildemess, in such unusual company, until John’s voice is airested and silenced, at 
which time Jesus retums to Galilee to carry on John’s work, his voc(alis)ation, his
All biblical quotations contained herein are from the New Revised Standard Version of The New  
Oxford Annotated Bible with Apoctypha, Bruce M. Metzger and Roland E. Murphy, eds. To 
avoid needless repetition, where not otherwise noted, biblical references (cited in-text, 
chaper:verse) refer to the Gospel according to Mark. Also, unless otheiivise noted, all italicised 
biblical passages should be understood as my added emphasis.
See Frank Kermode, Genesis, pp. 23-27. Kermode points out XhaXparable may be understood as 
a comparison, an allegory or illustration, but also as an enigma, a riddle or a “dark saying.”
This word (also translated then or at once) is a favourite in Mark’s gospel, lending a sense of 
immediaey or urgency to the text’s primary message -  the proliferation of the good news of 
Christ and the journey drawing Jesus and his precursors/followers ever nearer to the Cross. But it 
also lends to Mark a sense of constant movement and activity. Jesus’ journey, although reaching a 
certain “end” on the Cross, never truly ends, and the gospel writer takes great effort to textually 
embody the endlessness and endless trasitoriness of this dissemination of the Word, employing 
this term about forty times in a mere sixteen chapters.
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foretelling of the good news of God and the Kingdom coming, which both has come and 
is coming -  ever deferred, ‘here, not yet here...now-and-not-yet.
Jesus, fulfilling his calling (which as it turns out, is ca/Zmg), journeys from one 
place to the next across the pages of Mark’s gospel, collecting additional followers along 
the way, stopping to teach the occasional lesson to the astonishment of the religious and 
intellectual authorities, to rebuke demons and to offer healing to those in need. The 
writer tells us that ‘he cured many who were sick with various diseases, and cast out 
many demons; and he would not permit the demons to speak, because they knew him '
(1:34). This instance of the demons’ recognition of Jesus is important, for throughout 
Mark’s text -  as the alleged division between outside(rs) and inside(rs) emerges and then 
immediately dissolves -  it is those outside who most often recognize Jesus’ otherwise 
veiled identity, and it is those inside who continually miss the mark. The more Jesus 
speaks, the less it seems his listeners understand. His answers confound; time and again, 
his words mislead those inside, those closest to him. His illustrations, which are hardly 
illustrative of anything, only increase the confusion that Jesus’ words incur. Following 
the parable of the sower, Jesus tells his disciples ‘To you has been given the mystery of 
the kingdom of God, but fo r  those outside, everything comes in parables', in order that 
“they may indeed look, but not perceive, and may indeed listen, but not understand’”
(4:11-12). Mark later tells us that, ‘With many such parables he spoke the word to them; 
as they were able to hear it; he did not speak to them except in parables; but he explained 
everything in private to his disciples’ (4:33-34). The parable of the sower scattering his 
seed on terrain of varying fertility at first appears to illustrate the disciples’ inclusion in 
the hidden meaning of Jesus’ otherwise exclusive parabolic speech, but on closer 
inspection it may illustrate something else entirely. Frank Kermode reads the parable as
William H. Willimon and Stanley Hauerwas. Lord, Teach Us. p. 57.
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an excursus on the problem of interpretation^^ -  the seed sown is the very word of Jesus 
{the Word, according to John’s gospel), and as it is scattered upon the minds and hearts 
of men, it is received and digested in a number of ways. For some, the truth is stolen 
away by the enemy; for rootless others it is consumed but quickly squandered; and for 
some, represented by the ‘good soil,’ the word is heard, accepted, and bears much fruit 
(4:15-20). Earlier I suggested that one preoccupation in Mark’s gospel is the problem of 
speech and writing, and nowhere is that problem better demonstrated in Jesus’ parabolic 
speech. Take, for example, this allegorical explanation by Jesus of his own parable. As 
Jesus privately teaches the true meaning of his words to his disciples -  those elect few to 
whom the secret has been given — it seems Jesus could be referring not to spoken but to 
written words, as in a text.^ *^  As if  pointing not to words spoken out into the void like 
seed scattered hither and thither, but as if pointing to words (or pictures, hieroglyphs?^^) 
on a page, Jesus says: 'These are the ones on the path where the word is sown... And 
others are those sown among thorns: these are the ones...And these are the ones sown on 
the good soil’ (4:15, 18, 20). In this way, Jesus’ speech takes on the character of writing 
as condemned by Plato in the Phaedrus — it is the orphaned, fatherless word, destined to 
wander aimlessly to be picked up and inteipreted, used or misused, by anyone.
Furthermore, Jesus employs parables to interpret his parables.
The kingdom of God is as if  someone would scatter seed on the ground, 
and would sleep and rise night and day, and the seed would sprout and 
grow, he does not know how. The earth produces of itself, first the stalk, 
then the head, then the full grain in the head. But when the grain is ripe, 
at once he goes in with his sickle, because the harvest has come. (4:26-29)
See Frank Kermode, Genesis, pp. 23-47.
This conjecture is not rooted in any exegetical evidence but rather seives as a figurative 
suggestion to reinforce the multiplicitous nature of language -  particularly spoken language, and 
even more particularly of parabolic speech.
Taylor points out that hieroglyphics (derived from hieros, sacred + gluphe, carving) are ‘sacred 
inscription, holy w rif (A, 106). It is, then, not unusual that Jesus -  Mark’s ‘man of letters’ and 
John’s ‘Word made flesh’ -  should in John’s gospel account actually be found writing/carving 
out words in the ground (see John 8:8).
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Jesus goes a step further, comparing the kingdom of God to ‘a mustard seed, which, 
when sown upon the gi'ound, is the smallest of all the seeds on earth; yet when it is sown 
it glows up and becomes the greatest of all shioibs, and puts forth large branches, so that 
the birds of the air can make nests in its shade’ (4:30-32). In another pair of parables, 
both about sowing seed, Jesus seems to deliberately push the meaning of his words even 
further under the surface, burying the seed deeper beneath the soil; and the fruits 
produced by this seed will indeed testify to the (in)fertility of the disciples’ soil. Jesus 
parables are indeed like the mustard seed, which grows into a great shrub -  for some, it 
provides a habitable home; yet for others, it casts a shadow of doubt which looms larger 
the nearer they draw. And yet, even those who make their home in these branches are 
likened unto birds, bound to fly away, leaving behind their ever-so-temporary nests to be 
taken over by another or blown apart by the wind.
Both Frank Keimode and Stephen Moore point out that Jesus’ parables, according 
to Mark’s own interpretation, attempt to establish the distinction between inside and 
outside. While it seems that Jesus’ parables are designed to keep the outsiders out and 
the insiders in, Kermode intuits that ‘The sense of the parable...must be this: being an 
insider is only a more elaborate way of being kept o u ts id e .T h ro u g h o u t Mark’s 
gospel, the reality of this distinction is undermined. The lines between outside and 
inside become increasingly blurred the more Jesus moves and speaks amongst the 
people. His sustained presence, even with his disciples, seems to result in incident after 
incident of confusion and consternation. After feeding the multitude (6:30-44) and
Frank Kermode, Genesis, p. 27. (Note that Stephen Moore also picks up on this theme.) Kermode 
implies the possibility that the gospel writer himself is misled by Jesus’ parables, and needing 
sufficient explanation for these confounding words (which he, of course, did not hear first hand), 
added in this allegorical reading after the fact, attributing it to the riddler, Jesus. While the 
accuracy of postulation is, of course, impossible to determine, it yet hints at the underlying 
problem of signification and inteipretation implicit in Mark’s text -  how to determine what 
symbols mean? how to secure presence (o f meaning, o f  being) in the face ofprofoundest 
absence?
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Jesus’ phantasmagoric appearance walking on the sea (6:47-50), the disciples remain in 
the dark, mistaking Jesus for a ghost. By St. Mark’s account, it sounds as though the 
disciples are no different from ‘those outside,’ to whom ‘everything comes in parables’ -  
for evidently everything comes in parables to insiders as well. After witnessing so many 
miracles, seeing so many receive healing, hearing so many teachings, the disciples are 
still those to whom Jesus says in 7:18, ‘Then do you also fail to understand?’ They fail 
to follow and remain ‘on the inside looking in, as though they were in fact outside.
But Jesus continually points out their lack o f understanding: ‘Do you still not perceive or 
understand? Ai'e your hearts hardened? Do you have eyes, and fail to see? Do you have 
ears, and fail to hear? And do you not remember?’ (8:17-18) Perhaps the metaphor 
itself is the problem, for every time Jesus speaks of seed, grain, or bread, there seems to 
be a breakdown in communication. This is nowhere more evident than on the occasion 
of the Last Supper, in which Jesus tells his followers that the bread they eat represents 
his body (14:22). In John’s account, Jesus’ hyperbolic comparison of the bread to his 
flesh is met with characteristic perplexity: ‘This teaching is difficult; who can accept it?’ 
(John 6:60). Jesus knows that this conceit^"  ^is more than his followers can handle, that 
his misperceived concepts will ultimately conceive and bear forth chaos and discord.
Not long after he tells them that they ‘will all become deserters’ (14:27), Jesus’ disciples 
proceed to fall asleep on him, betray him, and finally, when ‘All of them had deserted 
him and fled’ (14:50), Jesus’ claiiwoyance proves accurate. Had they forgotten Jesus’ 
prediction, or had they just not listened? ‘Do you have ears, and fail to hear? And do 
you not remember?’ (8:17-18). Not only do the disciples have impaired perception, but 
it seems they have inadequate capacity for memory as well. Or to use Jesus’ own seed
Anderson and Moore, Mark and Method, p. 88. See also Stephen D. Moore, Mark and Luke, pp. 
13-14, 21-24. (Note also that Moore draws upon Kermode’s The Genesis o f  Secrecy.)
Note that conceit, as well as being an extended metaphor in poetic terms, is etymologically akin 
to conceive, conception and concept.
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metaphor, these insiders seem to have fertility issues -  their soil is a hostile recipient of 
the seed implanted therein. In fact, any time Jesus tries to sow his seed, his disciples 
misread his signals; every hint he drops, they fail to pick up.
And so it goes across the pages of Mark’s gospel. The distinction between the 
inside and outside breaks down time and again, and it is the W/word that affects this 
confusion, this mixing/fusing together o f assumed opposites. In fact, the more profound 
the words o f Jesus, the more they seem to cowfound those to whom they are directed. 
‘Sliced through,’ Stephen Moore writes, ‘Jesus’ speech is unable to reach its mark. It 
falls to the ground and is picked up wrongly. It is as if  Jesus were writing instead of 
speaking, as if  his disciples were reading instead of l i s t e n i n g . A s  the words/seeds of 
Jesus err time and again, wandering all over the pages of Mark, drifting ‘from 
misunderstanding to misunderstanding,’ we are reminded that ‘writing has always been a 
wandering outcast, drifting from (mis)reading to (mis)reading.’^^  Mark Taylor draws 
similar conclusions: like Jesus’ scattered seeds, ‘The words of the writer are always 
stolen’ (A, 16), carried away by birds, by Satan, or by those wielding the invasive scalpel 
of interpretation. Kermode notes that ‘Mark is a strong witness to the enigmatic and 
exclusive character of narrative, to its property of banishing interpreters fr om its secret 
p l a c e s -  and I suggest that this is true of both Marks, and indeed of Jesus. As Jesus 
conceals the messianic secret, constantly commanding those with whom he interacts to 
tell no one, Mark Taylor plays a similar game of cat and mouse with his reader — the 
errancy of his writing demonstrates how ‘Scripture turns everything inside out and 
outside in’ (A, 109).
Stephen D. Moore, Mark and Luke. p. 15. 
Ibid. p. 17.
Frank Kermode, Genesis, pp. 33-34.
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If there is any meaning concealed behind Taylor’s endless semantic playfulness, it 
might well be that the meaning is that there is no meaning -  in a similar way that the 
meaning behind Jesus’ life and words might be that on the cross, the Word is crucified; 
there is no life but in death. Revealing results in re-veiling, as the Word is wrapped in 
sheets (of paper, of linen), bound in a cloth cover, hidden away from sight. But Jesus 
says, and Mark reports, that ‘Heaven and earth will pass away, but my words will not 
pass away.’ The words of this writer (in this case, the Word himself) are destined to 
roam the earth eternally -  sharing the curse of Cain, the ‘fugitive and wanderer on the 
earth,’ marked by the Lord so as never to be killed (Gen. 4:12-15). Realising that these 
nomadic immortals receive such a fate for having committed the sin of fratricide, Mark 
Taylor warns that ‘(Ab)errant words are dangerous’ (A, 162). The letter kills -  kills, but 
cannot be killed. Jesus is likened unto the legendary Wandering Jew who mocked him 
along the via dolorosa. Both God and Man, Father and Son, Jesus is guilty of a giave 
murder -  his own: suicide, fratricide and patricide, all rolled into one.
Why is it that, traditionally, theologians and biblical scholars have regarded the 
gospel according to St. Mark as a slipshod piece of writing, a jumbled and primitive 
mess of narratives strung together, whose only canonical value is its role as source 
material for the more comprehensive and eloquent gospels of Matthew and Luke? Could 
it be that we are dis-eased by the en ancy of this bit of scripture? In his introduction to 
St. Mark’s gospel, songwriter Nick Cave writes that ‘Mark’s Gospel is a clatter of bones, 
so raw, nervy and lean on information that the narrative aches with the melancholy o f  
absence. If we have learned anything from the gospel according to Mark Taylor, it is 
that we fear and avoid this very absence because in it is manifest the incompleteness, the 
fallenness, that we desire to overcome by attempting to recover lost presence. And yet,
Nick Cave. “Introduction to the Gospel According to St. Mark.” p. ix. (emphasis mine)
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if we accept Taylor’s account of our errant condition, we must accept this that loss, this 
lack, is originary, always already in every (un)beginning and (un)ending. As Jesus’ body 
-  constantly in movement tliroughout Mark’s gospel, slipping from one place to the next, 
ever-so-slightly out of reach, until finally made most present in its death, its moment of 
profoundest negation -  escapes the final attempt to pin/pen it down and vanishes from 
the tomb, Mark ‘marks the closure of all presence that is not at the same time absence 
and marks the end of identity that is not also difference. In this way, the incarnate word 
spells the death of the God who alone is God’ (A, 106). We must accept that ‘In the 
absence o f complete presence, secure foundation, authoritative origin, and ultimate end, 
there is nothing other than erring’ (A, 179).
And, for that matter, what should we make of the ending of Mark’s gospel? 
Mark’s conclusion -  by never saying [or writing] ‘In conclusion...’ -  is profoundly 
inconclusive, though not inconclusively profound. During his trial, Jesus seems to 
abandon, or to be abandoned by his voice. His words, which have been the source of so 
much celebration and consternation, are now exchanged for a silence so powerful that 
even his inteiTogators are amazed (15:2-5). Jesus’ silence communicates more clearly 
than any other voice, and when he finally ‘gave a loud cry and breathed his last’ (15:37), 
in this moment of inarticulation, it is the final silence that speaks the profoundest truth to 
yet another outsider, ‘the centurion, who stood facing him, [who] saw that in this way he 
breathed his last, [and] he said, ‘Truly this man was God’s Son’ (15:39). On the Cross, 
in this most naked, definitive moment, as the temple curtain is rent in two (15:38), the 
curtain is finally pulled back on Jesus, revealing not the great and powerful Oz-like 
deity, but a feeble and frail man. Finally unveiled only in his death, Jesus no longer says, 
‘Say nothing to anyone...tell no one about this’ — ‘pay no attention to that man behind the
64
c u r t a i n . N o w  Jesus’ silence says it all; that is, it says everything by saying nothing.
And yet this un-clothing, this revelation is only the prelude to a re-veilation, when Jesus’ 
body is taken down from the cross, clothed in linen, and entombed (15:46). Even in 
death, however, as in life, Jesus’ body is always on the move, for when the women arrive 
at the tomb, they find it to be emptied o f its corpse/coipus and occupied by another 
young man, himself veiled in a white robe. ‘He is not here,’ they are told, ‘he has been 
raised... Go, tell...he is going ahead o f you to Galilee', there you will see him’ (16:6-7). 
But the women disobey orders, themselves now outsiders/outlaws. Still, with Jesus the 
action never ends, for the action is ening, the wandering word which even in death never 
passes away. Outlaws, like Jesus, John, the women, St. Mark and Mark Taylor, ‘travel 
about aimlessly and unprofitably.’ Their word, their writing ‘moves to and fro, hither and 
thither, with neither fixed course nor certain end. ’ The error, who is the true follower, 
turns out to be one who ‘not only roams, roves, and rambles but also strays, deviates, and 
errs...always unsettled and uncanny’ (A, 150).
Mark’s gospel ends; ‘So they went out and fled from the tomb, for tenor and 
amazement had seized them; and they said nothing to anyone, for they were afraid’ 
(16:8).^^ Any reader or writer will testify that this is no proper ending. According to 
Kermode, the “sense of an ending” is, of course, the organisation and unification of the
The Wizard o f  Oz (1939 film), dir. Victor Fleming. Based on L. Frank Baum’s novel The 
Wonderful Wizard o f  Oz. See http://www.imdb.com/title/ttQQ32138/
As Stephen Moore and countless others point out, Mark’s gospel has three known endings -  the 
one cited above (16:8), a ‘shorter’ ending that attempts to tie together all loose ends in a single 
verse, and a ‘longer’ ending of 11 verses. However, it is generally accepted amongst biblical 
scholars that the shorter and longer endings of Mark were added after the fact and were likely 
authored by someone other than the person responsible for the rest of Mark. As such, it is safe to 
regard 16:8 as the most “original” end of the text, although it is possible (though impossible to 
verify) that the writer intended to end Mark differently and was for some reason unable to 
properly conclude his work. Moore even goes so far as to suggest that, under this assumption, we 
might imagine a fourth unknown/unwritten ending that was the original author’s original intended 
ending, but this of course is largely inelevant to the discussion at hand, especially in light of 
Mark Taylor’s indictment of authorship and narrative coherence, and of the property/propriety of 
all writing.
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parts into the whole7^ But St. Mark’s ending neither organises nor unifies, but disrupts, 
upsets, teiTorises -  disorients, leaving all in ‘errant disaiTay.’^^  Like Joyce’s prototypical 
postmodern novel Finnegans Wake, which Kermode reminds us ends with the word the, 
St. Mark’s ending is either weak and ‘intolerably clumsy’ or ‘incredibly subtle’ -  
‘definite though barely p ro n o u n c e d .T a y lo r’s Erring ends with a similarly profound 
and confounding unending:
It is (un)finished 
Amen
Sobeit
(p.s'"
While beginning with the ‘trumpet call’ pronouncing ‘the good news of Jesus Christ, the 
Son of God’ (1:1), St. Mark’s gospel ‘ends with this faint whisper o f timid women’ -  
or, to adapt T. S. Eliot’s The Hollow Men, ‘this is the way the wor(l)d (of Mark) ends / 
not with a bang, but a whimper.
See Frank Kermode, The Sense o f  an Ending. For another useful study of endings in literature 
and theology, see Paul S. Fiddes, The Promised End: Eschatology in Theology and Literature.
See pp. 9-15 for Fiddes’ discussion of Kermode’s theory of endings.
Maurice Blanchot, Disaster, p. 4.
Frank Kermode, Genesis, pp. 67-68. See also David Jasper’s reflections on the ending/beginning 
oiFinnegan's Wake in his The Sacred Desert, pp. 153-54.
A, 184. I surmise that Taylor’s “(un)ending” can be understood duplicitously -  his ‘unconcluding 
postscript’ being simply the end matter (notes, “Biblio Graphy” and index) or, like Finnegans 
Wake, a loop in which we ‘beginegan’ back to the first words of the “Acknowledgments” -  Tf 
authorship is never original but is always a play that is an interplay, then clearly “I” did not write 
this text. Or at least “I” alone did not write it’ (A, xi). In this light, it is significant that Taylor 
chooses as Erring's epigraph lines from Wallace Stevens -  ‘Thinkers without final thoughts.. . ’ 
Also noteworthy is Taylor’s essay “p.s. fin again” (T, 55-72), which is a reflection on Altizer’s 
History as Apocalypse and which refers to Joyce, Blanchot and to Taylor’s own work. 
Unfortunately, the constraints of this project prohibit me from further exploring these 
connections.
Frank Kermode, Genesis, p. 68.
T. S. Eliot. “The Hollow Men.” In Collected Poems, 1909-1962. pp. 79-82.
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In Mark and Luke in Poststructuralist Perspectives: Jesus Begins to Write, 
Stephen Moore figures Jesus as a writer, a ‘man of l e t t e r s . S t .  Mark, in his writing (of) 
Jesus, demonstrates the way in which ‘writing is a kenotic process; it empties everything 
of absolute self-identity and complete self-presence... As a consequence of the eternal 
cross(ing) of scripture, nothing stands alone and everything “originates” codependently’ 
(A, 118). Perhaps this is why Jesus, intertextualist to the end, purloins his dying words 
from Psalm 22: ‘My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?’ (15:34). Jesus, the 
deceased father of his own now-orphaned words/writing, is likewise abandoned by his 
own father.
The wound of words -  of language, of writing -  is incurable, and its tear stains
every page o f Mark’s text. It is ‘a tear that can never be mended—a tear that can never
be wiped away’ (A, 233). In Erring, Mark Taylor writes:
Bewilderment reaches monumental proportions in the perplexing 
postmodern world. Instead of offering comforting reassurance, writing all 
too often discloses a world of endless contradiction and conflict. The 
Author having died and authors having disappeared, words frequently 
sound senseless and writing often seems to be more scribbling than 
scripture. The cacography of many postmodern texts reflects the 
cacophony of much contemporary experience. (A, 100)
According to this (mis)reading, could both the gospel according to St. Mark and the
writings of Mark Taylor be considered such ‘postmodern texts’ reflecting the cacophony
of some ancient experience -  an experience with no beginning or ending? Could this
ancient experience be the primal lack of presence, the absence of God, which we live and
die denying? To make such a suggestion, is it, then, possible to read Erring (for
example) as a sort of gospel? Whatever the conclusion, it should come as no surprise
that reading (both) Mark’s gospel(s) have left many ‘perplexed at these words’ (10:24)
which ‘frequently sound senseless,...more scribbling than scripture.’
Stephen D. Moore’s insightflil and exceedingly playful analysis of Mark’s gospel in Mark and 
Luke unfolds in Part 1 (pp. 1-84). See especially “Jesus as a Man of Letters” (pp. 11-18).
67
Shifty Marks, Part II  —  Mystics and Mark Taylor
In the Christian mystical tradition, as well as in the textual tradition of St. Mark’s 
gospel, we encounter a certain duplicity of language resulting from the confluence of the 
spoken and written word. The gospels, which are generally thought of as written texts, 
of course began as spoken testimony, were passed on orally and eventually inscribed for 
the sake of posterity and proselytisation. Also the writings of Chiistian mystics, which 
only survive to be studied in their textual fomi, demonstrate a similar duplicitous quality. 
For example, the sermons of Meister Eckhart, once (and probably only once) preached 
from the pulpit to a gathered congregation, are now preseiwed in written form. On the 
other hand, the works o f Pseudo-Dionysius suggest within their written form the nature 
of speech, as treatises in the style of oral lessons to a particular student. While probably 
never delivered orally as proper addresses, these written texts conflate the distinction 
between spoken and written language, betraying the way that one mode often exhibits 
characteristics of the other. When speech is inscribed in writing, testimony is 
transformed into textimony -  for once the immediacy of speech is irretrievably lost, 
writing is all that remains. To quote Demda, 'There is nothing outside o f the text.
Likewise, the texts that make up Mark Taylor’s corpus are riddled with this 
duplicity. Not simply a binary, Taylor’s writings are perhaps not so much duplicitous as 
multiplicitous. At times, Taylor relies on a sort of semantic playfulness that is only 
possible within the context of the written text, most obviously in the “/” of a/theology, 
which can be written but not spoken, or in his penchant for parentheticals, ellipses, puns 
and misspellings (i.e. reJoyce). But at the same time, Taylor’s writing often takes on 
characteristics of the spoken word, as in the distinction between tears and tears, which
Jacques Denida. Grammatology. p. 158. This statement might also be rendered 'There is no 
outside text' or ‘There is no outside to the text. ’ I mean to emphasise the lack of textual limit or 
outer boundaiy.
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may be spoken but not written. One rather peculiar formal feature of Erring is Taylor’s 
style of citation, which could, upon analysis, seem more akin to the conventions of oral 
than written communication. While most academic texts utilize copious and lengthy 
footnotes or in-text citations with corresponding endnotes and bibliography, Erring 
utilizes only endnotes and no in-text citations. The extent to and anonymity with which 
Taylor borrows the words of others, making them his own by incoiporating them into his 
own text is strangely un-literary and almost sneaky, for when Taylor quotes from another 
source, he more often than not leaves the author whose words he commandeers as his 
own decidedly unnamed, with only quotation marks and an endnote number to indicate 
that these words are borrowed. Rather than employing a style that would enable readers 
to know the source of a quotation as they follow the lines of the text, or by simply 
glancing down at a footnote, Taylor’s style is more difficult, more disruptive to the 
experience of reading his work by placing all such references at the end of the text. The 
result is that the reader must either choose to ignore the fact that Taylor’s words are often 
not his at all and resign herself to accepting the words as Taylor’s; or the reader, at the 
expense of any textual or naixative continuity, might choose to flip back and forth 
between the section of endnotes and the text itself so as to identify the “proper” source of 
the borrowed words. But this is, of course, not a very satisfactory (not to mention 
unsatisfying) way to read a book. And therein we have the paradox that Taylor seeks to 
create, for Erring is not properly a Book, or at least is not a proper book -  it is ‘a book,’ 
as one critic puts it, ‘that refuses to be a book.’^^  The status of this “book” is placed in 
quotation marks from the beginning, and actually from before the beginning as the 
acknowledgements, in which Taylor writes ‘this “book” (if it is a book)’ (A, xi), exist in 
the precursory void of roman-numeraled pagination. Taylor’s text argues that a Book
Eric Holzwarth. “Review of Erring: A Postmodern A/theology.” p. 259.
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requires a coherent narrative with an identifiable beginning, middle and end, and is the 
property o f a particular, self-possessed author. Consequently, Erring is suspicious from 
even before page one.
Just as Jesus’ parabolic speech disrupts the perception of the listeners in Mark’s
gospel, and just as, according to Oliver Davies, Meister Eckhart’s ‘particular use of
language...[is] full o f contradictions and flourish’ so as to ‘disrupt any premature
complacency in the mind of the listener,’ so also Mark Taylor’s writing places the
reader on precarious footing. The floor of this flinhouse of language is always moving,
sliding side to side, rocking to and fro with the intention of unsettling the balance and
equilibrium of the guest (reader). To enter into the maze of Taylor’s writing is to enter
the maze of textuality, the playful abyss that is language as a (w)hole. To understand
what Taylor’s writing is about is, in a certain sense, to miss the mark -  for Erring is
really about nothing. That is to say, Erring is not about anything because it is about (the)
nothing outside of itself -  it is, in the first and last instance, about the event, the
performative moment, o f reading the writing and writing the reading that is the text itself.
Full of writing, much of which is reading -  readings of other writings -  Erring conflates
the distinction between reading and writing in such a way that the reader must reflect
upon the plurisignification of these no longer simple terms, now complicated events.
Aniving at this impasse, we discover
language itself, which (as Eckhart knew) is a fundamental part of the 
problem. Language mediates the world to us with all its finiteness in 
space and time. And when we use it of God, it gets in the way by making 
an object of him [ '^ic], clothing him in concepts and images which are 
inappropriate to his uncreated nature. But if language is the obstacle, it is 
also paradoxically the place of our redemption.'^’
100 Oliver Davies, “Introduction.” In Meister Eckhart. Selected Writings, pp. xxxii-xxxiii. 
101 Ibid. p .  XXXV.
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Eckhart may be concerned primarily with language about God, but Taylor would perhaps 
suggest that language is equally incapable of providing the comforting clothing for 
which humankind longs. In the garden, it is the absence of God, of the immediacy of 
speech, that leads the first man and woman to (dis)cover their own nakedness, attempting 
to fashion clothing to hide themselves. Their exposure, not a source of dis-ease when in 
the presence of God, becomes in God’s absence a leprosy which must be hidden. In a 
manner as punning as ever, Taylor calls to attention the fact that ‘the tailor does not 
weave the material he cuts and sews. He stitches together textiles that have been woven 
by others...His writing is always a reading’ (A, 180). Language, it seems, is an ill-fitting 
garment, but it is all we have. It may indicate the loss of immediacy, of presence, but it 
is also a means of grace, a mediation that makes it possible to forsake any hope of return 
in resignation to the finite, the incarnate -  the now.
But to consider this loss of immediacy as a loss suggests an event prior to which 
existed the immediacy of presence -  an origin to recover. Taylor resists this notion, 
offering instead the language of lack as a condition rather than an event, not quite like 
Altizer’s apocalypse but more like Blanchot’s disaster. We do not live in the wake of an 
apocalypse that was so much as subsist in the condition of a disaster that, always having 
been, simply is. This subsistence is not existence in the ontotheological or metaphysical 
sense, but existence in an a/theological sense, a deconstructed sense, wherein existence 
equals erring, and erring, without begimiing or end, is all in all. The condition of erring 
is not banishment or punishment imposed upon humanity by God, as one reading of the 
Eden myth might suggest, but is simply the consequence of being human -  of human 
being(s), o f being(s) in relation. It is not God who has taken leave of us or banished us, 
but rather we who abandon God. ‘We are bom in an abandonment of which we have no 
memory. We can, therefore, never be sure that it occurred, where it occuned, whether it
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occurred. Nonetheless, we always “know” -  or so it seems -  that we have been 
abandoned....Though abandonment occurs, no one, no-thing abandons’ {AR, 253). 
Although the Christian nan ative figures this abandomnent as an act of wilful 
disobedience, we live (within) this abandonment as a inemediable condition. As Meister 
Eckhart reflects, ‘Man’s last and highest parting occurs when, for God’s sake, he takes 
leave of god’ -  or in the words of another translation, ‘Taking leave of God for the sake 
of God is the greatest act of renunciation that someone can make.’’°^  This renunciation 
is a moment of pure abandon(ment), of giving (up) freely with no hope or expectation of 
return. It might also be understood in terms of what Taylor calls denegation, a denial of 
both affirmation and negation that, denying itself, ‘entails negation without negation"
{AR, 32 -  italics in original).
In The Mystical Theology, Pseudo-Dionysius writes: ‘Now we should not 
conclude that the negations are simply opposites of the affirmations, but rather that the 
cause of all is considerably prior to this, beyond privations, beyond every denial, beyond 
every a s s e r t i o n . T h i s  “beyond” should not be understood in terms of transcendence 
(as in that which is higher than) but in a movement away from the centre and towards the 
limit. Living beyond affirms one as a peipetual outcast by denying one a place in the 
centre. This beyond is perpetual movement, wandering, erring along the margins, 
searching for the limit of the limit, the boundary that delineates the edge of the boundary. 
Pseudo-Dionysius goes on to discuss this in terms of aphaeresis, an ‘act of clearing 
aside’ that might also be rendered ‘denial.’’®'’ If our abandonment of God, this ‘leave- 
taking,’ is also an act of clearing aside, it is one in which we ourselves are also cleared 
aside, plunged ‘into the truly mysterious darkness of unknowing,’ the condition in which
See respectively Meister Eckliart, A Modern Translation (trans. by R. Blakney), p. 204; and 
Meister Eckliart, Selected Writings (trans. O. Davies), p. 178.
Pseudo-Dionysius. The Complete Works, p. 136.
’®'’ Ibid. p. 138 (fn. 11).
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one ‘knows beyond.. .by knowing nothing.’’®^ Like Jesus’ disciples in St. Mark’s 
gospel, perplexed by his parables, sacred knowing is an unknowing; likewise, like the 
centurion’s recognition of Christ in his moment of profoundest negation, unknowing is 
true knowing. The cross does not simply represent the place where opposites -  God and 
(wo)man, sacred and profane, death and life, etc. -  meet and are inverted; it is a place 
where opposites are crossed out, abandoned, denegated. This coincidentia 
oppositorunl^^ is not figured in binary terms (both/and, either/or, neither/nor) but as a 
radical chiasmus or over-turning which is beyond mere inversion -  a rupture of 
signification, of meaning, o f knowledge, and of being.
But being beyond is to be beyond the safety of home. In this way, to be beyond is
to be prodigal -  again, not banished or cast out, but one who makes oneself an outcast,
who clears aside the ties that bind and takes his leave to wander aimlessly and endlessly.
‘For the responsible person who stays near home,’ writes Taylor, ‘there is something
improper and disturbing about prodigality. The prodigal is given to extravagant
expenditure and tends to disperse property recklessly. Convinced that the father is dead,
the prodigal is unable to believe in any prospect of return. He is, it seems, destined to err
endlessly’ (A, 143). In 1849, in the midst of writing his Point o f View, Danish
philosopher and theologian Soren Kierkegaard wrote the following in his journal:
What Christianity needs for certain is traitors. Chiistendom has 
insidiously betrayed Christianity by wanting not to be truly Christian but 
to have the appearance of being so. Now traitors are needed.
But this concept, traitors, is dialectical. The devil also, so to speak, has his 
traitors, his spies, who do not attack Christianity but attack the Christians 
-  with the express purpose of getting more and more to fall away. God, 
too, has his traitors: God-fearing traitors, who in unconditional obedience
’®^ Ibid. p. 137.
’®^ See E. A. Livingstone, ed. Concise Oxford Dictionary o f  the Christian Church. See “Nicholas of 
Cusa.” A coincidentia oppositorum is a coincidence of opposites ‘wherein all contradictions 
meet. God is at once infinitely great and infinitely small, the center and circumference of the 
universe, everywhere and nowhere, neither One nor Tliree, but Triune’ (p. 358).
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to him simply and sincerely present Christianity in order that for once 
people may get to know what Christianity is. I am sure that established 
Christendom regards them as traitors, since Chr istendom has taken illegal 
possession of Christianity by a colossal forgery...
...I was contemplating the possibility of not letting myself be taken over 
by Christianity, even if  it was my most honest intention to devote my 
whole life and daily diligence to the cause of Christianity, to do 
everything, to do nothing else but to expound and interpret it, even though 
I were to become like, be like the legendary Wandering Jew -  myself not a 
Christian in the final and most decisive sense of the word and yet leading 
others to Christianity.^®^
Recall that, in addition to Hegel, the most significant figure in the development of
Taylor's thought is Kierkegaard, who inspired Taylor to learn Danish so as to read his
writings in their original language. While it is probable that Taylor, in his
comprehensive study of Kierkegaard’s works, read these words at some point, it is not
my purpose to somehow “prove” that Taylor intentionally set out to be the sort of traitor
to Christianity that Kierkegaard describes in this passage. It seems to me that the mantle
of the “traitor as true Christian” is not to be taken up and put off at will, but perhaps
simply is either something one is or is not. Perhaps to be the purest of traitors would be
to fully abandon Christianity ‘in the final and most decisive sense’ with no intention or
hope of ever returning, of ever being redeemed. The pure traitor would hardly intend or
even recognise his treachery as the deconstructive force that gives way to a
reconstruction. In this way, the hero of the Passion narrative might as likely be Judas as
Jesus (a possibility that Nikos Kazantzakis explores in The Last Temptation^^^). If the
events that culminate in Jesus’ crucifixion had to be set in motion by Judas’ betrayal,
then perhaps Judas is not Jesus’ foil so much as his co-conspirator. Likewise Satan,
traditionally the villain of the Eden story, is in fact a necessary component, an implement
Saren Kierkegaard. The Point o f  View. pp. 220-21.
Kazantzakis’ novel portrays a frail, human Jesus, afraid of death, uncertain of his ability to cany 
God’s plan to completion; Jesus implores an unwilling Judas, his loyal and protective ‘sheep­
dog,’ to betray him -  ‘We two must save the world,’ Jesus says. ‘Help me.’ See The Last 
Temptation, pp. 394-98, 430-31.
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in a greater scheme, for there would be no Fall without the tempter (and there would be 
no need for redemption without the Fall). As David Daiches reflects on Milton’s portrait 
in Paradise Lost, the story’s heroes, Adam and Eve, are afforded by Satan the 
opportunity to ‘face the post-lapsarian world with hope and dignity,’ a gift beyond 
compare. He goes on to write: ‘They leave Paradise, now made terrible by armed 
Cherubim, and slowly, hand in hand, leave their forfeited garden for the real world.’*®® 
And it is this real world to which Mark Taylor attends -  a ‘world without end,’ with no 
promised-land paradise to look forward to and no utopian garden at which to glance back 
longingly (at the risk of becoming a pillar of salt) -  a world where everything is as it is, 
as it is meant to be. The world without end is equally without beginning -  the world of 
the middle, the middest, where ‘the middle children of history’**® err to and fro, 
aimlessly and endlessly. The trick is not overcoming this condition by a denial of death, 
which turns out to be a denial of humanity, but learning to celebrate our carnality, our 
incamationality, as sacred in the most primary and profound sense.
Like Judas’ kiss, sacred writing (like that of Taylor, St. Mark, the mystics) is a 
betrayal of the logos -  the Word that claims to be steadfast and sure and in possession of 
tmth. By writing an a/theology that portrays language as eiTant, and erring as grace, 
Taylor enters into a strange realm that I suggest is similar to a liturgical performance. 
With language that is active, playful, shifty and more veiling than revealing of any 
certain meaning, Taylor’s writing becomes his act of worship, his sacrament, his means 
of grace -  it is this possibility to which I will direct my attention in the section that 
follows. To read the word, as to eat the Word made flesh, is to transform and to be 
transformed by this act. In this aberrant textual performance we discover that we are not
*®® David Daiches. God and the Poets, p. 48.
* *® Fight Club (film, 1999), dir. David Fincher, based on Chuck Palaliniuk’s novel.
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locked inside language’s prison house*** so much as caught up in its church house. In 
this place of worship, mediation is all there is, and the plurisignificance o f the Word is 
the totality of presence.
* * * This phrase, ‘the prison-house of language,’ is Nietzsche’s, and is borrowed by Fredric Jameson
for the title of his The Prison-House o f  Language: A critical account o f  structuralism and
Russian formalism. Nietzsche’s passage is reprinted as Jameson’s epigraph: ‘We have to cease to 
think if we refuse to do it in the prison-house of language; for we cannot reach further than the 
doubt which asks whether the limit we see is really the limit.’
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IV. (Dis)Embodying: A/theology in performance
Overview
Strange, that the act o f writing should deflect one's ideas so 
much from their proper course — I  thought I  knew by now 
how I  wanted to fashion that opening scene, and yet once I  
actually began putting pen to paper, it soon wandered o ff in 
quite the wrong direction. Sadly, I  can see only one 
solution to the problem. I  shall have to start again}^^
This is why my reading has no end: I  read and reread, each 
time seeking the confirmation o f a new discovery among the 
folds o f  the sentences.
In this section, I will consider the possibility of embodying, both literally and 
literarily, Mark Taylor’s a/theology as the praxis o f erring. As a description of the 
human condition under the shadow of God’s withdrawal, erring is not so much a 
theoretical concept as a perfoiinance, something we do, an activity in which we are 
engaged (wittingly or not), and as such might be considered a sort of liturgical 
enactment. For Taylor, this performance is nowhere more “real” than in the arena of 
writing, in the play of textual surfaces. As I have suggested previously, far horn being a 
‘prison-house of language’ or a ‘gaol’ of textuality,**"* the page for Taylor is a church- 
house, a wholly sacred space which is all the more holy for its holey-ness.
Thomas Altizer suggests in his Forward to Deconstructing Theology that Taylor 
is ‘the first American post-ecclesiastical systematic or philosophic theologian, the first 
theologian free of the scars or perhaps even the memory of Church theology, and the first 
theologian to address himself solely to the purely theoretical or cognitive problems of
* Andrew Crumey. Music, In a Foreign Language, p. 113.
* Italo Calvino. I f  On a Winter's Night a Traveller, p. 201.
* See fn. 111. See also Valentine Cunningham, In the Reading Gaol.
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theology.’**^  However, I suspect that Taylor is neither the first such theologian, nor is he 
completely free of the scars or memory of the Church. Taylor forgoes the task of 
interpreting religion (i.e. the Christian Church) to the world, and instead concerns 
himself with interpreting the world as a church -  in other words, a sort of religious 
reading of the world.* In this way, he is not so much interested in seeing the ways in 
which religion functions in the world as he is with exploring the ways in which the world 
behaves religiously -  the ways in which worldly practices take on a quasi-religious 
character as they are housed within the world. Taylor is not tmly ‘free’ from the 
ecclesia, as Altizer claims; rather, he seeks to rupture the boundaries between the sacred 
and the secular, the church and the world, to finger the wounds, to watch them bleed and 
blur into each other. Furthermore, Taylor cannot, as Altizer suggests, ‘address himself 
solely to the theoretical or cognitive problems of theology,’ simply because theory is 
inseparable from practice, a dictum which becomes increasingly apparent over the course 
of Taylor’s work.**^ Like the false line of demarcation between the sacred and the 
secular, the boundary between theory and praxis necessarily dissolves when theory is put 
into practice and when practices give rise to theory -  the two are co-determinative and 
coterminous. Taylor’s theory o f a/theology, which is the praxis of erring, is necessarily 
active. His thinking, and by necessary extension his writing, is always a doing. It must, 
in the first instance, be embodied and performed to be(come) anything at all.
For Taylor, this performance is necessarily interdisciplinary, leading him into 
dialogue with philosophy, literature, art, architecture, and technology. However, as this 
thesis is concerned with Taylor’s writings, and because a large portion o f his writings are
**^  Mark C. Taylor. Deconstructing Theology, p. xii.
* *® See Robert Detweiler, Breaking the Fall: Religious Readings o f  Contemporary Fiction. See
especially Ch. 2, “What is Reading Religiously?” (pp. 30-66).
* *^  Revealing his own position on the matter, Taylor writes; T have always believed that the worlds
o f theoiy and practice are inseparable’ {RT, 275).
78
about writing, I will attend to the perfonnance of erring as it is embodied in a textual 
milieu. In particular, I will focus on moments in Taylor’s work where he slips into an 
autobiographical or self-reflexive mode. Unlike traditional scholarly writing which 
strives to eradicate such subjectivity, these notably confessional essays and passages are 
necessary aberrations in the writing o f an a/theology -  as shall become clear, Taylor 
cannot do without them. In a secondary sense, I will also draw upon other stories which*
I believe capture the essence of a/theological writing -  the writing of erring.
Reading — Italo Calvino
The act of reading Italo Calvino’s novel I f  on a Winter’s Night a Traveller 
(written just a few years before Taylor’s Erring was first published) is unsettling, 
disconcerting. From the beginning, the line of demarcation between the reader outside of 
the text (i.e. me) and the Reader inside the world of the text (i.e. him, the novel’s 
protagonist) are obscured, if not erased entirely. The novel begins with a Reader who 
walks into a bookshop and purchases a copy of Italo Cal vino’s latest novel, I f  on a 
Winter’s Night a Traveller. Finishing the first chapter, the Reader realises that he has in 
fact acquired a corrupt copy of the book, for the book’s remaining pages contain nothing 
more than repetitions of that first chapter. When he returns to the bookshop to exchange 
his flawed copy for a correct one, he discovers that the novel he has begun is not I f  on a 
Winter’s Night a Traveller by Italo Calvino after all, but another novel by another author. 
However, by this time, the Reader is captivated by the story already underway and is 
intent on tracking down and finishing the book he started. The narrative, which eschews 
most narrative conventions, commences from there into a search for the Book -  first one, 
then another, then another -  a Book which is whole and complete and coherent, with a 
proper beginning and a proper ending, with a discernible plot and a definitive author.
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But what the Reader encounters, time and again, are books that begin but do not end; 
chapters extracted from their contexts; beginnings of stories that, without ever 
proceeding on to middles and ends, arguably even qualify as begimiings. The Reader 
labours in vain, for the true Book for which he searches is not to be found -  it turns out 
to be an impossibility, an elusive and ultimately illusive hoped-for object that cannot be 
grasped. In the novel’s penultimate chapter, the Reader’s ‘tempest-tossed vessel’ comes 
to port in a library, where the Reader encounters a series of anonymous other readers 
who offer reflections on the problem of one’s encounter with the text. One such reader 
notes;
Reading is a discontinuous and fragmentary operation.. .fri the spreading 
expanse of the writing, the reader’s attention isolates some minimal 
segments, juxtapositions of words, metaphors, syntactic nexuses, logical 
passages, lexical peculiarities that prove to possess an extremely 
concentrated density of meaning.. .like the void at the bottom of a 
vortex...**^
Is this not the predicament of all reading, of every attempt of a reader to grasp, possess, 
and capture the meaning behind any piece of writing? Certainly the reader o f  Calvino’s 
novel, along with the Reader in Cal vino’s novel, comes to realise the frustrating and 
problematic nature of our encounter with texts. I f  on a Winter's Night a Traveller 
deliberately directs the attention of the reader(s) to this; it requires a certain amount of 
reflection on the multiplicity of naiTatives for the reader to even continue his reading in 
spite of the mounting frustration of reading stories that begin but do not end, that open 
but are never brought to a close. By creating a text (but hardly a “Book”) that embodies 
the very problem it seeks to explore, Calvino’s novel creates a ‘discontinuous and 
fragmentary’ reading experience, one riddled with metaphors and ‘lexical peculiarities’ 
and that gives the reader(s) a sense of ‘the void at the bottom of a vortex.’ It is a
Italo Calvino, Winter's Night, p. 201. The final reader notes: ‘The ultimate meaning to which all 
stories refer has two faces: the continuity of life, the inevitability of death’ (p. 204).
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collision of the “real” world with the narrative world, the collusion and confusion of the 
reader (me) with the Reader (him) that unsettles both worlds, dispossessing both readers 
o f any original or final certainty.
Yet this is the excitement of entering into what Taylor calls the ‘fiin house’ of
reading. While ‘Many people enjoy the fun house only as long as they are convinced
that there is an exit...[for] other camival-goers, the assurance of an exit takes all the fun
out of the fun house. These wary readers are persuaded that the only thing more
disconcerting than uncertainty is certainty’ (E, 76). Our encounter with a text, any text,
is one which requires what Coleridge calls our willing suspension of disbelief,**® our
willingness to get lost in the fun-house of the narrative world. When I successfrilly get
lost, what is lost is my Self, and with my Self, my certainty o f anything inside or outside
of the narrative world. My every attempt to capture meaning or truth from a text is ill-
advised and bound for failure, for the text spins what Calvino terms ‘a network of lines
that enlace,’*^® and reading places us within this network. I do not capture the text, but
rather the text is a net that holds me captive. I am not, however, bound within a cell o f a
prison-house; I am set free and sent on a journey in the bound-/e5.s wilderness of the
page. Paul Auster provides a wonderful description of such errancy:
He wandered. He walked around in circles. He allowed himself to be 
lost...Cut off from everything that was familiar to him, unable to discover 
even a single point of reference, he saw that his steps, by taking him 
nowhere, were taking him nowhere but into himself. He was wandering 
inside himself, and he was lost. Far from troubling him, this state of
C. Hugh Holman, ed. A Handbook to Literature (4‘*’ ed.). See “Suspension o f Disbelief ’ -  ‘The 
willingness to withhold questions about the truth, accuracy, or probability of characters or actions 
in a literary work. This willingness to suspend doubt makes possible the reader’s temporary 
acceptance of the vicarious participation in an author’s imaginative world. The phrase suspension 
o f  disbelief comes from Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria, in which he writes of “that willing 
suspension o f  disbelief îov the moment, which constitutes poetic faith’” (p. 435).
*^ ® Italo Calvino. Winter’s Night, pp. 106-11.
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being lost became a source of happiness, of exhilaration. He breathed it 
into his very bones...and said to himself, almost triumphantly: I am lost.’ *^
As I get lost on this journey of reading, I discover that, in Christian terms, the only way
to find my Self is to lose my Self -  to allow my Self to be lost, utterly lost, abandoning
all hope of ever being found. This reading of lost-ness, which is the lost-ness of reading,
is the essence of erring. Reading Taylor’s writings, I find myself engaged in the sort of.
erring that Erring and his other works are about -  the semantic playfulness; the erratic
intertextuality culled fi'om Taylor’s own readings of other writers’ texts; the deliberate
inconclusiveness; the sense of one writing in a disembodied voice. ‘In other words,
writing is always in other words’ {E, 119).
Writing — Paul Auster, part I
The lost-ness that we encounter through reading is characteristic of all writing. 
For Taylor, writing is that which is no longer possible in the same way after the death of 
God. And yet it is an unavoidable, even necessary characteristic of erring a/theology.
He asserts that ‘writing inscribes the disappearance of the transcendental signified. In 
this way, scripture embodies or enacts the death of God, even as the death of God opens 
and releases writing. The disappearance o f the transcendental signified closes the 
theological age of the sign and makes possible the free play of a/theological writing’ {E, 
105-06). The disappearance of the transcendental signified, which in Taylor’s synthesis 
of Derridean and Altizerian thought is synonymous with the death of God, might be 
better understood as less an “event” and more the “condition” of the withdrawal or 
absence o f the F/father. It is this absence that consumes Paul Auster in his memoir The 
Invention o f Solitude. Auster’s writing, which is very important to Taylor himself.
Paul Auster. The Invention o f  Solitude, pp. 86-87. References to this work hereafter cited in-text 
as IS  with corresponding page numbers.
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explores very similar themes as those which consume Taylor: issues of language and
identity, of writing and art, of meaning and ex isten ce .S tru g g lin g  to write of his
father’s sudden death, Auster confesses:
The closer I come to the end of what I am able to say, the more reluctant I 
am to say anything. I want to postpone the moment of ending, and in this 
way delude myself into thinking that I have only just begun, that the 
better part of my story still lies ahead. No matter how useless these words 
might seem to be, they have nevertheless stood between me and a silence 
that continues to terrify me. When I step into this silence, it will mean 
that my father has vanished forever. (IS, 65)
The death of the F/father, or (M)other for that matter, leaves one with ‘nothing left to
say. Always nothing left to say. But how to say it?’ (TC, 136) Taylor writes these
words in the wake of his own mother’s death, words which mark the “beginning” of an
essay in which Taylor says nothing, he does ‘nothing with words ’ in an attempt to
respond to that to which no response is appropriate or sufficient. Death, not so much an
event as a condition, is that to which the only response is silence, death’s withdrawal and
the absence that is left over as trace. Taylor writes, ‘Death.. .is always sudden.. .even
when it comes slowly.. ..More I cannot say. The suddenness of it leaves no room for
thought’ (TC, 138). It appears that death is that which does not appear so much as
surfaces as that which is always already present within life. Wrestling with the death of
his mother, Taylor notes that ‘Death is always in some sense the death of the m-other -
even when it is the death o f the F/father or S/son,’ and as such ‘repeats the nonevent that
has always already taken place and thus never aetually takes place’ (TC, 146). In his
own writing, Auster reflects on the absurdity of writing about the nonevent of death:
In Hiding, Taylor writes: ‘Paul Auster is one of the most inventive authors currently writing. 
Best known for works that are commonly regarded as detective novels, Auster uses this popular 
genre as a disguise for provocative reflections on the nature and limits of language’ (H, 47). 
Taylor discusses Auster’s remarkable “City of Glass” (the first part of his New York Trilogy) in 
the first chapter of Hiding (H, 41-58). Even more remarkable are Taylor’s reflections on his 
“introduction” to Auster, on the nature of life, death and chance, and on (to borrow from Calvino 
again) the ‘network of lines that enlace’ Taylor’s own life (see H, 63-71). Upon reading Auster’s 
The Invention o f  Solitude (see above fn.), Taylor writes, ‘it was clear to me that Auster and I were 
pursed by similar demons and obsessed with the same uncamiy ;e ne sais quod (H, 64).
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Slowly, I am coming to understand the absurdity o f the task I have set for 
myself. I have a sense of trying to go somewhere, as if I knew what I 
wanted to say, but the farther I go the more certain I am that the path 
towards my object does not exist. I have to invent the road with each 
step, and this means that I can never be sure of where I am. A feeling of 
moving around in circles, of perpetual back-tracking, of going off in many 
directions at once. And even if I do manage to make some progress, I am 
not at all convinced that it will take me to where I think I am going. Just 
because you wander in the desert, it does not mean there is a promised 
land...
For the past few days, in fact, I have begun to feel that the stoi*y I am 
trying to tell is somehow incompatible with language, that the degree to 
which it resists language is an exact measure o f how closely I have come 
to saying something important, and that when the moment arrives for me 
to say the one truly important thing (assuming it exists), I will not be able 
to say it.
There has been a wound, and I realize now that it is very deep. Instead of 
healing me as I thought it would, the act of writing has kept this wound 
open. At times I have even felt the pain of it concentrated in my right 
hand, as if each time I picked up the pen and pressed it against the page, 
my hand were being tom apart. (IS, 32)
Auster’s and Taylor’s writings about life and death intertwine and enlace both writers
and the reader. These confessions have a strange resonance, a ghostly quality, when read
in parallel, like twins separated at birth but still somehow, across time and space, sharing
(in) the feeling -  pain, despair, ecstasy -  o f the other. Both Taylor and Auster write
about the wound of words, and the inevitable impossibility of writing in the face of the
profound absence that accompanies death -  the death of God, of the F/father, of the m-
other. Both write of the fear that accompanies every attempt to express the inexpressible.
What both writers inscribe is the failure of language to capture grief, to respond to death,
to heal anything at all. In an essay entitled “The End(s) of Theology,” Taylor writes: Tn
the aftermath of the death of God, religion no longer heals wounds by binding together
the opposites that tear apart...religion exposes wounds that can never be cured.’
Religion and writing, each of which might be understood as the attempt to cheat death by
Mark C. Taylor. “The End(s) of Theology.” p. 244.
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fabricating immortality, inevitably fail. And yet the practice of writing, and of religion, 
is no less necessary for this failure.
Remaining -  Paul Auster, part II
I began by referring to Calvino’s novel because, as with Auster’s writing, in it I 
find an incredible literary embodiment of the a/theological vision of textuality traced in 
Mark Taylor’s writings, and in a way no less significant for being unintentional. Like 
Calvino’s novel, Taylor’s texts are not so much definitive treatises filled with conclusive 
meaning so much as wanderings across the surfaces o f and boundaries between texts. 
These wanderings inevitably do not lead to intellectual enlightenment or describable 
conclusions but rather to the shadows that result from the eclipse o f (the) 
E/enlightenment, and the inexpressible, inarticulate place where language gives way to 
silence -  where ‘we plunge into that darkness which is beyond intellect, [where] we shall 
find ourselves not simply running short of words but actually speechless and 
unknowing.’*^"* By striving to embody textually the very discussion they undertake, 
Taylor’s writings become a performance -  a performance of the impossibility of their 
own being or meaning. For example, in Altarity, Taylor begins with an ending -  an 
introduction to the volume titled ‘Encore’ -  wherein he writes: ‘To “begin” with an 
encore is not to bring the argument full circle but is to call into question all forms of 
circularity by confessing (at the outset) the uncertainty of conclusions and the 
impossibility of concluding’ {A, xxxiii). Whereas Erring concludes with an ‘Interlude,’ 
which itself “ends” with its own sort of ‘(un)concluding postscript’ -  {p .s- Altarity in 
a strange way picks up Erring’s gaping parenthetical. ‘A p. s. is, of course, something
Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 139.
Taylor’s ‘(un)concluding postscript’ recalls Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript. 
Note that Taylor’s own postscript whereby Erring “ends” is unconcluding -  an open-parenthesis 
that never achieves closure, and a ‘p.s’ that never receives its final full-stop.
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like an encore -  a supplement to what appeared closed, a remainder left after everything 
seemed finished’ {A, xxxiii). The work is never complete; this wor(l)d without end is 
always unfinished. Like Calvino’s serpentine, suiTeptitious novel, Taylor’s texts always 
leave a remainder. In an important essay reflecting on his deconstructive a/theology 
some 15 years on, Taylor “begins” thus: ‘I thought I was done with God -  or that God 
was done with me. But I suppose I am not, at least not yet. And I am beginning to fear 
not ever. Erring was to have ended it all but it has not’ {AR, 29). In other words, while 
at the time it may have been considered (by others if not Taylor himself) an attempt to 
bring about the “end” of theology by tracing the “ends” of God, Self, History and Book, 
Erring essentially ends nothing, or perhaps only ends as much as it begins. What ends 
with Erring’s wor(l)d without end is the need, the desire, for an end -  a proper end; 
fulfilment; completion. What Erring then begins is fear that the work is not yet done, 
and indeed will never be done -  not ever. Thus we must begin to attend to what remains 
beyond the end. This remainder is the sacred which approaches (as it simultaneously 
withdraws) at the moment when ‘Belief in God becomes impossible and belief in the 
impossible unavoidable’ {AR, 31). Taylor writes that ‘the sacred is that which allows 
God to be God by enabling God to be other than everything that is not god. God, in 
other words, is an after-effect or symptom of the sacred’ (AR, 32). The sacred remains, 
and with it, God -  ‘Questions linger, calling us to linger with the question’ (AR, 30).
Paul Auster’s novel Moon Palace (1989) is an exceptional example of an 
unending text and deserves at least brief mention here (although the a/theological 
implications of this novel are too complex to fully explore in this context). The novel is 
the story of M. S. Fogg, a young man who after a period of self-destructiveness is hired 
to be the companion of a blind, ill-tempered, and dying elderly man named (or pseudo-
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named, as it turns out) Thomas Effing.*^® The majority of the novel consists of Fogg, the
narrator, recounting to the reader his experiences with Effing, the bulk of which consists
of Fogg’s transcription of Effing’s life story. Effing confesses, and Fogg writes.
Actually, Fogg wrote (the novel is written thoroughly in past-tense) Effing’s confession,
and now Fogg writes the novel that the reader reads. (Of course, Auster is the actual
author -  if  such designation is even possible -  which even further complicates the
relationship between author, narrator, confessor, and reader. Pseudonyms proliferate as
the naiTatives crisscross, straying to and fro.) Throughout his task of writing Effing’s
life, Fogg doubts the veracity of the story his pen produces, but eventually he gives up:
After a while, I stopped wondering if he was telling the truth or not. His 
narrative had taken on a phantasmagoric quality by then, and there were 
times when he did not seem to be remembering the outward facts of his 
life so much as inventing a parable to explain its inner meanings....[It] 
was all so farfetched, and yet the very outrageousness of the story was 
probably its most convincing element....I simply wanted to let myself go 
along with it, refusing to question whether these things had happened or 
no t {MP, 183)
Fact intermingles with fiction, and finally, for Fogg, fiction becomes fact.
Moon Palace is also on one level about the search for the F/father. The identity 
of Fogg’s father is a life-long mystery to him, but this all changes after his encounter 
with Effing. In a strange and rather far-fetched turn of events, Fogg learns that Effing, 
who by refiguring his own identity had left behind an orphaned son, is actually his own 
grandfather -  Effmg’s anonymous son is Fogg’s anonymous father. After Effing’s 
death, Fogg finally meets his “real father” Soloman Barber, who turns out to be hardly 
real or a father, and fails to possess the wisdom of his biblical namesake. And yet the
While I realise there is no connection between the two, and indeed to suggest so would be 
wildly far-fetched, I am amused by the fact that Effing and Erring are only distinguished by one 
letter. In the novel, Fogg intuits that Thomas is most likely a reference to doubting Thomas, and 
Effing’s surname is a play on ‘fucking,’ shortened to f-ing,. Ergo, by re-naming himself Thomas 
Effing, Julian Barber effectively calls himself ‘Fucking Thomas, the man who fiicked his life’ -  
implying a certain cursedness, among other things. See Paul Auster, Moon Palace, pp. 184-85. 
References to this work hereafter cited as MP  with corresponding page numbers.
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Effing, the Father of them both, even in his absence ends up sending these two, Barber
and Fogg, on an errand, an eixant journey that eventually leads to the de(con)struction of
both father and son. The journey begins with Effmg’s confession, laboriously written by
Fogg’s own hand, and ends with Fogg’s decision to leave everything, his very life,
behind in pursuit of the past life of a virtual (and dead) stranger, a stranger who is his
Father. The story Fogg tells “ends” like this:
That was when I started walking....! walked the whole of that day, from 
sunup to sundown, walking as thought I meant to punish the ground 
beneath my feet. The next day, I did the same thing again. And the day 
after that. And then the day after that. For the next three months, I 
continued walking, slowly working my way west...Once I reached the end 
of the continent, I felt that some important question would be resolved for 
me. I had no idea what that question was, but the answer had already 
been formed in my steps, and I had only to keep walking to know that I 
had left myself behind, that I was no longer the person I had once been.
[...] I had come to the end of the world, and beyond it there was nothing 
but air and waves, an emptiness that went clear to the shores of China.
This is where I start, I said to myself, this is where my life begins. (MP, 
305-06)
At this point it becomes clear why Fogg has told (written) the entire story in the past 
tense, and even finally “ends” the book in the past tense: because the real story is yet to 
come -  here-not-yet-here. The ending is a beginning. The story moves into the present 
tense now, but this story has not and cannot yet be written. In a sense, it is like Erring -  
the response now is to go and do likewise, to take up the mantle of this eiTant vision and 
“go ye and wancl-er(r) likewise.” Moon Palace does not end as much as simply fade 
away, wander off into the sunset...there is no way to know what the world beyond might 
bring, life or death. By writing (a story/book) without end, Fogg’s (Auster’s?) story 
becomes a world without end....a wor(l)d without end....a prelude to the coming 
unknown, to the unknown that is to come.
Fogg’s journey to the end of the earth is a wandering into himself which results in 
the loss of the Self. It is also a wandering into a past which never was, and which cannot
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exist as anything but fiction. Of course, Fogg’s journey west is also physically -
topographically -  a journey into the desert of the American west, which Effing describes
as ‘The flattest, most desolate spot on the planet, a boneyard of oblivion. You travel
along day after day, and you don't see a goddamned thing.. ..It’s a dead world, and the
only thing you ever get closer to is the same nothing....A giant cemetery was what it was,
a blank page of death’ (MP, 154). Taylor, too, considers the desert synonymous with the
blank page, and indeed the venue of physical erring might be the arid wasteland of the
desert just as the venue of literary erring is the wilderness of the blank page.
The desert is the place of time im-memorial, time outside of time, time 
that can never be recollected, time whose silence cannot be broken. This 
time is never present, nor is it absent; rather, it approaches by 
withdrawing. Desert, after all, is a verb as well as a noun. To desert is to 
withdraw, leave, forsake, abandon. Desert... deserting: What withdraws? 
Who forsakes? What abandons? Who is abandoned -  and to what?**^ ^
The Father deserts the son; the Son deserts the father. The Son deserts his Self,
abandons his own history, his-story. He closes the book on the life he has known, and
looks ahead into the abyss o f what lies beyond the end. He abandons any hope of
recovery, of ever being recovered. He gets lost -  and in so doing, embarks on his
greatest journey, taking his leave (of God, of Self, of History, o f Book), again and
again...into the wor(l)d without end. Only the trace, the remainder, remains.
Wandering - th e  Wilderness
Taylor’s wandering writings are in large part writings about wandering. In 
Erring, Taylor draws on a passage from Henry David Thoreau, entitled “Walking.” He 
explores the various semantic implications of walking, wandering, and sauntering, 
suggesting that to saunter is to be sans terre, without a land or home {E, 149-50). Yet to 
be homeless, that is, to call no-where “home,” is also to be at home everywhere. To
Mark C. Taylor. “Rubbings of Reality.” {Unpublished essay)
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saunter is also to wander towards Sainte Terre, or the Holy Land -  to be a ‘holylander.’
In a sense, the holylander is one who follows the sacred, which inevitably sets one on a
journey of erring, and leads into the wilderness. Yet in each case, the errant wanderer is
a happy drifter, content to saunter. Taylor sets this in contrast to the ‘unhappy, lacerated
consciousness’ {E, 152) of the guilty subject who understands the loss o f presence as an
acquired deficiency rather than an originary lack. For this unhappy soul
Lack...is regarded as a deficiency that should not be or as an emptiness 
that ought to be filled. When carried to completion, the pursuit of mastery 
proves to be a self-contradictory undertaking in which an agent 
simultaneously tries to deny deficiency and attempts to satisfy need. The 
historical subject’s apparent self-affirmation (which is covert self­
negation) is mediated by the negation of other subjects and objects. 
Though intended to demonstrate self-sufficiency, the effort to subjugate 
otherness actually discloses incurable need. The master who needs to be 
master is no master at all. {E, 69)
We must come to accept that ‘if lack is “original” and not secondary, then it is not
necessarily a deficiency’ {E, 148). The people of God have always wandered. Scripture
tells us that the Israelites erred for years in the wilderness in search of the promised land
-  which might be understood as a quest to recover lost, promised presence -  but the
promise is ever deferred and never fulfilled. Indeed, as Auster writes, ‘Just because you
wander in the desert, it does not mean there is a promised land’ {IS, 32). The origin
cannot be recovered because it never was. The promise will never come to pass in the
future because the future never is and never will be. The desire for the promised land is,
in a way, an end unto itself, for to fully realise and receive the promise brings an end to
desire. Taylor suggests that ‘When desire forsakes the prospect of complete satisfaction,
it opens the possibility of delight.... Since delight always involves loss, the joy it brings
is an anguished joy’ {E, 148). But this does not mean we forsake the quest. On the
contrary, our ‘desire desires not satisfaction but desire itself {E, 31). The journey
always implies the end that, paradoxically, is never finally realised, and the meaning
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sought is found in the search for meaning itself. It is not an end at which we arrive, for 
as Taylor argues over and over, the end at best eludes us, and more likely is an illusion in 
the first place. This a-teleological or an-eschatological vision is at first glance 
antithetical to orthodox Christianity, and indeed to most world religions save perhaps 
Buddhism. But Taylor’s point is that the purpose of the end is the desire for the end, the 
desire for fulfilment. The thing that sustains Chiistian practice is the hope for the 
Kingdom come, coming but not yet here. To bring about the fulfilment of this hope is 
the end to the hope. Therefore, for now, we must not give up hope, but embrace our 
hope even more fully as an end unto itself. Our hope is built on nothing past or future, 
but rather on nothing less than the eternal now of everlasting hope. As Charles Winquist 
writes, ‘The text is never a totality. The self as subjectivity is always u n f i n i s h e d . T o  
accept the incompletion of desire, of hope, is not to admit defeat, but to acknowledge the 
triumph of hope in the face of all despair and adversity.
Wrestling  -  the Wound
As we wander, we encounter others along the way. These other wandering errors 
sometimes take the form of angels, but sometimes appear as demons. Sometimes they 
grant a blessing, and other times they curse us or leave us wounded. If wanderings 
always follow  after the sacred, it seems that actual encounters with the sacred are few and 
far between. The sacred is that which is wholly Other, the divine which oftentimes takes 
the foim of the demonic. On the journey, the leader retains the possibility of becoming 
the adversary. Valentine Cunningham writes that ‘the encounter with the Other, with the 
transcendent, the divine is, literally, wounding.’*^® In Genesis 32, Jacob goes out 
wandering and encounters the divine in the form of a man, with whom he wrestles until
Charles E. Winquist. Desiring Theology, p. 126.
*^ ® Valentine Cunningham. “It is No Sin to Limp.” p. 305.
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daybreak (Gen. 32:24). Jacob (who we might recall is a trickster, thief of his brother’s 
birthright -  an error in his own right) demands that his opponent reveal his identity. But 
his opponent responds not by stating his name, but by giving Jacob a blessing. Jacob 
makes the same misjudgement that we all do -  confusing identity with presence, 
believing that ‘To be a self is to possess and to be possessed by a name’ {E, 34). For 
this adversary of Jacob’s to be “real” in any way, he must be a Self and therefore must 
have a name. Yet the opponent gives no name, but rather gives Jacob a wound and a 
blessing -  a blessing in the form of a wound -  a blessing that appears as a pharmakon of 
sorts, a cur(s)e. Jacob, like everyone who encounters the sacred, emerges from this 
encounter a changed man. Identities are not just refoimed, but deformed, radically 
altered. Every such encounter involves a dispossession of sorts. Names are taken away 
and replaced with pseudonyms: Jacob, ‘the supplanter,’ becomes Israel, ‘the one who 
strives with God.’ Some come away blind (St. Paul) or, in this case, lame. Jacob’s 
conversation with this mysterious Other takes place both physically and verbally. The 
two struggle with one another, struggle together, each attempting to master the other, to 
emerge as the better. As opponents, their aim is the same -  or perhaps it is not. Perhaps 
Jacob’s aim is to be the victor, while the intention of the Stranger is simply to give Jacob 
the blessing, and it is only by wounding Jacob that he is able to accomplish his goal. In 
any case, it should come as no surprise to us that, as Mark Taylor implicitly suggests, 
every encounter with the sacred, via texts, via art or architecture, via technology or 
indeed any commun(icat)ion, even via traditional religious rituals like the Eucharist, 
necessarily involves a sort of laming -  or as my own father used to say, ‘It’s all fun and 
games until someone gets hurt.’ Our every attempt at mastery is bound for failure, and 
our every wrestling match inevitably ends with our walking away wounded. This is the 
nature of communion, of communication, of conversation -  for every conversation
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inevitably leads to conversion, to further convers(at)ion. David Jasper reminds us of 
violent nature of every literary, or even literal, conversation, writing: ‘Conversations—or 
even, after the experience of Jacob, wrestlings with the mysterious ‘other’...need space— 
a room at least—across the text, with a delicate consideration of environment, that is the 
textuality o f the text.’*^® Interpretation is an invasion into the text, and the place that this 
invasion occurs is the page itself. The words penned by the writer fall under the gaze of 
the reader, but when the reader turns to interpret, his invasive tool is, too, the pen -  his 
reading becomes a writing, as ‘His writing is always a reading’ {E, 180), a drama that is 
staged along the lines of the page.*^* Under Enlightenment-era auspices, the right 
amount of cutting into the text eventually leads to uncovering the kernel of pure meaning 
hidden within the text. However, in an a/theological vision that embraces the metaphor 
of erring, our engagement with the text is a struggle that cuts into us, wounds us, and 
uncovers the emptiness and dispossession hidden beneath every surface. Jacob’s 
wrestling match ends at daybreak, but his limp lasts forever. The alteration is visible and 
is the result of divine altarity -  otherness that can be neither avoided nor escaped.
Limping ~ Valentine Cunningham
Reflecting on Jacob’s struggle with the angel, Valentine Cunningham writes:
This God, like this story, just won’t go away. Our whole experience is 
marked indelibly by this past and by successive encounters with it, and 
our whole culture limps after. It is for many a disagreeable residue, a set 
o f too painful traces, reminders, and remainders....Encounters with this 
mystery, with such mysteries, with stories and texts and histories like this, 
are the kind of necessary, painful, laming, stmggle that, as the Jacob story
130 David Jasper. “From Theology to Theological Thinking.” p. 296.
Taylor writes: ‘A book is no more possible without blanks than speech is possible apart from 
silence. Books stage an unfixable play in/of black and white’ {E, 92).
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has declared from the begimiing, can be redemptive, saving, transforming, 
healing...
This idea of the wounded wanderer might be a slight supplement or correction to 
Taylor’s construal of the happy wanderer. We can be happy despite our wounds, 
certainly, but it is nigh impossible to saunter erringly through this desert (as Erring at 
times seems to envision) when we are so wounded. As we follow the sacred, 
occasionally we might have the strength to walk, but most of the time, it seems, we limp 
or even crawl. We are bound to limp through life, bearing the marks of a presence only 
known in absence, which, in a sense, make the presence all the more present. The 
wound is the trace, the sign, and in the end, all-in-all. The wound is incurable. As 
Cunningham later writes, ‘the people of God must limp.. .limping is no unfortunate 
contingency of the encounter with God, but a necessary component of i t . . .The grip of the 
divine wrestler persists -  and harshly. He leaves a mark -  an inerasable mark -  that’s a 
kind of scarring, a legacy of pain.’ This legacy of pain is what writers like Taylor, 
Auster, Calvino and others inscribe in the pages of their writing. The pen is (mightier 
than?) the sword. Paper cuts.
Confessing -  (Un) Writing the Self
After Jacob’s blessing/wounding, he undertakes a re-naming of his own, calling 
the site of the encounter Peniel, meaning ‘the face of God,’ and confesses ‘For I have 
seen God face to face, and yet my life was preserved’ (Gen. 32:30). (Interestingly, he 
seems to assume or intuit that his encounter was with God, for his opponent, with whom 
he wrestled thioughout the night, never actually revealed himself. Perhaps those who
Valentine Cunningham. “It is No Sin to Limp.” p. 309. It is noteworthy that this essay was 
delivered as a sermon to the University of Oxford, 12 May 1991. The phrase ‘it is no sin to limp’ 
has its origins in rabbinic midrash.
Ibid. p. 307.
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encounter the divine in such a way, and who come away wounded, do not have to be told 
but simply Imow what they have experienced.) Jacob’s confession is a necessary 
accompaniment to the encounter, the necessary but painful follow-up to the 
wound/blessing of God. In Taylor’s own work, and we have also seen that this is true of 
Auster’s fiction,
the page tends to become a confessional without walls where our most 
intimate thoughts and unthoughts stand revealed for all to see and hear. 
Faced with the prospect of such exposure, we grow modest and withdraw. 
Devising strategies of avoidance in an effort not to think and not to say 
what nonetheless we cannot not think and cannot not say, we turn to 
history, politics, economics, literature, art. {AR, 30-31)
Taylor’s writings often subvert the conventions of scholarly writing by periodically
shifting into such a confessional or autobiographical mode. The essay cited above,
“Denegating God,” is one such example. In this essay, Taylor almost completely forgoes
the strictures of academic writing -  the references to other works, citations and footnotes,
etc. -  for exactly the sort of confession that he describes in the above passage. The
critical gaze is directed back at his own writings, and his own self, in a soul-searching
moment of self-reflexion. The essay reflects on a/theology, on the (lasting?) impact of
Erring, and to its reception around the time of its publication. Taylor describes the
reactions of colleagues, comments or letters he received, criticisms to which he never
found the right words of response. He traces the syntheses in his thinking that led to the
production of Erring, and attempts to clarify some of the most often misunderstood
components of his a/theological vision, writing:
A/theology is not the opposite of theology and must not be identified with 
atheism. Neither exactly positive nor negative, a/theology draws on the 
resources of deconstruction to develop a nonnegative negative theology 
that seeks to think what Western ontotheology leaves unthought. By so 
doing, a/theology traces the limits of theology in a way that displaces 
classical concepts of God. [...]
The first task of the a/theologian is to reread the theological tradition 
against the grain in an effort to discern the unsaid in the midst of the said.
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This is the deconstructive moment of a/theology. Second, it is necessary 
to move beyond deconstruction sensu strictissimo to reconfigure 
theological notions in an a/theological register. At this point, more radical 
implications of a/theology begin to emerge. (AR, 40)
Taylor deals with his own inability to respond to the criticisms his early work received,
and as the earlier passage suggests, might even consider the development of his work
thereafter to be a withdrawal -  a strategy o f avoidance in the foim of a turn away from
the (original) subject toward other subjects, away from depth and toward surfaces.
Elsewhere in this essay, he writes,
Since I am always lacking, the I is always wanting. This lack and this 
want, which are never my own, are gifts of the sacred...For a gift to be a 
gift, it must be prodigal, extravagant, excessive; it must, in other words, 
be an expenditure without return. The very possibility of return 
introduces an element of calculation that annuls the gift. (AR, 43)
This statement suggests the very essence o f erring -  gratuity, lack, wandering, limping. 
Acknowledging a wound that sometimes comes at the hand of another, a mysterious 
divine stranger, but oftentimes is the violation of one’s own hand.
In “The Betrayal of the Body: Live Not,” the last chapter of his Nots, Taylor 
writes about a very personal experience: the ritualised violence of the syringe in self­
administered insulin injections designed to regulate his diabetic condition; the wounding 
by his own hand; the injection of a foreign, synthetic substance, an antidote that is both 
cure and poison. Taylor spends the bulk of this essay exploring the medical phenomenon 
of autoimmune disease as an event wherein ‘the body inevitably betrays itself (N, 239). 
After a thorough and insightful synthesis of medical research and poststructuralist 
linguistics, Taylor concludes that ‘autoimmune disease results from the body’s failure to 
distinguish self from nonself. The body mistakes itself for an other and initiates an 
attack on itself, which is nonnally reserved for foreign invaders... autoimmune diseases 
result from a breakdown in the communications systems that govern the body’ (N, 246). 
But as the essay nears its end, Taylor shifts from a scholarly tone into the profoundly
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human voice of confession, of a mortal man trying to make sense of his frail body. In a
voice so much his own that it seems not his own, he writes:
I remember all too well (how could I ever forget?) the first time I suffered 
by my own hand the wound of the syringe. It was not the pain I dreaded, 
though there was that, but the violence, the violation o f my body. Its 
wounding, puncture, bleeding; the injection of a foreign, synthetic, 
artificial agent. I felt that I was betraying the body that had betrayed me. 
Wound upon wound, betrayal upon betrayal. What would it all solve? 
What would it cure?
My body, which, of course, is not my own, is a text that remains 
unreadable for me as well as the others who watch over it....[T]he more I 
struggle to achieve “reasonable control,” the more I am forced to admit 
that control is neither reasonable or possible. Things are always out o f  
control.
In time, it all becomes ritualized....Rituals are often violent and bloody... 
As in any ritual worth repeating, there is a moment when death draws 
near....
“This is my body 
broken”*^"*
As if gushing emotion into a diary, the sort of “book” the author never intends for 
another to read, the page becomes the stage upon which this drama is played out; the 
page becomes the altar for this sacramental performance. And like the needle in Taylor’s 
own hand, which violates the trust of his own body, the pen in his hand violates his trust 
by spilling the ink of confession all over the page. The diary is unlocked, not hidden 
away but left in plain view. This most private o f rituals, something as personal as a 
medical condition, the tonnent and turmoil that accompanies a failing body -  these 
confessions become for Taylor a necessary part of his writing. For his writing, like his 
body, is not ultimately his own, and to read these words, as to write them, is a violation 
of tiust. And yet, in both instances, this violation is necessary. Diaries are meant for 
keeping secrets, and yet, if I want to keep something truly secret, I would never write it
N, 253-55. (I have here opted for a footnote rather than an in-text citation of this passage so as 
not to disrupt the intentional textual placement of Taylor’s final, eucharistie phrase.)
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down in the first place -  not even “just for me.” In this way, a diary is meant for secrets 
that must be told, trusts that must be broken...sins that must be confessed.
In About Religion, again the last chapter, “Indifference,” Taylor re(ac)quires this
confessional voice, writing under various subtitles: Betrayal, Loving, Letting-Go,
Disappointment. In Abandomnent, he writes of a miscarried pregnancy and the sister he
never knew. Later, at the very end, in these few pages which serve as a sort of “public”
diary of his own, Taylor writes about his mother’s secret diary. He describes stumbling
upon the private book ‘years before her death while looking for some writing paper in a
drawer in her desk’ {AR, 262), but his intrusion into her concealed thoughts is interrupted
by approaching footsteps.
The page my eyes fell upon as if by chance described the room they had 
prepared for the baby....Though she gave no hint, it was clear that birth 
was near.
I never finished reading the diary. When we faced the melancholy task of 
emptying the house after he died, the drawer of her desk was where I went 
first. But the diary was gone....Did she have second thoughts about 
writing what she had never said? Did she consider (her) writing a 
betrayal?...Did they fear I would betray their secret? Didn’t they see that 
the secret was not theirs to betray or betray not?...Didn’t they know that 
their not-telling was telling? Did they realize, long before I, that the 
writing I believe was my own betrayed a secret I did not know by 
rewriting a diary I had never read? {AR, 262)
The miscarriage of the sister he never knew marks Taylor’s life with a profound sense of
absence. Life and death exists from the beginning, even before the beginning. His
sister’s life that never was could well have been, while his life could have been the one
that yielded to death before the beginning.
It began, as it always begins, with loss, lack, absence. A loss that 
occurred not long before I was and will continue long after I will have 
been. This loss was not, therefore, my loss, yet it is the loss that has, in no 
small measure, made me what I am and am not. The loss was the loss of a 
nameless one -  a nameless one who will remain nameless or who will be 
named only in the absence of which “my” name has become the mark. 
{AR, 248)
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Further (re)writing the story of his unborn sister, Taylor writes: ‘Without this wound I  
am not; with this wound I am not. Since wounding is the unavoidable condition of my 
being, recovery is impossible’ {AR, 251). Accepting the way life is marked by others, by 
everything, by nothing, is accepting that “my” life is not my own. This is the 
disappearance, this dispossession o f the self. This is the loss that cannot be recovered, 
for “I” am in large part inesponsible for who “I” am, for my very being. I am the result 
of events that have no narrative coherence except as it is imposed in retrospect, and the 
chance gift of my life is nothing more than the gift of chance (JT, 63). What underlies 
this feeling of abandonment, of loss and lack and absence, is the sort of “Indifference” 
that Taylor explores in this section, asking ‘What would it mean to live (with) 
indifference?’ Contrary to Peter Hodgson’s criticism, the implications of indifference in 
Taylor’s work are far from being devoid of ‘ethical s e r i o u s n e s s . T h i s  indifference is 
‘a difference that would make a difference’ {RT, 265), not ignorance of or blindness to 
difference, but rather an ‘essential indifference...[which] is always slipping away and, 
thus, is never present. Even when it seems near, indifference remains impossible.
In his review of Erring, Peter Hodgson writes: ‘Taylor’s god, it appears to me, is for those who 
don't need a real God -  a God who saves from sin and death and the oppressive powers -  because 
they already have all that life can offer; this is a god for those who have the leisure and economic 
resources to engages in an endless play of words, to spend themselves unreservedly in the 
carnival of life, to engage in solipsistic play primarily to avoid boredom and attain and certain 
aesthetic and erotic pleasure. Taylor's god is a god for the children of privilege, not the children 
of poverty; a god for the oppressors, not the oppressed...’ (pp. 257-58). I consider Hodgson’s 
remarks demonstrative of a fundamental misconception of Taylor’s work. The ethical 
seriousness of Taylor’s deconstructive a/theology, and indeed of any deconstructionist enterprise, 
is bound to the uncertainty of meaning that attends the deconstructive event. Positivistic 
approaches require the negative so as to avoid becoming essentialist and totalising (or worse, 
totalitarian) -  ergo, for one to be “certain” about the nature of the Divine is to risk abusing what 
one understands or believes to be the “will” of God. Centuries of Chiistian histoiy attest to this 
dangerous tendency, and, tragically, we can see that this concern is still great -  perhaps the 
greatest it has ever been -  simply by looking at the response of the United States to 9/11 and their 
consequent (though largely unrelated) initiatives in the Middle East under the auspices of a “War 
on Terror.” If the necessary result o f a theology such as Taylor’s is a fundamental uncertainty 
about the Divine, even to the extent of the abnegation of (belief in) God, it could be said that 
perhaps the most ethical option in the “information age” is the pursuit of doubt -  unknowing 
rather than knowing, unieason rather than reason, illogic rather than logic. To attend to the 
immanent, even to the negation of the transcendent, is not abysmally nihilistic (a critique often 
levied against Taylor’s work) but rather purely humanistic or existentialistic, which situates us 
within the realm of the here and now {hie et nunc), the ethical realm of human relationality.
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Strangely, the impossibility of indifference does not engender indifference; rather, its 
impossibility is what makes indifference so alluring’ {AR, 251). This indifference, this 
underpinning nothing that obsesses Taylor as it does the mystics, is what Meister Eckhart 
also writes about in terms of “Disinterest,” or what another translation renders 
“Detachment”;
Now I ask what the object o f pure disinterest is. I reply that it is neither 
this nor that. Pure disinterest is empty nothingness....What is the prayer 
of the disinterested heart? I answer by saying that a disinterested man, 
pure in heart, has no prayer, for to pray is to want something from God, 
something added that one desires, or something that God is to take away. 
The disinterested person, however, wants nothing, and neither has he 
anything of which he would be rid. Therefore he has no prayer...
Emptying  -  Kenosis
A common theme throughout these topical explorations is that of kenosis, which 
is both biblical and Hegelian, of emptying, or more precisely of s-e^emptying. The 
reader becomes lost in the nairative world. The writer loses himself in his creative 
practice, which might not be a calculated “craft” so much as an addiction or an 
obsession. Furthermore, the writer finds himself exposed in the confessional chamber of 
the text, spilling himself out all over the page for all to see. Confession, or 
autobiography, is not a solution to the lost Self -  that is to say, it is not a means of 
finding  the Self -  but inevitably fails, resulting in the utter loss, disappearance and 
dissolution of the Self. This is the embodiment, which is finally a (dis)embodiment, of 
erring; this is a/theology put into practice. By writing, and writing without end, the end 
is (being) written -  but it is an end that is found only in an emptying out, a move from 
the transcendent to the immanent, from immortality to mortality, from infallibility to 
eternal fallenness, from belief to disbelief, from speech to silence and from immediacy to
Meister Eckhart. A Modern Translation, pp. 88-89.
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mediation, from knowing to unknowing, to not knowing by knowing (the) not. This is 
where we are being led, and, being led, we must remember that we are always following. 
What we inevitably follow is the sacred, for as Taylor writes: ‘To follow the sacred -  
and everything as well as everybody inevitably follows the sacred -  is to err’ {AR, 45).
Of course, as the sacred inevitably leads us outside the ‘spaces once deemed holy,’ we 
find ourselves in the secular, and thereby the divisions between the two -  the sacred and 
the secular or profane -  tend to dissolve, deconstruct, and in desolation, allow the space 
for (re)construction to occur -  to see the sacred where it once was forbidden by 
structures designed to divide, to keep the sacred (God) in here and not out there. But 
indeed it does not have to be this way, and this is one thing that deconstruction, and that 
a deconstructive a/theology, might uniquely provide -  an opportunity to see the sacred in 
the unlikeliest of places, to explore God’s presence in the places which seem the most 
devoid of God -  to unfetter God by breaking the ligature of -ligion, the demonic 
captivity of Legion, so as to allow re-ligion to re-bind us back spiritually to the sacred 
(God) and ethically to one another.
Therefore, by embodying the very deconstruction that is carried out, Taylor’s 
words are the sacrificial victim of the deconstructive event. The body (corpse) of 
Taylor’s corpus is crucified, marked out on/with the cross. The sacrificial offering is the 
very sacrifice of Erring. This self-embodiment turns out, then, to be a certain 
disembodiment, as the texts time and again reveal their holey-ness. However, it must be 
inscribed as a (dis)embodiment, not fully embodied or disembodied, for ‘The word is 
never disembodied [since] it is forever inscribed in writing’ {E, 119). Writing is the 
embodiment of the text/scripture, but its body is broken and its blood is spilled. Poured 
out, writing is
radically, and thus “originally” kenotic....Kenosis is a self-emptying that
becomes actual in the cmciflxion of independent individuals. This
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kenotic process is not a once-and-for-all event, confined to the distant 
past. It occurs repeatedly in and tlnough the dissemination of the word. 
The word is spread through the cmcifixion of the self. Here lies the 
unavoidable passion of writing. {E, 141-42)
Like seed which must die to grow into life, for the word to spread, it must die and be
reborn as writing. The corpse becomes the corpus. The wooden cross, stained with
blood, is refined into paper and marked with ink. The stone that once covered the empty
tomb becomes a tablet inscribed with the proclamation ‘The Word is not here.’ The
folds of the loose grave-clothes contain the mysterious and troubling message of the
blank page -  nothing. Not a mark, stain or tear. Not a jot nor a tittle.
Coda — on Praxis^^^
The passion of writing... the Passion of Christ...the Passion of the Word 
{Logos)...ihs Passion (of) play. We have followed Taylor into ‘the desert of criticism, 
not airiving at but passing through a place where we may learn to read all writing as 
scripture, and all scripture as erring. ‘Within the relative play o f erring scripture, 
interpretation does not unveil established meaning but produces new meanings that have 
not previously been realized. So conceived, interpretation extends the text through an 
endless process of multiplication, pluralization, and dispersal’ {E, 180). For this reason,
In a similar way that this entire thesis is designed to somewhat mirror the “shape” that I suggest 
Taylor’s a/theological project has taken, in this section, I have intentionally mimicked Taylor’s 
formal style in “Indifference,” his final essay in About Religion (pp. 248-62). As has been 
repeatedly suggested, theory and practice are inseparable, and as such, I have found it both 
beneficial and in a sense necessary to embrace the conventions (if such things as a/theological 
“conventions” exist) of the material that I seek to discuss. In his introduction to Mark and Luke 
in Poststructuralist Perspectives, Stephen Moore writes, ‘Rather than take a jackhammer to the 
concrete, parabolic language of the Gospels, replacing graphic images with abstract categories, I 
prefer to respond to a pictographic text pictographically, to a narrative text narratively, producing 
a critical text that is a postmodern analogue of the premodem text that it purports to read’ (p. 
xviii). While the distinctions between pre- and post-modern textuality do not apply to ray 
interaction with Taylor’s writings, it is fair to say that I have attempted to respond to a/theological 
writing a/theologically (and in a microcosmic way, to mystical texts mystically, to confessional 
texts confessionally, etc.), however ambitious, or pretentious, this endeavour might seem.
Paul Ricoeur. The Symbolism o f  Evil. p. 349.
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both literally and figuratively, ^E/erring is endless'' {E, 184) -  for the writing/reading of
Erring is the liturgical perfomiance of the cruci-fiction of the Word. Taylor’s writings,
which he claims are not his own, do not exist until they are put into practice in the praxis
of reading. And yet, this is a ‘reading [which] has no end: I read and reread, each time
seeking the confirmation of a new discovery among the folds of the sentences.
However the confirmation never comes -  it is always deferred. We search amongst the
folds of the text(ile)s and find, exactly, nothing. ‘In other words,’ writes David Jasper,
we read not through the text, somehow consuming it in a search for its 
meaning, but read only by extending in ourselves the very existence of the 
text. In the oxymoronic text the saintly body becomes a total presence 
only in its absolute self-forgetfulness, in pure kenosis, and thus the 
impossible imitatio Christi, an impossibility which we therefore entertain 
in our reading. For in this act of reading, the letters that we see are only 
possible against the greater reality of the pure, blank spaces that allow 
them to become visual. The desert, we may say, is the blank page... '^^ ®
To embark on the journey of reading these hol(e)y scriptures ‘is to follow the sacred by 
denegating God....Erring is the gift of the sacred’s of(f)-erring. The non-place and no­
where of erring is the desert created by the desertion of the sacred’ (AR, 45). This desert 
is a pharmakon, the cur(s)e we need and long for, both a space of endless freedom and a 
scorching, deadly wilderness where travellers are wind-whipped and withered, where the 
ground shifts endlessly underfoot. This is the desert to which we are called again (and 
again, and...). If theory and practice are inseparable, as Taylor believes, this vision of 
erring is not just abstract theory but is concrete, incarnate praxis. It is a ritual, a 
liturgical enactment played out not in the realm of the spiritual but rather in the realm of 
the textual, in the sacred ecclesia of the blank/written page. It is to this place that we 
return to wander, to explore, like children in the crypt of a church-house, simultaneously 
frightened and excited by the thought of what they might encounter in such dark.
Italo Caivino. Winter’s Night, p. 201.
David Jasper. The Sacred Desert, pp. 29-30.
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mysterious spaces. It is a game, a pointless game, a diversion from the proper course. 
‘Strange, that the act of writing should deflect one's ideas so much from their proper 
c o u r s e . I f  ‘The endlessness of erring discloses its unavoidable purposelessness’ {E, 
157), it is a purposelessness that is correlate to gratuity -  the extravagance of grace, 
given freely, without purpose or hope for return; grace that is (a)mazing.
Andrew Cmmey. Music, p. 113.
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V. (Un)Forsaking: A/theology in Abandon
Since abandonment turns away even when it turns toward, 
living with abandon is always a diversion even when it 
seems hopelessly serious....To live (with) indifference is to 
live an infinite detour with abandon. {AR, 253-54)
In(-) conclusion...
In this final section, I hope to draw together the many themes brought forth in the 
preceding pages of this thesis and offer both conclusions and suggestions for further 
exploration. What I mean to suggest by the title of this section is that a/theology 
inevitably ends in abandon. ‘But what does it mean to live (with) abandon(ment)? Who 
abandons? What abandons? Who is abandoned? What is abandoned?’ {AR, 253) Who 
or what finally abandons or is abandoned is uncertain, but this abandonment should not 
be mistaken for failure, for a/theology is not resignedly forsaken but necessarily 
(un)forsaken -  unforsaken by being endlessly forsaken. This, too, is part of the praxis of 
erring: to wander, or limp as the case may be, in the God-forsaken wilderness of the here 
and now is a process of eternal leave-taking wherein we take our leave of God for the 
sake of God, God having taken leave of us. This process is a journey that never ends. 
Along the way, Self, History, all vestiges of certain truth or meaning must be continually 
forsaken, never in a once-and-for-all event, but in an errand on which we must leave over 
and over again. Running (from) this errand accomplishes nothing.
As I have endeavoured to bring this project to an end (although perhaps an end 
that does not imply completion), I have realised that to write about a/theology in a way 
that respects and accounts for the claims a/theology makes has required that I attempt to 
think and write a/theologically. The shape this thesis has taken attests to this. The 
prelude of reading and research led me to outline what I understand to be the overarching
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shape of Taylor’s work, a shape which I then applied to the outline of my own project. 
With this outline in place, I sought to contextualise Taylor’s a/theology in a way that 
makes sense to me as a Christian -  not to commandeer or co-opt one for the other but 
hopefully, in a way that respects and even celebrates difference, recognising the radical 
interrelatedness of a/theology and Christian theology. My attempt to locate the site 
where theology and a/theology converge has led me repeatedly to the cross, the place 
where all opposites finally coincide in the kerygma and the silence that accompanies 
Christ’s death and echoes through the empty tomb. This location shows itself to be (a) 
nowhere, nothing more than a point on a grid where two lines (labelled life/death, 
heaven/earth, God/man, etc.) intersect. This no-where is as small as nothing and as large 
as everything -  it is the site of the sacred, which is both ‘center and circumference of the 
universe,’ the stage upon which this passion(ate) play is set. Here I have realised that 
the tensions that hold a/theology and theology in their dialectical relationship -  
suspended between forces of attraction and repulsion, bound together and yet held apart 
-  are inescapable. Ultimately what Taylor seems to seek is ‘An affirmation that is a 
negation and a negation that is an affnmation [that] would not necessarily reconcile 
opposites but would maintain a tension that would leave everything in suspense’ {RT, 
265). The appropriate response is not to strive to overcome these tensions but to leam to 
live with(in) them. This living within is a “living between,” and is only as real as it is 
performed, and it can only be performed by an act of (dis)embodiment -  in other words, 
on the stage of the page, the writer becomes disembodied so as to allow erring to be 
embodied in writing. This performative quality brings theory to practice by giving text 
to context -  and this seems to be a common misunderstanding o f how a/theology 
functions and what it might accomplish. Not simply endless and meaningless semantic
E. A. Livingstone, op. cit.
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playfulness, a/theological writing forces the reader out of her usual role as interpreter, 
out of her usual conceptual, intellectual mode, and into the role of a practitioner -  in 
sacramental terms, the passive reader becomes an active communicant. By endlessly 
upsetting certainty in deference to play and meaninglessness, a/theology refuses to be 
grasped by anyone unwilling to take the step of faith required to put a/theology into 
practice, which is to say, to live it out. Indeed, it seems to me that one caimot understand 
the claims or contributions a/theology might make to the life of faith without first the 
willingness to abandon certainty and accept the challenge of the journey toward the 
nothingness of death, that coming absence which makes life present, however fleetingly. 
Although it may not be precisely what Mark Taylor means when he describes what it 
means to err or to live erringly, it occurs to me that this is something Jesus understood 
when he said, T f any want to become my followers, let them deny themselves and take 
up their cross daily and follow me. For those who want to save their life will lose it, and 
those who lose their life for my sake will save it’ (Lk. 9:23-24).
In St. Mark’s gospel, we find Jesus in perpetual movement. Although it often 
seems scattered or random -  errant -  in fact Jesus is always journeying toward 
Jerusalem, and what waits for him in Jerusalem is the cross. The cross is the site of the 
crucifixion, and a/theological writing likewise takes the form of a cruci-fiction -  a fiction 
shaped according to the cross, which rejoices in the tension created by such a 
coincidence of opposites. And in this way fictional writing -  such as Joyce’s Finnegans 
Wake, as well as the writing of Borges, Caivino, Cmmey, Auster, Kazantzakis and the 
poetry of Edmond Jabès -  might also be, in a sense, a/theological.'"^^ But is it any more
Although Taylor is an American thinker, American writers certainly do not comer the market on 
the task of a/theological writing. Indeed, the above list of writers includes an Irishman, an 
Argentinian, an Italian, a Scotsman, an American, a Greek and a Frenchman. O f course this list is 
far from exhaustive and cannot even hint at wholeness without more gender diversity. To rectify 
this, I suggest a possible begimiing with the parabolic short works of Isak Dinesen, the
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appropriate to call Jabès’ poetry “fiction” than it is to call the quasi-autobiographical 
novels of Auster or Cmmey “non-fiction”? (And of course to attempt to categorise 
Finnegans Wake as fiction or non-fiction seems wildly impossible, if not simply inane.) 
Also in this way, the a/theological writings o f Mark Taylor or Thomas Altizer (or 
Jacques Derrida, for that matter) are in one sense fictional, for their use of language 
instantiates poiesis. When theological writing ceases to be poetic it also ceases to 
possess any recreational power -  its very language must on one level remain ambiguous 
and resist solidification.'"^"' How then do we determine whether or not (such/any) writing 
is “tme”? Such writing becomes a ‘tme fiction,’ in the sense that Douglas Templeton 
might understand the term, when it is put into practice in the act(s) of writing/reading. 
Therefore I echo his admonition: ‘Let fiction flourish. And then, if they wrote, we must 
write. We must leave the poets -  for our own poetry. The task is not yet finished.’'"'^  
And the task is never finished precisely because to reach an end is impossible. 
When we leam to read and write and live erringly, we discover that the impossible is the 
only thing worth pursuing. It requires ultimate faith to knowingly undertake the pursuit 
of the impossible -  some might even say “foolishness,” but ‘God’s foolishness is wiser 
than human wisdom’ (I Cor. 1:25), and furthermore Christians are called to be ‘fools for 
the sake of Christ’ (I Cor. 4:10). To undertake a task or a journey that is decidedly 
impossible is to accept failure from before the beginning. Ergo, if failure is accepted as
pseudonym of Scandinavian-bom Karen Blixen. Her story “The Blank Page” is an especially 
excellent example of the type of writing I attempt to catalogue here. See Last Tales, pp. 99-105.
hi his unpublished essay “down through all Cluistian minstrelsy: Genesis, Joyce and 
contemporary vocabularies of creation,” David Jasper notes that ‘To read Joyce, it might be said 
then, is only possible when his absolute unreadability is confessed, when reading passes into a 
kind of mysticism’ (p. 4). He later describes this as a quality of Altizer’s writing as well: ‘As in 
Altizer’s most recent book, Godhead and the Nothing (2003), Joyce’s language is hardly 
comprehensible because it is utterly reflexive, utterly absorbed in making all things new. It does 
not seek to mean -  it hardly claims reference in its purpose. It makes a world, though the world 
barely comprehends it...’ (p. 7). I suggest that such description admirably characterises 
a/theological wilting, as the same could be said for Taylor, Derrida, and the other writers 
mentioned above.
Douglas Templeton. The New Testament as True Fiction, p. 311.
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inevitable, it might be celebrated as victory. To accept the impossible is to be indifferent 
to the results. This indifference, like Eckhart’s disinterest, ‘is empty nothingness,’ and 
only the heart that has been emptied out to a state nothingness is prepared for 
communion with the sacred.'"'^ When one learns to live with(in) (in)difference, which is 
to live (with) abandon, one might glimpse (but only for the briefest moment) what it 
means to celebrate these tensions, to rejoice in the mysterion, and to follow after the 
sacred.
Interestingly, almost concurrent with Taylor’s writing o f Erring, a similar but
unrelated project was underway across the Atlantic. Although not translated into English
until 1991, Catholic theologian Jean-Luc Marion’s God Without Being [Dieu sans l'être]
was first published in France in 1982. In this work, Marion undertakes his own sort of
deconstruction of theology by seeking to extract God from essentialist categories of
“being.” By beginning with a God whose very essence, according to scripture and the
incarnate Christ, is love, Marion admonishes us ‘To think God without any conditions,
not even that of Being, hence to think God without pretending to inscribe him or to
describe him as a being.’ The being of God, which is love, is ever emptied -  that is,
God’s love, which is God’s very being, is being ever poured out on behalf of the world.
For what is peculiar to love consists in the fact that it gives itself...
If...God is not because he does not have to be, but loves, then, by 
definition, no condition can continue to restrict his initiative, amplitude, 
and ecstasy. Love loves without condition, simply because it loves; he 
thus loves without limit or restriction....[It] does not mean at all to take; it 
postulates its own giving, giving where the giver strictly coincides with 
the gift, without any restriction, reservation, or mastery. Thus love gives 
itself only in abandoning itself, ceaselessly transgressing the limits of its 
own gift...'"'^
146 Meister Eckliart. A Modern Translation, p. 88. 
Jean-Luc Marion. God Without Being, p. 45. 
Ibid. pp. 47-48.
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This vision of profound and perpetual kenosis is significant, for if God only “exists” 
inasmuch as God is love being given, then for God to exist “for us” is for God to not 
exist at all. Consistent with the incarnation, death and resurrection of Christ, Marion 
provides a useful correction to a lesser view of God that might be captured, understood, 
described -  known, in the first instance, as either this or that. According to a vision of a 
God without Being, to know God is to not know God, or perhaps more appropriately, to 
Mrt-know God -  to labour endlessly to divest oneself of the limited and finally 
insufficient human knowledge of God. This is what Eckhart means by taking leave o f  
God fo r  God's sake, and this is what Taylor means when he writes that ‘Belief in God 
becomes impossible and belief in the impossible unavoidable’ {AR, 31).
While I do not suggest any serendipity or divine providence behind such a 
coincidence (indeed, as Taylor has explained, such nanative coherence is merely a 
fabrication of looking-back), it is not insignificant that Marion undertakes such a project, 
an ocean away from Taylor and his brand of American deconstructionist theology, at 
rouglily the same time. Just as in the mid- to late-1960s, Thomas Altizer and Jacques 
Derrida were at work writing their respective (de)negations -  the “death of God” in the 
case of the former, and the ultimate fallibility of language in the case of the latter -  so 
also Mark Taylor and Jean-Luc Marion take on similar (de)negatory projects. Both 
Taylor and Marion are philosophical theologians, and both have obviously been 
influenced by continental thought, especially that of France’s premier intellectual 
celebrity, Jacques Derrida. But while Marion remains explicitly Christian (as did Altizer 
in his own way), and indeed even decidedly ecclesial inasmuch as Marion is a Catholic 
theologian working within a certain amount of accountability to the Church, Taylor 
appears as his distinctively secular counterpart (just as Derrida appears relatively non- 
theological alongside his contemporary Altizer). In the case of Marion and Taylor, the
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roles are reversed -  in contrast to Denida and Altizer, this time it is the American who is 
a/theological and the French thinker who is overtly theological. Still, both might be 
described as atheistic, albeit uneasily, for at the same time, both thinkers are preoccupied 
with what is at various times called the sacred or the Divine -  in a word, God'"'^ -  
however impossible each finds it to talk about God in any intelligible terms.
It is important to consider, however, that if  a/theology is taken seriously, the line 
that divides the sacred and secular is obscured to the point of invisibility. Throughout 
his career as a scholar, Taylor has focussed his attention on the secular, the ‘Worlds 
beyond the church’ which seem even ‘more fraught with religion than the precincts once 
declared holy’ (RT, 259), exploring the ways in which this outside or ‘beyond’ world 
also actively pursues the sacred. In marked contrast to efforts such as those of Radical 
Orthodoxy, which attempts to erase the boundaries (post)modemity has erected between 
the sacred and the secular by reinstituting the sort of all-encompassing sacrality of 
medieval Christendom, Taylor’s work deconstructs these imaginary boundaries by 
transgressing them, erringly and endlessly. If everything is sacred, then nothing is 
sacred; so also, if everything is secular, then nothing is secular. In other words, Taylor’s 
negative approach -  which imagines God not as nothing nor as everything but as the 
nothing that is everything and the everything that is nothing — demonstrates that both the 
secular and the sacred are human categories that are meaningless in and of themselves, 
that only mean anything at all within a system of differences and negations. Taylor 
writes that ‘God and faith might be a difference that makes no difference’ {RT, 264). 
Arriving at this realisation, it seems that indifference to difference is the only difference
In God Without Being, Marion follows Derrida (who follows Heidegger before him) by putting 
particular terms under erasure -  in this case, God. Throughout most of the text, Marion 
transcribes the “proper” name of the Divine Çtetî- As such, the word 0»<î remains visible, despite 
its having been crossed out -  it is present in its absence. This, of course, bears theological 
significance to the God revealed in Jesus Christ, who is “crossed out” on the cross, emptied of 
being in an act of Divine love. In this way, Marion’s theology, like Altizer’s, is profoundly 
incamational. In short, for God to be God, God must become Gtÿd on the cross.
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that would make a difference. Such indifference is abandonment, a forsaking of the 
stmctures that inevitably deconstmct -  God, Self, History and Book.
And Taylor’s work embodies these very characteristics -  indifference, 
abandonment, forsakenness. As I have suggested before, let me now state explicitly that 
the necessary out-playing of a/theology is the eventual deconstruction of a/theology itself 
-  for if  a/theology is always already present within theology, ergo if theology is subject 
to deconstruction, so also is a/theology as that deconstructive force. Therefore, 
a/theology reaches a certain end that appears as failure, but as this is its stated aim from 
the beginning, such failure is its success. By inscribing these qualities, a/theology -  the 
praxis of which is erring -  affords a number of opportunities for the future o f theological 
thinking. First, by attending to the terms and voices that have been excluded and 
marginalised by logocentric hierarchies, an a/theological perspective recognises that ‘The 
task of thinking at the end of theology is to think what theology has left unthought by 
repeatedly refiguring interfaces that cannot be figured. Such thinking or not-thinking is a 
thinking-not, which is forever kept in motion by a desire that knows it is wanting but 
knows not what it wants’ {RT, 275-76). In this way, it is possible to see the future of 
theology that lies beyond what oftentimes appears to be the end of theology. 
Deconstruction creates the opening which allows the possibility for reconstruction. This 
has been Taylor’s task throughout his writing career, as indicated when he writes: ‘I 
decided to undertake the seemingly impossible task of appropriating deconstructive 
philosophy to write a “constructive” a/theology’ {RT, 267). To understand 
deconstruction as simply a nihilistic force which uproots any certainty of meaning is to 
betray only a partial understanding of the merits of deconstruction. While the tendency 
toward this misconception is fairly common, I hope that in some way this project has 
demonstrated the possibility of a more holistic view.
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Second, Taylor’s work inscribes the possibility of being decisively post- in all of 
its multifarious ways -/?o5r-modem,/>o5Ufoundational,/705Uecclesial... perhaps even 
/706'AChristian or /?o5/-theological. The sort of anamnesis that a/theology relies upon 
looks forwai'd whilst simultaneously looking back, not to a time unlike ours (as might be 
the view of the /?o.sr-secular approaches o f John Milbank or Phillip B l o n d ' b u t  to a 
now that ever is and is all in all. In this sense, Taylor’s a/theology is alsopo^Asecular 
and po.s’Z-sacred in a way that a radical orthodox approach cannot be. By being 
thoroughly post-, Taylor is able to move beyond by moving through, taking into account 
particular theological/philosophical developments (e.g. Augustine’s reflexivity,
Descartes’ radicalised doubt, etc.) without being encumbered by a false notion of 
“progress.” A/theology is not necessarily a radical heterodoxy and is not located at the 
extreme end of a continuum opposite Radical Orthodoxy at the other extreme. Neither is 
a/theology a radical theology identical to or derivative of (although related and indebted 
to) Altizer and Hamilton’s “death of God.” Rather, a/theology is perhaps most able to 
deal with the contemporary post- age because it is a po^'rttheology -  a theology of 
transition, o f beyond...of erring. Hence it might be argued that a/theology is radical by 
not being radical, but by radicalising (the) not, by being radically not theology (which is 
radical by being both theology and not theology simultaneously).
Additionally, a/theology when carried out becomes necessarily interdisciplinary, 
which is also to say interrelational, as evidenced by Taylor’s own traversal into the 
fields of literature, art, architecture, science, technology, and most recently economics. 
By looking away from the Church and toward the cultural foims and structures (sutures?) 
that stitch us together, Taylor finds his ‘third alternative that neither mediates nor 
synthesizes unity and difference and yet opens the space and provides the time for
See John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, and Phillip Blond, ed., Post-Secular 
Philosophy.
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connections and associations that create and sustain differences’ {RT, 274). By exploring 
how the sacred might be at work in such religious, non-religious and quasi-religious 
forms, we discover the ethical imperative of deconstruction and of a deconstmctive 
a/theology by recognizing ‘the difference that would make a difference’ {RT, 265).
I feel it is appropriate to close this dissertation by referring to one of Taylor’s
most recently published pieces of writing. It should be apparent by now that Taylor is
inextricably linked not only to deconstructive philosophy but also to Jacques Derrida
himself. Following his death in October 2004, the New York Times published a eulogy
for Derrida written by Taylor. In extraordinarily accessible terms, Taylor clarifies some
common misconceptions about deconstruction and describes the value not only of
Derrida’s intellectual contributions but also of the merits of the man himself. Taylor
inadvertently argues for the ethical value o f his own work when he asserts that, ‘By
struggling to find ways to overcome patterns that exclude the differences that make life
worth living, [Derrida] developed a vision that is consistently ethical.’'^' Taylor also
writes of Derrida’s twilight preoccupation with religion as perhaps his most significant
contribution to the present post~a.gQ. Just as every positive requires a negative (and vice
versa), Taylor writes that, for Derrida,
Belief not tempered by doubt poses a mortal danger....Fortunately, 
[Derrida] also taught us that the alternative to blind belief is not simply 
unbelief but a different kind of belief - one that embraces uncertainty and 
enables us to respect others whom we do not understand. In a complex 
world, wisdom is knowing what we don’t know so that we can keep the 
future open.'^^
When we reach the end, we realise that by reading, writing, remembering without end, 
the future remains radically open to the (im)possibility of the redemption that is only 
possible through commun(icat)ion with ©sd!.
Mark C. Taylor. “What Derrida Really Meant.” {Online Source) 
Ibid.
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